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INTRODUCTION 
(i) FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 
Before we proceed to examine the constitutional provisions relating 
to freedom of the press in India, it is necessary to investigate what is 
meant by the expression "freedom of the press" in this context. 
When the Indian Press Commission was appointed by the Central 
Government in 1952, it was required to examine, among other things, 
"freedom of the press and repeal or amendment of laws not in conso-
nance with it."1 The Commission therefore attempted to indicate the 
connotation of the expression freedom of the press. It said: "The ex-
pression "freedom of the press" has been understood in various senses 
by different persons. It is sometimes confused with the idea of the 
independence of the press. We think that the expression should be 
understood as meaning freedom to hold opinions, to receive and impart 
information through the printed word, without any interference from 
any public authority."2 It is in this sense that the expression is used 
in this study. 
(Ü) JUDICIAL OPINIONS IN INDIA 
There is not an abundance of authority in India on the concept of 
freedom of the press. The Constitution guarantees to all citizens free-
dom of speech and expression, but the nature, scope and extent of the 
fundamental right have not been exhaustively commented upon by 
the Courts. A few ideas on this right, however, clearly emerge from the 
observations of the Courts. 
In the first case involving an interpretation of the guaranteed right, 
Patanjali Sastri, J., (as he then was) of the Supreme Court said: "There 
1
 Notification dated September 23, 1952, issued by the Government of India, Ministry 
of Information and Broadcasting. 
* Press Commission, Report, Par t I, paragraph 1453. The Commission on freedom of 
the Press in the United States, while stressing for the press freedom from various 
external compulsions and freedom for the achievement of its conception of service, 
admitted that "freedom of the press is most commonly thought of in relation to the 
activities of the government." (A Free and Responsible Press, p . 79) 
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can be no doubt that freedom of speech and expression includes free­
dom of propagation of ideas, and that freedom is ensured by the 
freedom of circulation. Liberty of circulation is as essential to that 
freedom as the liberty of publication. Indeed, without circulation the 
publication would be of little value."3 
In the second case the same learned Judge observed: "... liberty of 
the press... is an essential part of the right to freedom of speech 
and expression declared by Article 19(1) (a)"4 of the Indian Constitu­
tion. 
Interpreting the words "freedom of speech and expression" in the 
Article, the Madras High Court observed that "the term 'freedom of 
speech and expression' would include the liberty to propagate not only 
one's own views but also the right to print matters which are not one's 
own but have either been borrowed from some one else or are printed 
under the direction of that person."6 
(ІІІ) JUDICIAL OPINIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the absence of authority in Indian judicial decisions, it is not 
uncommon for Indian Courts to look for light and leading in the pro­
nouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States, especially in 
matters involving interpretation of certain constitutional provisions.· 
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court on the subject of 
freedom of the press would indicate : 
(i) freedom of speech and freedom of the press are fundamental 
personal rights of the citizen ;7 
(ii) the exercise of these freedoms is the foundation of free govern­
ment by free men;8 
* Romesh Thappar ν State of Madras, 1950 S.C R 594 a t 597 
« Bnj Bhusman v. State of Delhi, 1950 S C R . 605 a t 608 
4
 Srtmvas В hat v. State of Madras, A I R (1951) Madras 70 a t 73 
' In Express Newspapers ν Union of India, the Supreme Court of India said " I t is 
trite to observe that the fundamental right to the freedom of speech and expression 
enshrined in Article 19(1) (a) of our Constitution is based on these provisions in Amend­
ment I of the Constitution of the United States of America and it would be therefore 
legitimate and proper to refer to these decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States of America m order to appreciate the true nature, scope and extent of this right 
in spite of the warning administered by this Court against the use of Amencan and other 
cases " (1958 S С J 1113 a t 1157-58) Note also the observation ' Our Constitution has 
drawn freely inter aha upon the Constitution of the United States" (Bhagwati, J , in 
Bengal Immumity Company ν State of Bihar, 1955 S С J 672 at 714). 
' Schneider v. Irvtngton, (1939) 308 U S 147 a t 160 
" id at 161 
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(ш) the State is foreclosed from assuming a guardianship of the 
public mind through regulating the press:9 
(iv) freedom of the press assumes that the widest possible dissemi­
nation of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential 
to the welfare of the public ;1 0 
(v) freedom of the press involves the freedom to employ the neces­
sary means of exercising the nght, for instance, freedom from restraint 
in respect of employment of the editorial force.11 
According to this concept of freedom of speech and of the press 
obtaining in the United States, no measure can be enacted which would 
have the effect of imposing prior censorship,12 reducing circulation,13 
or restricting the employment or non-employment of the editorial 
staff.14 If any such measure happened to be passed, it would be struck 
down as constitutionally invalid, on the ground that it would infringe 
the right to freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the First 
Amendment. This concept of freedom cannot be stretched so far as to 
make the press immune from the apphcation of general laws,15 for 
instance, laws relating to industrial relations or the ordinary forms of 
taxation. In Grosjean v. American Press Company,16 it was observed : 
T h e p r e d o m i n a n t purpose of t h e g r a n t of i m m u n i t y here invoked was t o 
preserve a n u n t r a m m e l l e d press as a vocal source of publ ic information T h e 
newspapers, magazines a n d o t h e r journals of t h e country, i t is safe t o say, h a v e 
shed a n d cont inue t o shed, m o r e l ight on t h e publ ic a n d business aflairs of t h e 
n a t i o n t h a n a n y o t h e r i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y of publ ic i ty ; a n d since informed publ ic 
o p i m o n is t h e m o s t p o t e n t of all res t ra ints u p o n m i s g o v e m m e n t , t h e suppression 
or a b r i d g e m e n t of t h e publ ic i ty afforded b y a free press c a n n o t be regarded 
otherwise t h a n wi th grave concern T h e t a x here involved is b a d . because in 
t h e l ight of i ts h i s tory a n d of i ts present sett ing, i t is seen t o be a del iberate a n d 
calculated device in t h e guise of a t a x t o l imit t h e c irculat ion of information t o 
which t h e publ ic is ent i t led m v i r t u e of t h e const i tu t ional guarantees A free 
press s t a n d s as one of t h e interpreters between t h e G o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e people. 
T o allow i t t o be fettered is t o fetter ourselves. 
• Thomas ν Colhns (1945) 323 U S 516 at 544 
1 0
 Associated Press ν Umted States, (1945) 326 U S I 
1 1
 Associated Press ν National Labour Relations Board, (1936) 301 U S 103 at 140. 
1 2
 Lovell ν Griffin (193Θ) 303 U S 444 at 451 
» Re Jackson, (1878) 96 U S 727 
1 4
 Associated Press ν National Labour Relations Board, (1936) 301 U S 103 
" ibid 
" (1935) 297 U S 233 at 250 The case was concerned, among other things, with the 
question whether the First Amendment provided protection against a licence tax levied 
for "selling, or making any charge for, advertising " Sutherland, J , in his opinion, 
related how m England in the 18th century the imposition of taxes had been used for 
the purpose of gagging the press, and expressed the view that such "modes of restraint" 
as the one involved in the case were inhibited by the constitutional provision 
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It was held in The Associated Press v. National Labour Relations 
Board17 that the provisions of the National Labour Relations Act which 
inhibited an employer from discharging an employee on account of 
union activities would be applicable in the case of an editor. The Court 
characterised as an "unsound generalisation," having no relevance to 
the circumstances of the present case, the contention that any pro-
tective regulation of union activities or the right to collective bargain-
ing on the part of such employees was necessarily an invalid invasion 
of the freedom of the press. Thus the application to newspapers of the 
anti-trust laws, the minimum wage laws, or the Fair Labour Standards 
Act does not abridge freedom of the press. 
(iv) FURTHER JUDICIAL OPINIONS IN INDIA 
Citing with approval these decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, Bhagwati, J., of the Indian Supreme Court has observed 
that while no immunity from the general laws can be claimed by the 
press, 
it would certainly not be legitimate to subject the press to laws which take 
away or abridge the freedom of speech and expression or which would curtail 
circulation and thereby narrow the scope of dissemination of information, or 
fetter its freedom to choose its means of exercising the right or would undermine 
its independence by driving it to seek government aid. Laws which single out 
the press for laying upon it excessive and prohibitive burdens which would 
restrict the circulation, impose a penalty on its right to choose the instruments 
for its exercise or to seek an alternative media, prevent newspapers from 
being started and ultimately drive the press to seek government aid in order 
to survive, would therefore be struck down as unconstitutional.19 
Such laws would not be saved by the permissible restrictions contem-
plated in Article 19(2) of the Constitution. 
Thus, freedom of the press does not mean that the general laws of 
the country should be inapplicable to the press ; nor does it mean that 
special laws should not be adopted governing certain types of utter-
ances.19 But the laws applicable to the press, whether general or special, 
should not be unduly repressive or restrictive, and, in particular, 
should not subject the press to the control of the executive. "The fact 
that the press is only subject to the ordinary law of the land may not 
" (1936) 301 U.S. 103 
18
 Express Newspapers v. Union of India, 1958 S.C.J. 1113 at 1161 
" This was pointed out by the Commission on the Freedom of the Press in the United 
States. (A Free and Responsible Press, p. 81) 
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in itself be sufficient if these laws are themselves repressive and par­
ticularly affect the press in practice... The existence of special press 
laws may or may not be a restriction on freedom according to the 
content of these laws."20 
Again, freedom of the press does not mean that the press is free 
from responsibility in the exercise of its freedom.21 A free press must 
be responsible to society for promoting the general interests of the 
public, including the maintenance of the rights of citizens.22 The 
Supreme Court of India has observed that the advertising of pro­
hibited drugs or commodities of which the sale is not in the interests 
of the general public cannot be speech within the meaning of freedom 
of speech contemplated in the Indian Constitution.23 It has been de­
cided by the Court that commercial advertisements do not fall within 
the concept of freedom of speech, for the object of such advertisements 
is "not propagation of ideas, social, political, or economic, or further­
ance of literature or human thought," but the commendation of the 
efficacy, value or importance of the advertised article. Quoting with 
approval the observations of Roberts, J., of the United States Supreme 
Court to the effect that the United States Constitution imposed no 
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising,24 
Kapur, J., said that commercial advertisement was a part of business 
and that it was being used for the purpose of furthering the business 
of the person concerned and "had no relationship with what may be 
called the essential concept of the freedom of speech."26 
It appears from the above observations that the Indian Supreme 
Court is inclined to adopt the concept of press freedom envisaged in 
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. 
4 0
 D. C. Holland, Freedom of the Press in the Commonwealth, Current Legal Problems, 
Vol. I X (1956) p. 186. 
8 1
 While emphasising the point that freedom of the press is not a freedom from 
responsibility for its exercise, it has been said in the United States: "That there was 
such a legal liability was so taken for granted by the framers of the First Amendment 
t h a t it was not spelled out." (Frankfurter, J., in Pennekatnp v. State of Florida, (1946) 
328 U S . 331 
2 1
 The interests of the community seem to have been given legitimate emphasis in 
the Dutch Staatsregeling of 1798. Article 16 of the Staatsregeling begins with the decla­
ration that "Every citizen may utter and spread his sentiments in whatever way he 
sees fit, which is not inconsistent with the purpose of the community." (emphasis added) 
2 5
 Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, 1960 S.C.J. 611 
" Valentine ν Chrestenson, (1942) 316 U.S. 52 
2 5
 Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, 1960 S.C.J. 611 at 621 
CHAPTER I 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
(І) GUARANTEE OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
The Constitution of India, unlike its predecessor, the Government 
of India Act, 1935, enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, 
was adopted, enacted and given to themselves by the people of India 
with a view to constituting India into a sovereign democratic republic 
and to securing, among other things, liberty of thought and expression 
for all its citizens.1 Part III of this basic law deals with fundamental 
rights; it contains, to quote the Supreme Court of India, "the express 
constitutional provisions limiting the legislative powers and controlling 
the temporary will of the majority by a permanent and paramount 
law settled by the deliberate wisdom of the nation."2 Some of these 
rights are guaranteed to the citizens only, while others, like protection 
of life and personal liberty, are guaranteed to all persons, whether 
citizens or aliens, residing within the territory of India and subject to its 
j urisdiction. Article 19 in this Part guarantees to all citizens what Indian 
legal literature usually calls the seven freedoms, namely, freedom of 
speech and expression, of assembly, of association, of movement, of resi­
dence, of ownership and disposal of property, and of profession or occupa­
tion. This Article declares and protects "those great and basic rights 
which are recognised and guaranteed as the natural rights inherent in the 
status of a citizen of a free country."3 But individual rights of an 
absolute nature cannot exist in a modern state. "The liberty of the 
individual to do as he pleases, even in innocent matters, is not absolute. 
It must frequently yield to the common good."4 Hence the scope of the 
civil rights guaranteed by the article has been limited by certain re­
strictions contemplated in the article itself. Let us consider as an 
example the first of the seven freedoms, namely, freedom of speech 
and expression, with which we are mainly concerned in the following 
1
 See Preamble 
« A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, (1950) S.C.J. 174 
» State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal, (1954) S.C.R. 65 at 74 
* Adkins v. Children's Hospital, (1923) 261 U.S. 525 
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pages, as freedom of expression includes freedom of the press.5 The 
Article in part states: 
"19(1). All citizens shall have the right 
(a) to freedom of speech and expression..." 
This apparently unhmited freedom is restricted by clause (2) of the 
article which says, 
"Nothing in subclause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of 
any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far 
as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right 
conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the security of the 
State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or 
morality, or in relation to centempt of court, defamation or incitement 
to an offence." Thus the Constitution first guarantees a right, then 
permits the State, as an exception, to make laws for some specified 
purposes, and then imposes further restrictions on the permissible 
subjects, as exception to the exceptions, in so far as all exceptions are 
required to be reasonable. 
In the United States, where no limitations were imposed by the first 
ten Amendments of the Constitution, the Supreme Court invented the 
doctrine of the police powers of the State, which meant in substance 
that the State had the inherent power to impose such restrictions as 
were necessary to protect the common good, for example, public health, 
safety and morals. The police power "is the governmental power of 
self-protection and permits reasonable regulation of rights and property 
in particulars essential to the preservation of the community from 
injury."5" It is to secure general convenience, prosperity and welfare.6 
As the Constitution of India, after having guaranteed a civil right, 
mentions the permissible restrictions on that right, it has not been 
necessary for the courts in India to develop any doctrine similar to 
that of the police power of the State in the United States. 
It is of interest to note that the permissible restrictions on freedom 
of speech and expression in India were not exactly the same as given 
above when the Constitution was first adopted in 1949. Sub-clause (2) 
of Article 19 in its present form is the result of the First Amendment 
of the Constitution in 1951. This amendment is considered to have 
a
n necessitated by the interpretation given by the Courts in India 
•e sub-clause as it then stood. The sub-clause was as follows: 
berty of the press .. is included in the right of freedom of speech and expression 
ed by Article 19(1) (a)" Bnj Bhushan v.State of Delhi, (1950) S C J 425 at 426 
handle Pipeline v. State Hhghway, (1935) 79 L Ed. 1090 at p. 1097 
.k ν Richmond, (1912) 226 U.S. 137 
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"(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation 
of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from 
making any law relating to libel, slander, defamation, contempt of 
Court or any matter which offends against decency or morality or 
which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State." 
In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras7 the validity of the Madras 
Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, was challenged. Section 9 ( 1 A) of 
the Act authorised the Provincial Government "for the purpose of secu­
ring the public safety or the maintenance of public order, to prohibit or 
regulate the entry into or the circulation, sale, or distribution in the 
Province of Madras or any part thereof of any document or class of 
documents." Under this provision, the Governor of Madras, being 
satisfied that "for the purpose of securing the public safety and the 
maintenance of public order" it was necessary to do so, prohibited by 
order the entry into and the circulation, sale and distribution in the 
State, of the Cross Roads, an English weekly published from Bombay. 
In Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi8 a pre-censorship order against 
"The Organiser" an English weekly from Delhi, was challenged. The 
order directed the publisher and the editor of the weekly "to submit 
for scrutiny, in dupUcate, before pubUcation, till further orders, all 
communal matter and news and views about Pakistan including photo­
graphs and cartoons other than those derived from official sources or 
supplied by the news agencies." This order was passed under the 
powers granted by Section 7(1) (c) of the East Panjab Public Safety 
Act, 1949, which provided that the "Provincial Government or any 
authority authorised by it in this behalf, if satisfied that such action 
is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity 
prejudicial to the public safety, or the maintenance of public order may, 
by order in writing, addressed to a printer, publisher or editor... (c) 
require that any matter relating to a particular subject or class of 
subjects shall before publication be submitted for scrutiny." 
In both the cases the decision of the Supreme Court centred on the 
constitutionality of the enabling statutes rather than the validity of 
the executive action taken. The Court held that the expressions "public 
order" and "public safety" covered much wider fields than were 
contemplated by the use of the words, "undermines the security of, ' 
tends to overthrow the State" in the Constitution. The learned ju' 
expressed the view that in many circumstances and on most оссэ 
' (1950) S.C.J. 418 
8
 (1950) S.C.J. 425 
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a danger to public order or public safety would also be a danger to the 
security of the State, but that many acts prejudicial to public order 
or public safety would not be as grave as to endanger the security of 
the State. The constitutional provision justifying legislative abridge­
ment of freedom of expression would cover only those grave offences 
against public order which would endanger the security of the State, 
and not all offences against public order. 
Patanjali Sastri, J., delivering the opinion of the majority of the 
Court in Romesh Thappar's case observed: 
"The Constitution... has placed in a distinct category those offences 
against public order which aim at undermining the security of the 
State or overthrowing it, and made their prevention the sole justifi­
cation for legislative abridgement of freedom of speech and expression, 
that is to say, nothing less than endangering the foundations of the 
State or threatening its overthrow could justify curtailment of rights 
to freedom of speech and expression..."9 
The Court found that it was impossible to apply the doctrine of 
severability and to save part of the statute by severing it from the 
other provisions which were declared ultra vires. "Where a law purports 
to authorise the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in 
language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without 
the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting 
such right, it is not possible to uphold it even so far as it may be applied 
within the constitutional limit, as it is not severable."10 
Some of the High Courts interpreted the decision to mean that an 
impugned law restraining freedom of speech and expression would be 
invaUd unless it was directed solely against speech or expression under­
mining the security of the State or tending to overthrow it. They came 
to this conclusion by putting special emphasis on the word "solely" 
in the following extract from the judgement in Romesh Thappar's case. 
"We are therefore of the opinion that unless a law restricting freedom 
of speech and expression is directed solely against undermining the 
security of the State or the overthrow of it such law cannot fall within 
the reservation under clause (2) of Article 19, although the restrictions 
which it seeks to impose may have been conceived generally in the 
Ь : »rests of public order. It follows that Section 9(1 A) which authorises 
to tuition of restrictions for the wider purpose of securing public 
* "L.or the maintenance of public order falls outside the scope of 
guaraní. 
м
 Par,3.c.J. 418 at 423 
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authorised restrictions under clause (2) and is therefore void and un-
constitutional."11 
The ratio decidendi of the judgement would seem to be that re-
strictions on the right to freedom of speech and expression could not 
be justified unless the danger that the exercise of the right was likely 
to create would be so serious as to undermine the security of the State 
or tend to overthrow it. In other words, what the Supreme Court held 
was that a statute seeking to restrict freedom of speech and expression 
for the purpose of maintaining public order or ensuring public safety 
could not be considered valid in as much as it purported to impose 
restrictions for a more comprehensive and wider purpose than contem-
plated by the constitutional provision which delimited the sphere of 
legislative abridgement by the words "undermines the security of, or 
tends to overthrow, the State." 
Not only did some of the High Courts misread the ratio decidendi, 
but they went further and made strange deductions from the judge-
ment. The decision of the Patna High Court in In re Bharati Press12 is 
illustrative of the view taken by the High Courts. In that case a Special 
Bench of the Patna High Court considered the validity of section 4(1) (a) 
of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, which sought to re-
strict the publication of any newspaper or other document inciting to 
or encouraging "the commission of any offence of murder or any 
cognizable offence involving violence." As the decisions of the Supreme 
Court are binding on the High Courts, Sarjoo Prasad and Ramaswami, 
J., felt that they had no alternative but to hold that the law was 
ultra vires the Constitution as it was not solely directed to the security 
of the State or the protection of its foundations. The way Sarjoo 
Prasad, J., read the ratio of the Supreme Court decision constrained 
him to observe, albeit reluctantly, that, "if a person were to go on 
inciting murder or other cognizable offences either through the press 
or through word of mouth he would be free to do so with impunity in 
as much as he would claim the privilege of exercising his fundamental 
right of freedom of speech and expression."13 
The validity of the same provision of the Act was challenged before 
the Madras High Court in Srinivas Bhatt v. State of Madras™ twenty 
days after the judgement in the Bharati Press case had been handed 
down. Though its validity was upheld by a majority of two to one, 
» ibid. 
" A.I.R. 1951 Patna 12 
11
 id. at page 21 
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pages, as freedom of expression includes freedom of the press.5 The 
Article in part states : 
"19(1). All citizens shall have the right 
(a) to freedom of speech and expression..." 
This apparently unlimited freedom is restricted by clause (2) of the 
article which says, 
"Nothing in subclause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of 
any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far 
as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right 
conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the security of the 
State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or 
morality, or in relation to centempt of court, defamation or incitement 
to an offence." Thus the Constitution first guarantees a right, then 
permits the State, as an exception, to make laws for some specified 
purposes, and then imposes further restrictions on the permissible 
subjects, as exception to the exceptions, in so far as all exceptions are 
required to be reasonable. 
In the United States, where no limitations were imposed by the first 
ten Amendments of the Constitution, the Supreme Court invented the 
doctrine of the police powers of the State, which meant in substance 
that the State had the inherent power to impose such restrictions as 
were necessary to protect the common good, for example, public health, 
safety and morals. The police power "is the governmental power of 
self-protection and permits reasonable regulation of rights and property 
in particulars essential to the preservation of the community from 
injury."5" It is to secure general convenience, prosperity and welfare.' 
As the Constitution of India, after having guaranteed a civil right, 
mentions the permissible restrictions on that right, it has not been 
necessary for the courts in India to develop any doctrine similar to 
that of the police power of the State in the United States. 
I t is of interest to note that the permissible restrictions on freedom 
of speech and expression in India were not exactly the same as given 
above when the Constitution was first adopted in 1949. Sub-clause (2) 
of Article 19 in its present form is the result of the First Amendment 
of the Constitution in 1951. This amendment is considered to have 
been necessitated by the interpretation given by the Courts in India 
to tbe sub-clause as it then stood. The sub-clause was as follows: 
5
 "Liberty of the press... is included in the right of freedom of speech and expression 
guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a)" Brij Bkushan v. State of Delhi, (1950) S.C.J. 425 at 426 
·» Panhandle Pipeline v. State Htighway, (1935) 79 L. Ed. 1090 at p. 1097 
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"(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation 
of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from 
making any law relating to libel, slander, defamation, contempt of 
Court or any matter which offends against decency or morality or 
which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State." 
In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras7 the validity of the Madras 
Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, was challenged. Section 9 (1 A) of 
the Act authorised the Provincial Government "for the purpose of secu­
ring the public safety or the maintenance of public order, to prohibit or 
regulate the entry into or the circulation, sale, or distribution in the 
Province of Madras or any part thereof of any document or class of 
documents." Under this provision, the Governor of Madras, being 
satisfied that "for the purpose of securing the public safety and the 
maintenance of public order" it was necessary to do so, prohibited by 
order the entry into and the circulation, sale and distribution in the 
State, of the Cross Roads, an English weekly published from Bombay. 
In Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi6 a pre-censorship order against 
"The Organiser" an EngUsh weekly from Delhi, was challenged. The 
order directed the pubhsher and the editor of the weekly "to submit 
for scrutiny, in duplicate, before publication, till further orders, all 
communal matter and news and views about Pakistan including photo­
graphs and cartoons other than those derived from official sources or 
supplied by the news agencies." This order was passed under the 
powers granted by Section 7(1) (c) of the East Panjab Public Safety 
Act, 1949, which provided that the "Provincial Government or any 
authority authorised by it in this behalf, if satisfied that such action 
is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity 
prejudicial to the public safety, or the maintenance of public order may, 
by order in writing, addressed to a printer, publisher or editor... (c) 
require that any matter relating to a particular subject or class of 
subjects shall before publication be submitted for scrutiny." 
In both the cases the decision of the Supreme Court centred on the 
constitutionality of the enabling statutes rather than the validity of 
the executive action taken. The Court held that the expressions "public 
order" and "public safety" covered much wider fields than were 
contemplated by the use of the words, "undermines the security of, or 
tends to overthrow the State" in the Constitution. The learned judges 
expressed the view that in many circumstances and on most occasions 
' (1950) S.C.J. 418 
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a danger to public order or public safety would also be a danger to the 
security of the State, but that many acts prejudicial to public order 
or public safety would not be as grave as to endanger the security of 
the State. The constitutional provision justifying legislative abridge-
ment of freedom of expression would cover only those grave offences 
against public order which would endanger the security of the State, 
and not all offences against public order, 
PatanjaU Sastri, J., delivering the opinion of the majority of the 
Court in Romesh Thappar's case observed : 
"The Constitution... has placed in a distinct category those offences 
against public order which aim at undermining the security of the 
State or overthrowing it, and made their prevention the sole justifi-
cation for legislative abridgement of freedom of speech and expression, 
that is to say, nothing less than endangering the foundations of the 
State or threatening its overthrow could justify curtailment of rights 
to freedom of speech and expression..."8 
The Court found that it was impossible to apply the doctrine of 
severability and to save part of the statute by severing it from the 
other provisions which were declared ultra vires. "Where a law purports 
to authorise the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in 
language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without 
the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting 
such right, it is not possible to uphold it even so far as it may be applied 
within the constitutional limit, as it is not severable."10 
Some of the High Courts interpreted the decision to mean that an 
impugned law restraining freedom of speech and expression would be 
invalid unless it was directed solely against speech or expression under-
mining the security of the State or tending to overthrow it. They came 
to this conclusion by putting special emphasis on the word "solely" 
in the following extract from the judgement in Romesh Thappar's case. 
"We are therefore of the opinion that unless a law restricting freedom 
of speech and expression is directed solely against undermining the 
security of the State or the overthrow of it such law cannot fall within 
the reservation under clause (2) of Article 19, although the restrictions 
which it seeks to impose may have been conceived generally in the 
interests of public order. It follows that Section 9(1 A) which authorises 
imposition of restrictions for the wider purpose of securing public 
safety or the maintenance of public order falls outside the scope of 
• 1950 S.CJ. 418 at 423 
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authorised restrictions under clause (2) and is therefore void and un-
constitutional."11 
The ratio decidendi of the judgement would seem to be that re-
strictions on the right to freedom of speech and expression could not 
be justified unless the danger that the exercise of the right was likely 
to create would be so serious as to undermine the security of the State 
or tend to overthrow it. In other words, what the Supreme Court held 
was that a statute seeking to restrict freedom of speech and expression 
for the purpose of maintaining public order or ensuring public safety 
could not be considered valid in as much as it purported to impose 
restrictions for a more comprehensive and wider purpose than contem-
plated by the constitutional provision which delimited the sphere of 
legislative abridgement by the words "undermines the security of, or 
tends to overthrow, the State." 
Not only did some of the High Courts misread the ratio decidendi, 
but they went further and made strange deductions from the judge-
ment. The decision of the Patna High Court in In re Bharati Press12 is 
illustrative of the view taken by the High Courts. In that case a Special 
Bench of the Patna High Court considered the validity of section 4(1) (a) 
of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, which sought to re-
strict the publication of any newspaper or other document inciting to 
or encouraging "the commission of any offence of murder or any 
cognizable offence involving violence." As the decisions of the Supreme 
Court are binding on the High Courts, Sarjoo Prasad and Ramaswami, 
J., felt that they had no alternative but to hold that the law was 
ultra vires the Constitution as it was not solely directed to the security 
of the State or the protection of its foundations. The way Sarjoo 
Prasad, J., read the ratio of the Supreme Court decision constrained 
him to observe, albeit reluctantly, that, "if a person were to go on 
inciting murder or other cognizable offences either through the press 
or through word of mouth he would be free to do so with impunity in 
as much as he would claim the privilege of exercising his fundamental 
right of freedom of speech and expression."13 
The validity of the same provision of the Act was challenged before 
the Madras High Court in Srinivas Bhatt v. State of Madras,11 twenty 
days after the judgement in the Bharati Press case had been handed 
down. Though its validity was upheld by a majority of two to one, 
11
 ibid. 
» A.I.R. 1951 Patna 12 
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 id. at page 21 
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Govinda Menon, J., commenting that "It is very difficult to postulate 
with any definiteness that the classes of offences mentioned in section 
4(1) (a) will not undermine the security of State or may not tend to 
overthrow it,"1B it is intriguing to see that Panchapagesa Sastri, J., 
expressed an opinion very similar to that of Sarjoo Prasad, J., in the 
Bharati Press case. "Publications which incite murder of some indi-
viduals or incite cognizable offences involving violence are not always 
such as may be described to undermine the security of or tend to 
overthrow the State."19 
In another case17 the Madras High Court declared void section 3 of 
the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, on the same grounds as in the 
Supreme Court decisions, as interpreted by the High Court. 
The Panjab High Court declared invalid section 4(1) (h) of the same 
Act holding that the provision in the sub-clause was not solely directed 
to the security of the State or the protection of its foundations. Kapoor, 
J., who dissented from the majority view suggested that the obser-
vations of Patanjali Sastri, J., could be confined to the facts of Romesh 
Thappar's case. 
The Saurashtra High Court also followed the lead given by the 
decision in the Patna case when the validity of a legislative provision 
authorising the Chief Secretary of the State to subject "any matter 
relating to the present disturbances in Rajkot" to precensorship was 
challenged before it. The Court observed: 
"The words 'security of the State' are not to be found in the amended 
section 6-A, with the result that the two decisions of the Supreme 
Court shall apply, as there is no question of the security of the State 
being affected if the precensorship order were not made."18 
The Court held that the provision would be ultra vires "because the 
words security of State are not there."19 
It appeared that any legislative provision restrictive of freedom of 
speech and expression in the interests of public safety would be con-
sidered ultra vires, unless the words security of State were not incorpo-
rated in the text of the statute. 
Alarmed by these deductions drawn by the High Courts from the 
Supreme Court judgement, the Law Minister of the Union Government 
» A.I.R. 1951 Madras 70 
" idem at p. 73 
16
 idem at p. 78 
17
 Pattammal v. Chief Presidency Magistrate, Egmore, A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 950 
»
e
 Amarnath Bali v. The State. A.I.R. 1951 Panjab 18 
" Indu Kumar Shankerlal Saherwala v. The State, A.I.R. 1951 Saura. 9 
» ibid. 
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hastened to propose an amendment to the Constitution without waiting 
to hear from the Supreme Court when the High Court decisions came 
to be considered by it in appeal. 
When the decision in the Bharati Press case went up in appeal, the 
Supreme Court observed that "the decisions of this Court in Romesh 
Thappar's case and in Brij Bhushan's case have been more than once 
misapplied and misunderstood and have been construed as laying down 
the wide proposition that restrictions of the nature imposed by section 
4(1) (a) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, or of similar 
character are outside the scope of Article 19(2) of the Constitution in 
as much as they are conceived generally in the interests of public 
order."20 The Court proceeded to observe that "It is plain that speeches 
or expressions on the part of an individual which incite to or encourage 
commission of violent crimes such as murder cannot but be matters 
which would undermine the security of the State and come within the 
ambit of law sanctioned by Article 19(2) of the Constitution."21 Re-
ferring to the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, the Court 
said, "whatever ends the impugned Act may have been intended to 
subserve and whatever aims its framers may have had in view, its 
application and scope could not, in the absence of deUmiting words in 
the statute itself, be restricted to those aggravated forms of prejudicial 
activity which are calculated to endanger the security of the State nor was 
there any guarantee that those authorised to exercise the powers under 
the Act would in using them discriminate between those who act preju-
dicially to the security of the State and those who do not."22 
This interpretation would give constitutional validity to legislation 
restrictive of freedom of speech and expression in relation to incitement 
to aggravated forms of prejudicial activity or to commission of violent 
crimes like murder which would undermine the security of the State ; 
but it could not help in pronouncing validity on restrictive legislation 
covering the large field of public order and incitement to crimes which 
are not of an aggravated nature and which may not undermine the 
security of the State. It would appear therefore that the Supreme Court 
decision in Shailabala's case23 did not render an amendment of Article 
19(2) unnecessary. It is worth mentioning in this connexion that the 
Supreme Court itself in that case finally relied on the retrospective 
a
° State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi, 1952 S.C.J. 465 at 467 
" id. at 466-67 
»» %d. at 467 
·» 1952 S.C.J. 465 
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effect given to the amendment in deciding upon the validity of the 
Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931. 
When the Amendment Act was passed, not only public order, but 
two other subjects were introduced, namely, friendly relations with 
foreign states and incitement to an offence, as appropriate for re-
strictive legislation in relation to the right to freedom of speech and 
expression. It would appear therefore that the amendment enlarged 
the sweep of legislative abridgement of this basic right. But it added 
a qualifying word "reasonable" to the permissible legislative restric-
tions. The restrictions now are to be reasonable ; and this means that 
the Courts win be entitled to examine whether the restrictions im-
posed by a law are reasonable or not. 
Under the powers granted by the Amendment the legislatures in 
India if they so choose, may pass restrictive laws covering a much 
wider field than before, and the possibility of misapplication of legis-
lative powers may be regarded as a clear danger. For instance, it would 
be possible, by the creation of an appropriate offence, to restrict free-
dom of speech and expression on a particular subject under the pro-
vision relating to "incitement to an offence." In such a situation the 
only saving feature appears to lie in the standard of reasonableness the 
Courts would adopt in relation to the restrictive piece of legislation. 
One point deserving special notice in regard to the constitutional 
provision is that the general trend of judicial decisions points to the 
view that the categories enumerated in clause (2) are exhaustive.24 It 
is regarded as a fundamental premise that the rights guaranteed under 
sub-clause (a) of clause (1) can be encroached upon only to the extent 
and for the objects permitted by clause (2). Desai, J., observes that 
whatever limitations exist on the freedom of speech in India "are those 
mentioned in sub-clause (2) of Article 19 and no other."25 Since the 
exceptions to the absolute freedom of speech and thought are spe-
cifically and expressly laid down in the Constitution, there can be no 
other exceptions than those which are so specifically and expressly 
mentioned. If the liberty of a citizen is curtailed by any law, then it 
must be shown that the law falls within the four comers of these ex-
*' A dissenting voice is occasionally heard, as, for example, tha t of Teja Singh, C. J , 
m Jang Bahadur Santpal v. Principal, Mohmdra College, Paiiala, (A.I R. 1951 Pepsu 59) 
where he said tha t he was of the opinion that "apart from the qualifications enumerated 
in clauses (2) to (6) of the Article they (the fundamental rights) are also subject to the 
qualification that the exercise of these rights should not infringe the rights of others." 
*
s
 Ram Manokar Lohia v. Superintendant, Central Prison, A.I R. 1955 All. 193 a t 
p. 203. 
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ceptions.26 If in any particular case, observes the Supreme Court, the 
restrictive law cannot be shown to relate rationally to any of the 
specified grounds in clause (2), the law must be declared void.27 
(ІІ) REASONABLENESS OF RESTRICTIONS 
We have seen that the Constitution makes provision for the limi­
tation of the scope of the guarantee of fundamental rights in Article 
19(1) by means of the reasonable restrictions which may be imposed 
under clauses (2) to (6) of the article. This was an attempt made by 
the framers of the Constitution and of the First Amendment to help 
strike a proper balance between the freedoms guaranteed by clause (1) 
and the social control permitted by the other clauses of the article. 
The fact that the word "reasonable" precedes the word "restrictions" 
in the clauses (2) to (6) has not only limited the scope of legislative 
abridgement of these rights, but has also made the reasonableness of 
the restrictions a justiciable issue. "It is not disputed," observed 
Mukherjea, J., "that the question of reasonableness is a justiciable 
matter which has to be determined by the Court."28 Mahajan, J., echoed 
the same sentiment when he said, "The determination of the legislature 
of what constitutes a reasonable restriction is not final or conclusive. 
It is subject to the supervision of this Court."29 The Courts are thus 
empowered to determine whether a restrictive law comes under any 
of the purposes specified in the respective clauses and also whether the 
restrictions the legislature seeks to impose are reasonable. 
We have had occasion to mention that by the Constitution (First) 
Amendment Act, 1951, the word "reasonable" was inserted before the 
word "restrictions" in clause (2). This brought the clause in line with 
the following clauses, all requiring certain standards of reasonableness 
in the restrictive enactment. But the standard of reasonableness con­
sidered applicable in one case in relation to one clause may not be 
applicable in another case relative to another clause. The observation 
made by Patanjali Sastri, С. J. in The State of Madras v. V. G. Row30 
is of interest in this context. He said, "... a decision deahng with the 
» ibid. 
" Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, 1950 S.C.R. 594; Sodhi Shamseer v. State of 
Pepsu, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 276, Express Newspapers v. Union of India, 1958 S.C.J. 1113. 
2 8
 N. B. Khare v. State of Delhi, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 211 a t 217 
" Chmtaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1950 S.C.J. 571 
A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 196 
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validity of restrictions imposed on one of the rights conferred by 
Article 19(1) cannot have much value as a precedent for adjudging the 
validity of the restrictions imposed on another right, even when the 
constitutional criterion is the same, namely, "reasonableness," as the 
conclusion must depend on the cumulative effect of the varying facts 
and circumstances of each case."31 
Before we attempt to understand the standards of reasonableness 
adopted by the Courts, it is helpful if we appreciate the position of the 
judiciary in India. In A.K.Gopalan v.State of Madras32 Das, J., clearly 
indicated its position when he said, "In India the position of the judici-
ary is somewhere in between the Courts in England and the United 
States. While in the main leaving our Parliament and the State Legis-
latures supreme in their respective legislative fields, our Constitution 
has by some of the articles put upon the legislatures certain specified 
limitations... in so far as there is any limitation on the legislative 
power, the Court must, on a complaint being made to it, scrutinise and 
ascertain whether such limitation has been transgressed and if there 
has been any transgression the Court will courageously declare the law 
unconstitutional, for the Court is bound by its oath to uphold the 
Constitution. But outside the limitations imposed on the legislative 
powers our Parliament and the State Legislatures are supreme in their 
respective legislative fields and the Court has no authority to question 
the wisdom or the policy of the law duly made by the appropriate 
legislature."33 Bose, J., when explaining the fact that "in every case it 
is the rights which are fundamental, not the limitations," has pointed 
out what the duty of the Court is in regard to the guarantee of funda-
mental rights. "It is," says he, "our duty and privilege to see that 
neither Parliament nor the Executive exceed the bounds within which 
they are confined by the Constitution when given the power to impose 
a restricted set of fetters on these freedoms."34 
The Constitution nowhere lays down what is and what is not a 
reasonable restriction. And for that matter it does not define what a 
fundamental right like, for example, the right to freedom of speech 
and expression, consists in or may or may not include. Hence it has 
been left to the Courts to determine the standard of reasonableness to 
be adopted in judging the validity of particular legislative restrictions. 
How they have done it may be better said in their own words. 
" id. at 200 
32
 1950 S.C.J. 174 
as
 id. at 284 
»* Ram Singh v. State of Delhi, 1951 S.C.J. 374 at 383 
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"The phrase 'reasonable restrictions' connotes," said Mukherjea, J., 
"that the limitation imposed upon a person in enjoyment of a right 
should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond what is re­
quired in the interests of the public... legislation which arbitrarily or 
excessively invades the right, cannot be said to contain the quality of 
reasonableness, and unless it strikes a proper balance between the 
freedom guaranteed... and the social control permitted... it must be 
held to be wanting in reasonableness."35 
It would appear that it is impossible to lay down absolute standards 
of reasonableness. "It is important," said Patanjali Sastri, С. J., "in 
this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever 
prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and 
no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid 
down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have 
been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the 
extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the 
disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time 
should all enter into the judicial verdict.36 In evaluating such elusive 
factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable in all 
the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social phi­
losophy and the scale of values of the judges participating in the 
decision should play an important part, and the limit to their inter­
ference with legislative judgement in such cases can only be dictated 
by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering 
reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their 
way of thinking but for all, and that the majority of the elected repre­
sentatives of the people have, in authorising the imposition of the 
restrictions, considered them to be reasonable."37 
It is only the reasonableness of a particular legislative restriction 
that comes under judicial scrutiny, and not the wisdom of the legis­
lative measure. " I do agree that... the adjective 'reasonable' is predi­
cated of the restrictions that are imposed by law and not of the law 
itself," said Mukherjea, J. 3 8 
In determining the reasonableness of a restrictive enactment, the 
Courts consider both the substantive and the procedural aspects of the 
•
s
 Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 224 at 227. 
*· One is reminded of Mr Justice Holmes's observation in Schenck ν l/.S. (249 U.S. 52) 
"The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done... The 
most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting 
"fire" in a theatre and causing a panic." 
»' State of Madras v. V. G. Row, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 196 a t 200 
" N. B. Khare v. State of Delhi. A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 211 a t 217 
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law challenged before them. This was handed down as a guiding princi­
ple by Kania, С J., in N. B. Khare v. State of Delhi,3* wherein he 
observed, "The law providing reasonable restrictions on the exercise 
of the right conferred by Article 19 may contain substantive provisions 
as well as procedural provisions. While the reasonableness of the re­
strictions has to be considered with regard to the exercise of the right, 
it does not necessarily exclude from the consideration of the Court the 
question of reasonableness of the procedural part of the law. It is 
obvious that if the law prescribes five year extemment or ten year 
externment the question whether such term of externment is reason­
able, being the substantive part is necessarily for the consideration of 
the Court under clause (5). Similarly, if the law provides the procedure 
under which the exercise of the right may be restricted, the same is 
also for the consideration of the Court, as it has to determine if the 
exercise of the right has been reasonably restricted."40 
The case law on the question of reasonableness tends to show that 
the Courts do not generally attempt to lay down general principles on 
the subject and are content with determining the reasonableness of the 
particular statute impugned before them. But they do give weight to 
certain general considerations like the ones the Madras High Court 
mentioned in V. G. Row v. State of Madras.*1 "In deciding on the 
reasonableness of the restrictions," the Court said, "it is not possible 
to think only in the abstract. Several circumstances must be taken into 
consideration, in particular (a) the purpose of the Act, (b) the con­
ditions prevailing in the country at the time, (c) the duration of the 
restriction, (d) its extent and nature."42 The evaluation of the several 
circumstances will vary from one judge to another, or to adopt Lord 
Seldon's phrase, it may vary with the length of the judge's foot, for 
some element of subjectivity is bound to enter into the judicial de­
cision, in accord with the social philosophy and background of the 
individual judge. But the element of subjectivity may be more ju­
diciously and scrupulously measured out in the decision if the circum­
stances mentioned by the Madras High Court are given due consider­
ation. When Mukherjea, J., observed that "The reasonableness of a 
challenged legislation has to be determined by a Court and the Court 
decides such matters by applying some objective standard which is 
" A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 211 
4 0
 id. at 214; see also State v. Baboo Lai, A.I.R. 1956 All. 571 
4 1
 A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 147 
4 1
 id. at 179 
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said to be the standard of an average prudent man,"43 he was probably 
pointing out what the Court intends to do rather than what it actually 
does. For the average reasonable man of judicial pronouncements is an 
extremely elusive figure; no one seems to know for certain what his 
standards are. It is not easy for the judge to undertake a psycho-
analytical study of the mental workings of the man in the street or 
"on the Clapham omnibus" and come to a decision in relation to the 
reasonableness of a particular statute. 
In their search for an objective test of reasonableness the judges 
are, however, able to rely for guidance on the directive principles of 
State pohcy enumerated in Part IV of the Constitution,44 in matters 
relating to the objects enjoined by those principles, and on principles 
of natural justice in matters of procedure. 
It is judicially recognised that the restrictive provision of law should 
have "rational connexion" with the respective sphere of social control 
contemplated in the Constitution.45 If it is found that the language 
employed in the provision is wide enough to cover restrictions both 
within and without the bounds of permissible legislative action in 
relation to the right, the Courts will hold such provision void. Mahajan, 
J., said in Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh** that "So long 
as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by 
the Constitution cannot be ruled out it (that is, the law) must be held 
to be wholly void."47 
There may be circumstances in which restrictions may be permitted 
to the extent of total prohibition. The general current of judicial 
opinion in India seems to favour the view that total prohibition is not 
beyond contemplation as a possible means of permissible restriction. 
The Oxford Dictionary, it may be recollected, defines "restrict" to 
mean also "to restrain by prohibition." 
In A. K. Gopalan's case,48 when interpreting Article 21, Капіа, С. J., 
and Das, J. distinguished restriction from prohibition and held the 
view that restriction did not mean extinguishment of the entire right. 
Patanjah Sastri, J., on the other hand, inclined to the view that in 
certain circumstances "restriction may reach a point where it may 
amount to deprivation." But he, however, thought that the word 
« N. B. Khare v. State of Delhi, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 211 at 217 
" See State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 318 
4 5
 Sodhi Shamser v. State of Pepsu, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 276 
" A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 118 
" id. at 120 
" A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27 
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"restriction" in Article 19 clauses (2) to (6) did not mean total prohi-
bition or total deprivation. 
In a later case49 while upholding the provisions of the Ajmer Excise 
Regulation of 1915 which purported to regulate trade in liquor in all 
its various spheres, the Supreme Court observed, "It can also be not 
denied that the State has the power to prohibit trades which are illegal 
or immoral or injurious to the health and welfare of the public. Laws 
prohibiting trades in noxious or dangerous goods or trafficking in 
women cannot he held to be illegal as enacting a prohibition and not 
a mere regulation."49 
Another judicial observation, this time from a High Court, argues 
in favour of the view that restriction includes prohibition. Narasimhan, 
J., said in Loknath v. State of Orissa:60 
"It is true that it was held in Municipal Corporation v. Virgo61 that 
"a power to regulate and govern seems to imply the continued ex-
istence of that which is to be regulated or governed." But the words 
used in the 19th Article is restriction and not regulation. That the 
framers of the Constitution were aware of the distinction between the 
power to regulate and the power to restrict will be apparent from a 
scrutiny of subclause (a) of clause (2) of Article 25 where the words 
"regulating" and "restricting" occur in juxtaposition thereby indicating 
unmistakably that the framers of the Constitution intended to convey 
two different meanings by the two words. It will be noticed that Article 
19 and consequently the expression "restriction" in Article 19(6) cannot 
be held to be synonymous with regulation. Restriction may be com-
plete or partial and where it is complete it would imply absolute 
prohibition. The dictionary meaning of the word "restriction" includes 
prohibition also."60 
Though the learned judge was referring to restrictions under clause 
(6) and not under clause (2) of Article 19, circumstances may arise in 
which the same interpretation would be relevant in relation to re-
strictions contemplated under clause (2). 
The legislative abridgement of fundamental rights would be regarded 
*· Barucha v. Excise Commissioner, 1954 S.C.J. 246 at 249 
60
 A.I.R. 1952 Orissa 42. See also the observations of Changez, J., of the West 
Pakistan High Court to the same effect: "Restrictions may be complete or partial. If, 
in the circumstances of a case, total prohibition of the exercise of a fundamental right 
is reasonable for achieving a purpose for which the imposition of restriction is per-
missible, then even the total prohibition of the exercise of such a right will be legal 
and valid." (Abdul Hameed v. District Magistrate, Lahore, P.L.D. 1957 (W.P.) Lahore 
213 at 217) 
81
 1896 A.C. 88 
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as procedurally unreasonable if it seeks to restrict the right without 
complying with the principles of natural justice. "The essentials of 
procedure, in the minimum," observed Ray, C. J. of the Orissa High 
Court, "are essentials of notice, opportunities to be heard and a tri­
bunal. Essentials of notice require to appraise the victim of the cause 
against him in order to afford him sufficient opportunity to prepare 
and make his answer. Opportunity to be heard is the second essential 
of procedure established by law. To condemn without hearing is re­
pugnant to natural justice. Any procedure which does not guard against 
this requirement is no procedure by law. The essentiak of such oppor­
tunities do not, however, consist in any particular form or method of 
hearing. All that is required is reasonable opportunity to be heard. The 
opportunity does not guarantee a person a right to an appeal. One 
hearing is all that is required. Tribunal as the third essential of pro­
cedure does not necessarily mean a judicial tribunal, any impartial 
tribunal would meet the requirement."62 The High Courts of Calcutta, 
Madras, Rajasthan and Saurashtra expressed the same views as the 
learned Chief Justice in regard to the minimum requirements necessary 
for proper procedure. 
It appears that the Supreme Court's answer to the question whether 
the restriction of a fundamental right could be made dependent on the 
subjective satisfaction of the executive would be that no absolute 
answer can be given to it. In 1950 the Court expressed its considered 
view in relation to the externment of a person under Article 19(5) in 
the following words : 
"The subjective satisfaction of the authority was not unreasonable 
as the desirability of passing an individual order of externment against 
a citizen has to be left to an officer and no such provision could be made 
in the Act."63 
After second thoughts in 1952 it put a gloss on the statement, proba­
bly feeling that it had left to the executive very wide discretionary 
powers which might lead them to temptation. In State of Madras v. 
V. G. Row6* Patanjali Sastri, С. J. observed: 
"The formula of subjective satisfaction of the Government or of its 
officers, with an Advisory Board thrown in to review the materials on 
which the Government seeks to override a basic freedom guaranteed 
to the citizen, may be viewed as reasonable only in very exceptional 
" Ismail v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1951 Orissa 86 
" N. B. Khare v. State of Delhi, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 211 a t 214 
" A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 196 
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circumstances and within the narrowest limits, and cannot receive 
judicial approval as a general pattern of reasonable restrictions on 
fundamental rights."58 
We have already noticed the views expressed by the Courts in regard 
to the standard of reasonableness of legislative restrictions. We shall 
now examine in some detail a few instances where they tested the 
vahdity of restrictive laws in the touchstone of reasonableness. 
The question of reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech and 
expression in the interests of public order was considered by the Patna 
High Court in relation to a state statute in State v. Ramanand Tiwari.56 
Section 5 of the Bihar Essential Services Maintenance Act, 1948, en­
acted that "whoever intentionally causes or attemps to cause or does 
any act which he knows is likely to cause, disaffection towards the 
Government estabhshed by law amongst the persons engaged in any 
employment or class of employment to which this Act appUes, or 
induces or attempts to induce, or does any act which he knows is 
likely to induce any person engaged in such emplojnnent or class of 
employment to withhold his services or to commit a breach of disci-
pline shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or 
anything having the force of law, be punishable with imprisonment 
which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine." The 
Court held that the restrictions imposed by the section on the right of 
freedom of speech and expression are reasonable restrictions and that 
clause (2) of Article 19 saves the section. Das, С J., said, "Public order 
can be affected in ways other than incitement to violence or tendency 
to violence."57 After holding the first part of the section which related 
to causing disaffection towards Government to be a reasonable re­
striction, he observed that "the other two parts which relate to with­
holding of services and committing a breach of discipline are also, in 
my opinion, reasonable restrictions in the interests of public order. If 
the members of an essential service withhold their services or if they 
are induced or encouraged to commit breaches of discipline, it is 
obvious that such action will paralyse Government and will affect 
maintenance of public order or the maintaining of services necessary 
to the life of the community. The contemplated and authorised use of 
section 5 is confined to causing disaffection towards Government 
established by law as distinguished from mere criticism or disappro-
" id. at 200 
" A.I.R. 1956 Patna 188 
« id. at 193 
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bation, including withholding of services and inducing commission of 
breaches of discipline in a member of an essential service, a service 
which is essential for securing the public safety, the maintenance of 
public order or for maintaining services necessary to the life of the 
community. Read in the context of section 3, section 5 of the impugned 
Act imposes an easily intelligible and reasonable restriction in the 
interests of public order on the right of freedom of speech and ex-
pression."68 Section 3 stated that the Act would apply to any em-
ployment or class of employment under the State Government which 
the State Government being of opinion that such employment or class 
of employment was essential for securing the public safety, the mainte-
nance of public order, or for maintaining services necessary to the 
community might, by notification, declare to be an employment to 
which this Act applied. 
In Virendra v. State of Panjabi to which reference has already been 
made, the Supreme Court declared void the following provision in the 
Pan jab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956: 
"The State Government or any authority authorised by it in this 
behalf if satisfied that such action is necessary for the purpose of 
preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the mamtenance 
of communal harmony affecting or likely to affect public order, may, 
by notification, prohibit the bringing into Panjab of any newspaper, 
periodical, leaflet or other publication." 
The grounds for declaring it void were that the provision was un-
reasonable both from the substantive and the procedural points of 
view. It was held that it was substantially objectionable because no 
limitation was imposed either in regard to the duration of the prohi-
bition authorised by the provision or to the subject matter of the 
publication. The prohibition applied to any publication and might be 
of indefinite duration. Procedurally it left the whole matter to the 
subjective determination of the State Government and there was no 
provision even for any representation by the party affected. It was 
therefore found to be against the rules of natural justice. 
The Court upheld the validity of another section of the Act whose 
provisions met these objections. Section 2(1) (a) provided: 
"The State Government or any authority so authorised in this be-
half, if satisfied that such action is necessary for the purpose of pre-
venting or combating any activity prejudicial to the maintenance of 
" id. at 194 
»· 1958 S.C.J. 88 
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communal harmony affecting or likely to affect public order may, by 
order, in writing addressed to a printer, publisher or editor, 
(a) prohibit the printing or publication in any document or class of 
documents of any matter relating to a particular subject or class of 
subjects for a specified period or in a particular issue or issues of a 
newspaper or periodical ; 
provided that no such order shall remain in force for more than two 
months from the making thereof; 
provided further that the person against whom the order has been 
made may within ten days of the passing of this order make a repre-
sentation to the State Government which may on consideration thereof 
modify, confirm or rescind the order." 
To sum up, (a) it is for the Courts to determine the reasonableness 
of legislative restrictions. 
(b) The restrictions should be such as would strike a proper balance 
between the guaranteed freedom and the permitted social control. 
(c) It is the reasonableness of the restrictions which the Courts 
scrutinise and not the wisdom or the policy of the restrictive law. 
(d) In determining the reasonableness of a restrictive law the Courts 
consider both the substantive and the procedural aspects of the im-
pugned legislative provision. The consideration of such circumstances 
as the purpose of the impugned law, the conditions prevaihng in the 
country at the time when the law was passed, the duration of the 
restriction, and its extent and nature, especially its rational connexion 
with the object in view, will tend to help the judge in visualising a 
reasonable standard to which he may safely refer as the standard of 
the average reasonable man. In considering the procedural aspect of 
the restriction, the judge takes into account whether provision has 
been made for certain minimum requirements. These requirements 
consist of (i) a notice to the person who would be affected by an order 
prescribing the restriction (ii) an opportunity for him to make a repre-
sentation and (iii) some tribunal to consider the representation. 
(e) There cannot be any absolute standard of reasonableness. The 
judge weighs in the balance the impugned restriction taking into ac-
count of what he considers to be the standard of the average reasonable 
man, which, it is submitted, is coloured by what Professor Laski calls 
"the inarticulate premises" of the individual judge. 
(f) The restrictions may extend to the point of complete prohibition 
if the circumstances, especially the nature of the business, permit it. 
(g) A restriction made exercisable on the subjective satisfaction of 
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the government may be judicially upheld, but only in very exceptional 
circumstances and within very narrow limits. 
(ІІІ) PRIOR RESTRAINTS 
(a) Pre-censorship 
Pre-censorship in normal times is regarded in most countries as an 
unwarranted restriction on freedom of the press. The Danish Consti­
tution of 1915, for instance, prohibits "censorship and other preventive 
measures." The Greek Constitution of 1911 does the same in almost 
identical language. The Netherlands Constitution states: "No person 
shall require previous permission to publish thoughts or feehngs by 
means of the printing press, without prejudice to every man's responsi­
bility according to law." In England, freedom or the press, as Black-
stone viewed it, was tantamount to the absence of pre-publication 
restraints. "Liberty of the press," he said in his Commentaries, "con­
sists in laying no previous restraint upon publications, and not in 
freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every free 
man has an undoubted right to lay what sentiment he pleases before 
the pubhc; to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press."60 In 
the United States also there is no pre-censorship in time of peace. In 
Marsh v. Alabama61 the Supreme Court of the United States explained 
why it stood against censorship. "To act as good citizens, they (the 
people) must be informed. In order to enable them to be properly 
informed, their information must be uncensored." 
There is no provision prohibiting prior censorship in the Constitution 
of India. But when the Supreme Court of India had to decide the 
question of validity of pre-publication censorship in Brij Bhushan v. 
State of Delhi92 it followed common law principles and refused to uphold 
such censorship in the absence of grave emergencies like war or insur­
rection. The Court observed: "There can be little doubt that the impo­
sition of pre-censorship on a journal is a restriction on the liberty of the 
press which is an essential part of the freedom of speech and expres­
sion declared by Article 19(1) (a)."*3 and quoted Blackstone in support 
of the statement. But the observations of Fazl Ali, J., in his dissent­
ing opinion are worthy of serious consideration. He said: "It must be 
•o 4 Commentaries 151 
" (1945) 326 U.S. 501 
" (1950) S.C.R. 605. The same opinion was expressed in In re Venugopal (A.I.R. 1954 
Madras 901) and in Trilokchand v. The State (A.I.R. 1951 Ajmer 100). 
" (1950) S.C.R. 605 at 608 
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recognised that freedom of speech and expression is one of the most 
valuable rights guaranteed to a citizen by the Constitution and should 
be jealously guarded by the Courts. It must be recognised that free 
political discussion is essential for the proper functioning of a demo­
cratic government, and the tendency of modern jurists is to deprecate 
censorship though they all agree that "liberty of the press" is not to 
be confused with its "licentiousness." But the Constitution itself has 
prescribed certain limits for the exercise of the freedom of speech and 
expression and this Court is only called upon to see whether a particu­
lar case comes within those limits. In my opinion the law which is 
impugned (that is, the East Panjab Public Safety Act, 1949) is fully 
saved by Article 19(2)."и 
It may be recollected from our discussion of the case that the Court 
had no occasion to determine whether the action taken by the govern­
ment could have been taken under a statute otherwise valid, without 
unconstitutionally encroaching upon the citizen's right to freedom of 
expression. It would seem that if the impugned statute was one solely 
directed to the security of the State, the provision for pre-censorship 
would have been upheld under Article 19(2) as it then stood. It is 
doubtful whether precensorship would be regarded as an unreasonable 
restriction under the amended clause, especially because the trend in 
judicial opinion seems incUned to favour the view that restriction may 
include prohibition. If prohibition of the whole is a permissible re­
striction, there is no reason to suppose that prohibition of the part (the 
form which pre-censorship usually assumes) would be regarded as an 
unreasonable restriction. 
In Virendra v. State of Panjab95 the Supreme Court decided that 
section 2 of the Panjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956, "must be 
held to have imposed reasonable restrictions" on the exercise of the 
right to freedom of speech and expression. Section 2(1) (c) empowers 
the State Government or its delegated authority to impose pre-censor­
ship. But the question for decision in the case was not the validity of 
section 2(1) (c), but of section 2(1) (a). No reference to pre-censorship 
is, therefore, to be found in the opinion of the Court. 
(b) Other Prior Restraints 
Apart from pre-censorship, there are other prior restraints like 
licensing provisions and bond requirements adopted by governments 
·* 1950 S.C.J. 425 at 431 
" 1958 S.C.J. 88 
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to curtail or negative freedom of the press. Though in the United 
Kingdom freedom to publish without previous licence is regarded as 
a vital factor in the liberty of the press, such a licence is required in 
many colonies and protectorates of the United Kingdom. For example, 
in Aden, section 5 of the Press and Registration of Books Ordinance, 
1939, provides: "It shall not be lawful for any person to print, publish 
or edit any newspaper within the colony unless authorised by a licence 
in writing granted by the Governor and signed by the Chief Secretary, 
which licence the Governor may, in his absolute discretion, grant, 
refuse or revoke." The licence when granted is valid for one year only. 
A newspaper is defined in such wide terms as to cover all periodical 
publications. Further, the Governor's decision will be final. In North 
Borneo the keeper of a printing press as well as the proprietor of a 
newspaper needs an annual licence which is to be obtained from the 
Registrar who has an absolute discretion to grant, refuse or revoke the 
licence or grant it subject to conditions. There is a right of appeal to 
the Governor in Council. In Malta the provision in the Press Ordinance, 
1933, requiring the payment of a deposit prior to publication of a 
periodical was amended in 1946 so as to require a deposit to be paid 
only on conviction of certain offences under the Press Ordinance. The 
same was the position of the press in independent India under the 
Press (Objectionable Matter) Act, 1951, until its repeal in 1957. 
In India, the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, is a legacy 
of the British Indian government. It has been amended a number of 
times. The Act, as amended, seeks to provide for the regulation of 
printing presses and newspapers, for the preservation of copies of every 
book and newspaper printed in India and for the registration of such 
books and newspapers. 
Under section 3 it is provided that every book or paper printed 
within India shall have printed legibly on it the name of the printer 
and the place of printing and if the paper or book be published, the 
name of the publisher and the place of publication. Paper is defined 
to mean any document, including a newspaper, other than a book. 
Section 4 provides that no person shall keep in his possession a press 
for the printing of books or newspapers, unless he has made a decla-
ration before a Magistrate to the effect that he has a printing press at 
a place named in the declaration. Section 5(1) lays down that every 
copy of a newspaper shall contain the name of the person who is the 
editor thereof printed on it as the name of the editor ofthat newspaper. 
It also provides that the printer as well as the pubhsher of every such 
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newspaper should appear in person or by agent before a District, 
Presidency or Sub-Divisional Magistrate and make a declaration that 
he is the printer or publisher (or printer and publisher) of the news­
paper, giving the name of the newspaper and the name of the place of 
printing. This declaration as well as its authentication by the Magis­
trate is necessary "before the newspaper can be published."650 In case 
of cancellation on account of alleged contravention of the provisions 
of the Act or rules made thereunder, or for any of the other grounds 
specified in section 8B such as false representation or concealment of 
any material fact when making the declaration, there is provision made 
under section 8C for appeal to the Press and Registration Appellate 
Tribunal to be appointed by the Central Government. 
Section 3 of the Act has been declared constitutionally valid by the 
Madras High Court.66 A learned commentator67 expresses the view that 
the statute does not impose any restriction upon the press any more 
than a law requiring registration of births and deaths does upon the 
individual.68 In this connexion it is interesting to notice the fate of a 
similar requirement in the United States. In 1945 the Supreme Court 
of the United States declared unconstitutional a statute of the State 
of Texas which required that a labour organiser desiring to recruit 
members for a labour union must register in the State. Under this 
statute, a labour leader who had carried on his activities without such 
registration was convicted. The Supreme Court quashed the conviction. 
The majority of the Supreme Court found that there was a prior re­
straint on speech conflicting with the First and Fourteenth Amend­
ments.69 Rutledge, J., speaking for the majority observed that any 
attempt to restrict the liberties secured by the First Amendment must 
be justified by clear public interest threatened by clear and present 
danger. The four dissenting Justices expressed the view that this 
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· · In re Alavandar, A.I.R. 1957 Madras 427 
" D. D. Basu, Constitutional Protection of Civil Rights in India, Journal of the 
International Commission of Jurists, Vol. I. No. 2, p. 170. 
β β
 The comparison, it would seem, is not particularly apt. The registration of births 
and deaths is made after the event. The declaration under section 5 has to be made 
before publication. 
•* First Amendment : "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech 
or of the press." 
Fourteenth Amendment : "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States" and it has been held that 
freedom of the press is among the foremost of these privileges. 
™ Thomas v. Collins, (1945) 323 U.S. 516 
CHAPTER II 
SEDITION AND RELATED OFFENCES 
(І) THE LAW OF SEDITION IN INDIA 
(a) Introductory Remarks 
"Security and liberty, in their pure form, are antagonistic poles. 
The one pole represents the interest of the politically organised society 
in its self-preservation. The other represents the interest of the indi­
vidual in being afforded the maximum sight of self-assertion, free from 
governmental and other interference."1 
But it is impossible to extend to either of them absolute protection, 
as "absolute rules would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions, and 
such exceptions would eventually corrode the rules."2 It has, therefore, 
been considered necessary to strike a proper balance between the 
claims of liberty and those of security. 
It is generally conceded that if freedom is to be maintained, some 
risks must be taken. This view was expressed by Sastri, J., of the 
Supreme Court of India: "Freedom of speech and that of the press lay 
at the foundation of all democratic organisations, for without free 
political discussion no public education so essential for the proper 
functioning of the processes of popular government, is possible. A 
freedom of such amplitude might involve risks of abuse."3 Sastri, J., 
was echoing the sentiments expressed by Madison: "It is better to 
leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than by 
pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper 
fruits."* 
As security of the State and organised government are the very 
foundation of freedom of expression, which maintains the opportunity 
for free political discussion to the end that government may be re­
sponsive to the wül of the people, it is understandable that the end 
should not be lost sight of in an overemphasis of the means. It has, 
1
 B. Schwartz, American Constitutional Law, p. 240 
a
 Frankfurter, J., in Dennis v. t7.S. (1951) 341 U.S. 494 at 524 
a
 Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950) S.C.R. 594 
4
 Quoted in Near v. Minnesota (1931) 283 U.S. 697 at 717-718 
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therefore, been judicially held in the United States that the right to 
freedom of expression does not prohibit punishment for utterances 
which threaten the overthrow of government by force or violence,5 or 
the advocacy of a proletarian revolution by mass action,6 or anarchy.7 
It has also been held that the State can prohibit8 or punish utterances 
which obstruct war measures, such as inciting resistance to the partici-
pation of the State in a war,9 or to conscription,10 undermining the 
morale of the armed forces,11 publication of information regarding war 
measures or movements of forces, which may help the enemy12 and 
encouraging curtailment in the production of goods deemed necessary 
for the successful prosecution of war.13 
A number of restrictions are imposed on the right of freedom of 
expression by statute in England. 
The Treason Act, 1795, declares it treasonable to express, utter or 
declare, by publishing any printing or writing, an intention to commit 
or to incite another to commit such acts, among others, as causing the 
death or destruction of the Queen, levying war against her, or moving 
any foreigner to invade the realm. While the Incitement to Mutiny 
Act, 1797, penalises any endeavour to seduce the King's soldiers or 
sailors from their duty, and the commission of an act of mutiny or 
traitrous practice, the Incitement to Disaffection Act, 1934, declares 
it an offence to attempt to seduce any member of the armed forces 
from duty, or to be in possession of any document for this purpose, 
with intent to commit, abet or counsel the commission of such offence. 
An attempt to cause disaffection amongst the members of any police 
force or an attempt to induce any such member to withhold his services 
or to commit breaches of discipline is made an offence under the Police 
Act, 1919. It is provided by the Official Secrets Act, 1911, which was 
amended in 1920 and 1939 that it is an offence to communicate to any 
person any sketch, plan or other information calculated to be useful 
to an enemy. 
Apart from these statutory provisions there is the common law 
offence of sedition in respect of which restrictions are imposed on 
freedom of expression. Sedition in England "embraces all those prac-
5
 Giilow v. New York, (1925) 268 U.S. 652 
• Whitney v. California, (1927) 274, U.S. 357 
7
 Stromberg v. California, (1931) 283, U.S. 359 
8
 U.S. v. Burleson, (1921) 255 U.S. 407 
• Schaefer v. t / .S. (1920) 253 U.S. 142 
10
 Debs v. U.S. (1919) 249 U.S. 211 
" - » U.S. v. Macintosh, (1931) 283 U.S. 605 
" Abrams v. U.S. (1919) 250 U.S. 616 
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tices whether by word, deed or writing, which are calculated to disturb 
the tranquillity of the State and lead ignorant persons to subvert the 
government." 1 4 It covers any attempt to bring into hatred or contempt 
the Crown, the Houses of Parliament and the Constitution, to raise 
discontent among the people or promote hostility between the various 
classes of the people."1 5 
But "an intention to show that Her Majesty has been misled or 
mistaken in her measures, or to point out errors or defects in the govern­
ment or constitution as by law established, with a view to their refor­
mation, or to excite Her Majesty's subjects to attempt by lawful 
means the alteration of any matter in State by law established, or to 
point out, in order to their removal, matters which are producing, or 
have a tendency to produce, feelings of hatred and ill-will between 
classes of Her Majesty's subjects, is not a seditious intention." 1 6 A 
discussion on the plane of political science would not be held to-day to 
amount to sedition even though the words might technically bring the 
Government or the Constitution into contempt. 
(b) Section 124 A of the Indian Penal Code 
Though in the United Kingdom sedition is committed only if there 
is an intention to excite violence, when bringing into hatred or con­
tempt, or exciting disaffection against the Government, in the de­
pendent territories of the United Kingdom where sedition is a statu­
tory offence, no such intention is necessary and therefore any criticism 
which may bring into hatred or contempt or excite disaffection against 
the Government is seditious, even if no violence is intended or results, 
subject only to a saving quaUfication in relation to the mere pointing 
out of errors or defects in the Government. Section 124A of the Indian 
Penal Code enacted by the British Indian Government may be cited 
as an example. I t provides: 
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible repre­
sentation, or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or 
excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards the Government established 
by law m India, shall be punished with transportation for life or any shorter 
term, to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment which may extend to 
three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine. 
Explanation 1. The expression "disaffection" includes disloyalty and all feel­
ings of enmity. 
1 1
 R ν Sulhvan (1868) 11 Сох С С 54 
1 5
 Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, 1935, vol I I , ρ 306 
" R. v. Burns. (1886) 16 Cox C.C. 355 
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E x p l a n a t i o n 2. C o m m e n t s expressing d i sapprobat ion of t h e measures of t h e 
G o v e r n m e n t w i t h a view t o obta in their a l te ra t ion b y lawful means, w i t h o u t 
excit ing or a t t e m p t i n g t o excite h a t r e d , c o n t e m p t , or disaffection, do n o t consti­
t u t e a n offence u n d e r th i s section. 
E x p l a n a t i o n 3 C o m m e n t s expressing d i sapprobat ion of t h e admini s t ra t ive 
or o t h e r act ion of t h e G o v e r n m e n t w i t h o u t excit ing or a t t e m p t i n g t o excite 
h a t r e d , c o n t e m p t or disaffection, do n o t cons t i tu te a n offence under this section. 
"As one looked at it, it was a formidable section," wrote a District 
Magistrate commenting on this section. "By a wink which attempted 
to bring the Government into contempt with those who saw the wink 
you might be committing sedition."1 7 He further remarked: "A man 
was guilty if he tried to excite hatred against the Government, even 
if he failed to do so ; nor was he innocent if in exciting hatred he had 
spoken against violence. I t was enough if he meant his audience to 
feel contempt, and it was beside the point whether they felt it or not. 
Thus, a speech which imputed dishonesty to the Government might be 
seditious, and a speech which made use of such an imputation to advo­
cate quite a legitimate policy might equally be seditious. In short the 
law was so wide that it left a great discretion to the executive. Under 
it they had the power to prosecute their political opponents." 1 8 
British Indian judges in general did not see any reason to interpret 
narrowly this very comprehensively worded section. The word "disaf­
fection" was given a very wide interpretation. Petheram, С J., in the 
Bangobasi case1* interpreted it to mean "the contrary of affection," 
and Strachey, J., gave it a further expansion when he said in Tilak's 
case:
20
 "I agree with Sir Comer Petheram in the Bangobasi case that 
disaffection means simply the absence of affection."21 He observed 
interpreting the section. "If a man excites or attempts to excite feeUngs 
of disaffection - great or small - he is guilty under the section. I t does 
not consist in exciting rioting or rebellion, or any sort of actual dis­
turbance, great or small. Whether any disturbance or outbreak was 
caused by these articles is absolutely immaterial... if he tried to excite 
feelings of enmity to the Government, that is sufficient to make him 
guilty under this section."2 2 As explanatory of disaffection, he used 
1 7
 Maurice Collis, Tnals m Burma (1938) ρ 112 
1 8
 id ρ 213 
" Queen Empress ν J С Base, (1891) I L R 19 Cal 35 
s o
 Queen Empress ν В G Tilak, (1897) I L R 22 Bom 112 
« Í ¿ at 134 
" (1897) I L R 22 Bom. 112 I t may be noted that when Strachey, J , interpreted 
the section, the words "hatred" and "contempt" were not included in the definition of 
sedition, and Parsons, J , in Queen Empress ν Ramchandra N агат could not see how 
" h a t r e d " could be included in the connotation of "disaffection". The learned judge 
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the word "disloyalty" as the general term, "comprehending every form 
of bad feeling to the Government." 
In 1942 Sir Maurice Gwyer, C. J., reviewed the position and at-
tempted to restrict the scope of the section by interpreting it according 
to the "external standard" applied by judges in England. He recog-
nised the great change that had taken place in the concept of govern-
ment since the days of the enactment of the section and since its 
interpretation in Tilak's Case. He felt that "bad feeling" towards 
government could no longer be regarded as the basis of sedition. He 
gave the section an interpretation appropriate to the modern concept 
of government by laying down that unless the acts or words had a 
tendency to create public disorder they could not be considered se-
ditious, as sedition was essentially an offence against public order. 
The learned Chief Justice said: "This is not made an offence in order 
to minister to the wounded vanity of Governments, but because where 
Governments and the law cease to be obeyed and no respect is felt any 
longer for them, only anarchy can follow. Public disorder, or the 
reasonable anticipation or likelihood of public disorder, is thus the 
gist of the offence. The acts or words complained of must either incite 
to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that that is 
their intention or tendency"23 This decision has great significance, 
though it was overruled by the Privy Council in King Emperor v. 
Sadashiv Narayan2*, the Judicial Committee observing that they would 
adopt the language of Strachey, J., as "exactly expressing their own 
view on the point." 
The Federal Court decision indicated that it was possible to interpret 
the section differently from Strachey, J. The judgement of the Chief 
Justice specially emphasised the need for a dynamic interpretation 
appropriate to the changed circumstances of the country. The learned 
Chief Justice quoted with approval the observations of Lord Sumner 
in Bowman v. Secular Society Ltd.25 wherein he said: "The words as 
well as the acts, which tend to endanger society, it has been observed, 
differ from time to time in proportion as society is stable or insecure 
observed: "In my opinion the word disaffection used in the section under discussion 
(124A) cannot be construed to mean an absence of or the contrary of affection, or love, 
that is to say, dislike or hatred; but must be taken to be employed in its special sense 
as signifying political alienation or discontent, tha t is to say, a feeling of disloyalty to 
the Government or existing power which tends to a disposition not to obey but to 
resist and at tempt to subvert tha t Government or power." (I.L.R. 22 Bom. 152 at 159) 
23
 Niharendu Dutt Mazumdar v. King Emperor, (1942) 5 F.L.J. 47 a t 57 (F.C.) 
" L.R. 74 I.A. 89 
·» L.R. 1917 A.C. 406 
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in fact, or is believed by its reasonable members to be open to assault. 
In the present day meetings and processions are held lawful which 150 
years ago would have been deemed seditious and this is not because 
the law is weaker or has changed, but because, the times having 
changed, society is stronger than before."26 
Sir Maurice drew the conclusion that "many judicial decisions in 
particular cases which were no doubt correct at the time when they 
were given may well be inapplicable to the circumstances of to-day."27 
As the interpretation of Strachey, J., continued to be authoritative, 
because of the confirmation given to it by the Privy Council decision, 
it was necessary to consider the constitutional validity of the section 
when the question arose, previous to the First Amendment, in Tara 
Singh Gopichand v. State of East Panjab.26 The Panjab High Court 
invahdated the section along with section 153-A of the Indian Penal 
Code and 24-A of the East Panjab Public Safety Act, on the ground 
that these provisions were not solely directed to safeguarding the 
security of the State or the prevention of its overthrow. 
Weston, C. J., observed in the course of his judgement that section 
124A had become inappropriate by the very nature of the change which 
had come about, namely, India becoming a sovereign democratic state. 
After the amendment, the Patna High Court29 expressed the view 
that the section was covered by the words "in the interests of public 
order" in Article 19(2). "Disapprobation" in Explanation 3 of the 
section, the Court observed, became disaffection when there was a 
tendency to undermine the authority of the government. In an Allaha­
bad case30 it was, however, held that the section was ultra vires Article 19. 
The Court observed: "In view of the fact that it is not considered that 
a tendency to disorder, much less a calculated tendency, inheres in all 
utterances creating disaffection against the government and in view 
of the fact that even the mildest form of disaffection could be caught 
by section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, it would appear that the 
restrictions which that section imposes are far too wide and cannot be 
justified as being solely in the interests of public order"31 within the 
meaning of Article 19(2). The question of the constitutionahty of 
the section has not yet been brought before the Supreme Court. 
" id. at 466. 
" ЛГ. D. Mazutndar v. King Emperor (1942) 5 F.L.J. 47 at 56-57 (F.C.) 
« A.I.R. 1951 Panjab 27 
» Debi Soran v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1954 Patna 254 
M
 Ram Nandan v. The State, A.I.R. 1959 All. 101 
3 1
 idem at p. 114 
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It is^interesting to see how the section was interpreted in Pakistan.32 
In 1957 the Lahore Bench of the West Pakistan High Court observed 
in The State v. Abdul Gaffar Khan33 that if hatred and contempt were 
created against persons who exercised the powers of the executive 
government or attempts to that effect were made, the probable result 
would be breach of public order and on that ground the section would 
not become void by reason of Article 8 of the Pakistan Constitution34 
(which corresponded to Article 19 of the Indian Constitution) read 
with Article 4 (which corresponded to Article 1335 of the Indian Consti-
tution). The next year the Peshawar Bench of the same High Court 
gave the section an interpretation more appropriate to the changed 
circumstance of the State. In Hussain Buksh Kausar v. The State,36 the 
Court observed: "Section 124A, whatever its significance and the scope 
of its application were before the Constitution, will have to be read in 
the light of the changed circumstances and subject to Article 8. It is 
permissible for a citizen to hold up the men who form the executive 
government to ridicule and contempt if they are guilty of maladminis-
tration. All that the accused had done was to give an exaggerated 
emphasis on the treatment meted out to a leader of a political party 
while under custody. It is not the criticism of the government, in 
whatever venemous and enraging words it is cloaked, which consti-
tutes an offence under section 124A, but the adoption of methods for 
the attainment of a purpose, which encourage force and violence and 
which may lead to conflict with the authorities with the certainty that 
there will be serious loss of life. Short of that every criticism of govern-
ment is permissible"3ea This view seems to approximate generally to 
that taken by courts in the United Kingdom when dealing with cases 
involving seditious acts committed within the realm. 
In Australia, where sedition is a jury matter, though the theoretical 
definition3611 is as wide as in the Indian statute, in practice the juries 
'* As it was enacted by the British Indian government, the same section is found in 
the Pakistan Penal Code also. 
»" P . L D . 1957 (W.P) Lahore 142 
** The reference is to the Pakistan Constitution which was abrogated m 1958 
*· Article 13(1) declares all existing laws, in so far as they are inconsistent with the 
guaranteed fundamental rights, to be void to the extent of the inconsistency. 
»· P . L D 1958 (W.P.) Peshawar 15 
aeo
 idem, pp 18-19 
Mb
 In the Commonwealth legislation a seditious document is defined as "one dis-
playing an intention to bring the sovereign into hatred and contempt, to excite dis-
affection against the Sovereign, the government, constitution. Parliament of Britain, 
the Dominions, the Commonwealth, and the States, to advocate the alteration other-
wise than by lawful means of any matter established by law, to promote feelings of ill 
will and hostility between different classes of people But it is not seditious to show m 
SEDITION AND RELATED OFFENCES 35 
are unwiUing to convict unless incitement to immediate violence is 
proved against the accused. 
After the First Amendment of the Indian Constitution, which widened the 
field of permissive legistation, it is probable that section 124A could be brought 
within the ambit of Article 19 (2) I t is equally probable that the Courts might 
find the section ultra vires the Constitution, m so far as it penalises mere exciting 
or attempting to excite feelings of hatred, contempt or disaffection to the 
Government without exciting or attempting to excite disturbance of public 
order Mobilising public opinion against the government by expressing dissat­
isfaction with its activities with a view to changing the government is something 
that is accepted as part of the democratic way of life " In so far as the section 
seeks to penalise such expression of dissatisfaction, it may be regarded as op­
posed to the concept of the freedom of the Press, apart from its being likely to 
be held ultra vires the Constitution 
The Press Commission, in view of the grounds stated above, recom­
mended the repeal of the section.38 They, however, expressed their 
view that it would be desirable to penalise expressions which incite 
persons to alter by violence the system of government with or without 
foreign aid.39 This, they said, could be done by the insertion of a new 
section, 121B.40 
(c) Section 505 of the Penal Code 
Section 505 of the Indian Penal Code provides : 
Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement, rumour or report 
(a) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, any officer, soldier, sailor 
or airman in the Army, Navy or Air Force of Her Majesty or in the Impenal 
Service Troops to mumty or otherwise disregard or fail in his duty as such, or 
(b) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, fear or alarm to the 
public or to any section of the public whereby any person may be induced to 
commit an offence against the State or against the public tranquillity, or 
(c) with intent to incite, or which is likely to incite, any class or community 
of persons to commit any offence against any other class or community, 
shall be pumshed with imprisonment which may extend to two years, or with 
fine, or with both 
good faith that the sovereign has been badly advised, or that there are errors in es­
tablished government and law or causes of ill will between classes of people which 
should be removed, nor to excite people to attempt to cure such defects, provided that 
only lawful means are chosen to make the criticism and only lawful steps advocated 
to cure the defect in question " 
" A writer in The New Statesman and the Nation (December, 17, 1955, at ρ 815) 
remarked in relation to the press in the United Kingdom that the proper function of 
the press "is to create trouble and uproar for those in authority when issues anse on 
which public opinion is deeply disturbed " Professor D Holland commenting on this 
said, "That, to my mind, should be true of the press everywhere" (Current Regal Prob­
lems, Vol 9 (1956) ρ 204) 
3 8




36 SEDITION AND RELATED OFFENCES 
Explanation - I t does not amount to an offence, within the meaning of this 
section, when the person making, publishing or circulating any such statement, 
rumour or report, has reasonable grounds for believing that such statement, 
rumour or report, is true and makes, publishes or circulates it without any such 
intent as aforesaid. 
Clearly the object of the section is to penalise reports calculated to 
produce mutiny and also inducements for one section of the public to 
commit offences against another. It would appear that the section is 
covered by Article 19(2) ; clause (a) would be covered by the provisions 
relating to the security of the state, clause (b) by those relating to 
public order, and clause (c) by those relating to incitement to an 
offence. 
(d) Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1922 
Section 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1922, penal­
ises any act which causes or is likely to cause disaffection towards the 
Government among the members of the Police Force or induces or at­
tempts to induce any member of the Police Force to withhold his 
services or to commit a breach of disciphne. 
(e) Section 27В of the Post Office Act 
Section 27B of the Post Office Act, 1898, enacts that any officer of 
the Post Office authorised by the Post Master General in this behalf 
may detain any postal article in course of transmission by post, which 
he suspects to contain any document of a seditious character, that is, 
any matter the publication of which is punishable under section 124A 
of the Penal Code. Any person interested in the article detained may 
apply for its release, but if the application is rejected, the applicant 
may, within two months, apply to the High Court for its release on 
the ground that the article does not contain any document of a se­
ditious character. 
(f) Sections 181A to 181C of the Sea Customs Act 
Sections 181A to 181С of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, empower the 
government to detain and dispose of any package suspected to contain 
any newspaper or any document the publication of which is punishable 
under Section 124A of the Penal Code, when such newspaper or docu­
ment is brought into, or taken out, of India across any customs 
frontiers. 
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(g) Section 108 of the Criminal Procedure Code 
Section 108 of the Criminal Procedure Code enables the government 
to demand security both from private individuals and from those 
responsible for running, printing and publishing a newspaper if it is 
found that their intention is to disseminate or abet the dissemination 
of any matter which is punishable under section 124A or section 153A 
or any matter concerning a judge which amounts to intimidation or 
defamation. But in the case of newspapers, no proceedings can be 
started against the editor, proprietor, printer or publisher except under 
the authority of the state government or of some officer empowered 
by the State government in this behalf. 
Under section 123 of the Criminal Procedure Code failure to give 
security will result in a sentence of imprisonment. 
(h) Sections 99A to 99G of the Criminal Procedure Code 
Section 99A of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the State 
government to forfeit every issue of a newspaper or a book whenever 
it appears to them that it contains matter falling within the purview 
of section 124A, section 153 A or section 295A41 of the Penal Code. 
Sections 99B to 99G make procedural provisions in relation to the 
forfeiture contemplated under section 99A. They respectively provide 
for application to the High Court for setting aside the order of forfei­
ture, for hearing of the application by a Special Bench, for the order 
of the Bench, for taking of evidence to prove the nature or tendency of 
the newspaper, for procedure in the High Court, and for bar of juris­
diction, otherwise than as provided under section 99B. 
(ІІ) PROMOTING FEELINGS OF ENMITY BETWEEN DIFFERENT CLASSES 
Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code supplements the law of 
sedition. It provides: 
153-A. Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible 
representations, or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote feelings of enmi­
ty or hatred between different classes of His Majesty's subjects, shall be punished 
with imprisonment which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 
Explanation: I t does not amount to an offence within the meaning of this 
section to point out, without malicious intention and with an honest view to 
their removal, matters which are producing, or have a tendency to produce, 
feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of His Majesty's subjects. 
4 1
 See infra, p.52 
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It has been judicially held that the word "classes" in the section 
includes any definite and ascertainable class of citizens and that capi­
talists do not constitute a class within the meaning of this section.42 
It would appear that the section merely enacts the common law princi­
ple which was applied in England in the decision of R. v. Leese and 
Whitehead.*3 In that case it was held to be public mischief to print and 
publish scandalous and libellous sentiments concerning the Jewish 
subj ects of the Crown with intent to create ill will between His Maj esty's 
subjects of the Jewish faith and those not of the Jewish faith. 
Before the First Amendment, following the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Romesh Thappar's case,** the Panjab High Court held that 
the section was void and unconstitutional in as much as it was not 
covered by Article 19(2).4S After the amendment, the Court of the 
Judicial Commissioner of Ajmer upheld the constitutional validity of 
section 3(v) of the Press (Objectionable Matter) Act,47 which correspond­
ed to section 153A of the Penal Code. It was observed by Nigam, J. C, 
that "matters which are likely to promote feelings of enmity or hatred 
between different sections of the people of India are something which 
is likely to affect the interests of public order as it may lead to riot, 
commotion and commission of other offences"48 and that therefore the 
impugned provision did not offend against Article 19(1) (a). The 
Lahore Bench of the West Pakistan High Court took the view that the 
explanation attached to the section49 did not bar the drawing attention 
to objectionable matters which were promoting feelings of hatred or 
enmity in the minds of a group of people. The Court held that the 
restrictions imposed by the section on freedom of speech and ex­
pression were reasonable.50 
From the trend of these decisions it would appear that there is no 
great likelihood of the section being held unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court. Nevertheless, out of abundant caution, the Press 
Commission suggested legislation restricting the operation of the 
4 1
 Emperor v. Mantben Kara, (1932) 34 Bom. L R. 1642 
» (1936) L.J. Newspaper 310 
" 1950 S C.J. 418, 1950 S C R . 594 
" Tara Szngh Goptchand v. State of East Panjab, A.I R. 1951 Panjab 27 
" Ttlok Chand v. The State, A.I R. 1954 Ajmer 19 
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 Section 3(v) of the Act enabled government to take action where matter likely 
" t o promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different sections of the people m 
India" was published. 
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 Ttlok Chand v. The State, A I R . 1954 Ajmer 19 at p. 20 
4
* I t may be recalled that the Penal Code enacted by the British Indian Government 
is the same in both India and Pakistan, except for a few amendments effected after 
the division of India into two Dominions. 
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section "to those cases where there is intention to cause disturbance of 
public peace or knowledge of likelihood of violence ensuing."61 They 
endorsed the view of the Press Laws Enquiry Committee who recom-
mended that a second explanation should be added to section 153A to 
the effect that it would not amount to an offence under this section 
"to advocate a change in the social or economic order, provided that 
any such advocacy is not intended or likely to lead to disorder or to 
the commission of offences."52 
(iii) THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT, 1923 
The Indian Official Secrets Act, 1923, is modelled on the British 
Official Secrets Acts, 1911 and 1920. Section 5 of the Indian Act which 
relates to the press provides : 
If any person having in his possession or control any secret official code or 
pass word or any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information 
which relates to or is used in a prohibited place or relates to anything in such 
a place, or which has been made or obtained in contravention of this Act, or 
which has been entrusted in confidence to him by any person holding office 
under Government, or which he has obtained or to which he has had access 
owing to his position as a person who holds or has held office under Government 
or as a person who holds or has held a contract made on behalf of Government, 
or as a person who is or has been employed under a person who holds or has held 
such an office or contract (a) wilfully communicates the code or pass word, 
sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information to any person other 
than a person to whom he is authorised to communicate it, or a Court of 
Justice or a person to whom it is, in the interests of the State, his duty to 
communicate it; or 
(b) uses the information in his possession for the benefit of any foreign power 
or in any other manner prejudicial to the safety of the State; or 
(c) retains the sketch, plan, model, article, note or document in his possession 
or control when he has no right to retain it, or when it is contrary to his duty 
to retain it, or wilfully fails to comply with all directions issued by lawful au-
thority with regard to the return or disposal thereof; or 
(d) fails to take responsible care of, or so conducts himself as to endanger the 
safety of, the sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, secret official code, 
password or information, 
he shall be guilty of an offence under this section. 
Because it is generally recognised that highly secret information 
concerning the vital interests of the State should not be allowed to be 
disclosed, there appears to have been no serious objection raised against 
the provisions of this Act. The Press Laws Enquiry Committee thought 
" Report. Part I, paragraph 1055 
** Press Laws Enquiry Committee, Report, paragraph 71 
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that the Government should be the sole judge in deciding which confi­
dential information should be published in the public interest and 
without prejudice to the interests of the State and that the democratic 
government in India would make use of these provisions only when 
there would be genuine necessity and in the large interests of the State 
and the people.63 The Press Commission endorsed the view of the news­
paper men that merely because a circular or note was marked secret 
or confidential, it should not be allowed to attract the provisions of 
this Act, if the publication of it would be in the public interest.64 
It is worth mentioning that between the years 1931 and 1946 there 
was only one prosecution under the Act throughout the whole of India, 
even through a foreign government was in power during the period. 
(iv) ENDANGERING FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN STATES 
An explicit constitutional provision enabling the State to restrict 
freedom of expression in the interests of friendly relations with foreign 
states does not appear to be envisaged in any written constitution 
other than that of India.640 But by the comity of nations, many States 
punish libels published by their citizens against the heads of foreign 
States, foreign ambassadors and foreign diplomatic representatives on 
the ground that such libels will endanger peaceful relations with foreign 
countries and may lead to open hostilities. The proposal made by the 
Federal Republic of Germany to enact what the German joumahsts 
called "Lex Soraya" is a recent instance where a State considered it 
necessary to adopt measures in order to protect the repuation of the 
head of a foreign State or a member of his family. It was proposed to 
amend the German criminal law providing for punishment to any 
person who published a statement of a factual nature concerning the 
private or family life of the head of a foreign State or a member of his 
family and capable of endangering the external relations of the Federal 
Republic. The offender was to be liable to punishment irrespective of 
и
 Report of the Committee, paragraph 64 
" Report of the Press Commission, paragraph 1048. Article 3550 С of the Penal Law 
of the Federal Republic of Germany provides that any person who discloses the contents 
of "an official document labelled secret or confidential" is liable to punishment. This is 
a provision which German journalists regard with intense disfavour. 
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Act forms part of the Constitution. 
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the truth or falsehood of the statement. The background of the pro-
posed legislation, it was generally known, was the diplomatic protest 
from the government of Persia occasioned by the writings in the West 
German press on Soraya, the former Queen of Persia. 
With a view to maintaining peaceful relations with other countries, 
in Syria and Turkey there are legislative provisions enabling the 
government to suspend temporarily any periodical publishing articles 
which are likely to compromise international relations. While Mexico 
protects only those States with which it has friendly relations penalising 
insults to such States, their heads, and their official representatives in 
Mexico, the laws of Belgium and France are more restrictive in that 
they punish "whomsoever shall, by any hostile acts, not approved by 
the government, have laid the State open to a declaration of war." A 
press campaign against a neighbouring State may be regarded as a 
hostile act likely to create hatred and lead to war ; but as the chain of 
cause and effect would be difficult to establish, this provision of law 
in these two countries has never been applied. In England it is a mis-
demeanour at common law to publish any libel tending to degrade, 
revile, expose to hatred or contempt any foreign prince, ambassador 
or dignitary, with intent to disturb peace and friendship between the 
United Kingdom and the country to which any such person belongs.55 
But if the writing is a fair criticism on a matter of public interest56 or 
if it is calculated to disturb only the government of a foreign country,57 
it is no offence. The Foreign Enhstment Act, 1870, seeks to preserve 
friendly relations with foreign States at peace with the United King-
dom by enacting that it would be an offence, if a British subject, 
without the King's licence, (i) accepts a commission or engagement in 
the armed forces of a foreign State at war with a friendly State, or 
leaves the country with intent to accept such engagement, or (ii) 
builds, equips or dispatches a ship knowing or having reasonable cause 
to believe that it will be employed by a foreign State at war with a 
friendly State, or (iii) prepares or fits out a naval or military expedition 
agamst the territory of a friendly State. Incitement to do any of the 
above acts is also declared an offence under the Act. 
It is of interest to recall the view expressed by the British govern-
ment when the Nazi government of Germany made a diplomatic 
protest agamst the tone of a large section of the British press which 
« R. v. Gordon (1787) 22 St. Tr. 213 
· · Stephen, Digest of Criminal Law, Artide 133 
« R. v. Antonelli, 70 J .P . 4 
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was highly critical of the surrender made by Neville Chamberlain. The 
British government was of the view that the press in Britain was free 
and that the government could neither guide the press nor impose 
restrictions on the freedom of expression enjoyed by the press in the 
interests of friendly relations with foreign States. 
There was considerable criticism when, by the First Amendment to 
the Indian Constitution, "friendly relations with foreign States" was 
introduced as one of the subjects in respect of which there could be 
reasonable restrictions on the right to freedom of speech and expression. 
I t was pointed out that the words "in the interests of friendly relations 
with foreign States" were of very wide connotation and might con-
ceivably be reUed upon to support any legislation which might restrict 
even legitimate criticism of the foreign policy of the government. The 
same point was raised before the Indian Press Commission. The Com-
mission while expressing themselves in favour of the Parliament having 
this reserve power, recommended that "whatever legislation might be 
framed in the interest of friendly relations with foreign States, it should 
be confined in its operation to cases of systematic diffusion of deliber-
ately false and distorted reports which undermine relations with 
foreign States, and should not punish any sporadic utterance or dis-
semination of true facts although they may have the tendency of 
endangering the friendly relations with foreign States."58 I t may be 
recalled in this connexion that Article 2(j) of the Covenant on Freedom 
of Information and the Press prepared by the United Nations Confer-
ence at Geneva in 1948 provided for necessary legislative restrictions 
being placed with regard to the "systematic diffusion of deliberately 
false and distorted reports which undermine friendly relations between 
peoples or States." When the Commission on Human Rights was con-
sidering a draft which did not include a clause on the lines of Article 
2(j) of the Covenant, the Indian representative suggested an amend-
ment to add the words, "or for the prevention of spreading deliberately 
false and distorted reports which undermine friendly relations with 
peoples and States." But the suggestion was rejected. The representa-
tives of the United Kingdom and the Philippines expressed their 
apprehension that, in an effort to eliminate the danger visualised by the 
Indian representative, all information regarding foreign countries 
might be made subject to censorship, thus destro jong the very freedom 
which the Covenant sought to safeguard. As was pointed out in the 
note of dissent on press legislation expressive of the minority view of 
88
 Press Commission of India, Report, Part I, Paragraph 993 
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the Indian Press Commission, "It will be seen, therefore, that the weight 
of international opinion is not in favour of placing any such restric­
tion".59 
Speaking of the proposed amendment to Article 19, Dr Ambedkar, 
the Law Minister, explained to the Parliament that the underlying 
principle of introducing "friendly relations with foreign States" in the 
subjects mentioned in subclause (2) was nothing more than the ex­
tension of the principle of defamation with respect to a foreign 
State. It would appear that the expression "defamation" in the 
subclause would cover defamation of heads of foreign States, their 
families and diplomatic representatives.60 If matter published against 
a State is such as to imperil relations with that State to the extent of 
creating a likelihood of open hostdities, economic sanctions or any 
other grave consequences, it will be covered by the expression "se­
curity of State" in the subclause. It appears therefore that the addition 
of the words "friendly relations with foreign States" may, in the main 
tend to serve only the purpose that was apprehended ; that is, that it 
would enable the government to deny the citizens the right to criticise 
the foreign policy of the government. If it was intended to protect 
Pakistan from hostile criticism by the Indian press, that purpose could 
not be served by the inclusion of this category. For Pakistan is not to 
be deemed a foreign State for purposes of the Indian Constitution. 
According to the Constitution (Declaration as to Foreign States) Order, 
1950, the members of the Commonwealth of Nations are not foreign 
States for the purposes of the Constitution.61 Hence restrictions 
contemplated under the category "friendly relations with foreign States" 
cannot, it would appear, be extended to adverse criticism of Pakistan. 
It may be that in its pursuit of a policy of non-allignment and neu­
trality, the government of India who sponsored the amendment, do 
not appreciate any unfavourable criticism of a foreign State ; if that 
· · га., paragraph 1146 
^ Section 4 of the Civil Procedure Code provides : A foreign State may sue in any 
Court in India, provided the object of the suit is to enforce a private nght vested in 
the Ruler of such State or in any officer of such State m his public capacity 
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 Article 367(3) of the Constitution of India provides. "For the purposes of this 
Constitution 'foreign State' means any State other than India, provided that, subject 
to the provisions of any law made by Parliament, the President may by order declare 
any State not to be a foreign State for such purposes as may be specified in the order " 
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be so, it is an aspect of the government's foreign policy. And if the 
inclusion of this subject in Article 19(2) tends to help the government 
in silencing or restraining criticism of their policy, the provision cannot 
be regarded as being in consonance with the concept of freedom of the 
press. 
CHAPTER III 
PUBLIC ORDER AND INCITEMENT TO AN OFFENCE 
(І) PUBLIC ORDER 
As the essential rights are subject to the essential need for order 
without which the guarantee of civil rights would be a mockery,1 re­
strictions on freedom of expression are considered permissible in the 
interests of public order and in relation to incitement to an offence. 
"Public order is an expression of wide connotation and signifies that 
state of tranquillity which prevails among the members of a political 
society as a result of the internal regulations enforced by the govern­
ment which they have estabUshed."2 
According to the view expressed by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, the "offence known as breach of the peace embraces a great 
variety of conduct destroying or menacing public order and tranquillity. 
It includes not only violent acts and words likely to produce violence 
in others. No one would have the hardihood to suggest that the princi­
ple of freedom of speech sanctions incitement to riot... When clear and 
present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the 
public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace and 
order appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious."3 
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court indicate that a 
variety of restrictions may be regarded as permissible in the interests 
of public order. In fact they cover most of the restrictions that are 
permitted under the various heads in Article 19(2) of the Indian 
Constitution. To cite a few instances, it has been held by the Supreme 
Court that the State may punish speeches and expressions of opinion 
tending to incite an immediate breach of the peace4 or riot,5 regulate 
the places and hours of public meetings and discussions,6 and the use 
of public streets in relation to the exercise of the right to freedom of 
1
 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, (1947) 330 U.S. 75 a t 95 
• Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, (1950) S C R 594 a t 598 
» Cantwell v. Connecticut, (1940) 310 U S. 296 at 308 
• Chaphnsky v. New Hampshire, (1942) 315 U S 568 
s
 Cantwell v. Connecticut, (1940) 310 U S. 296 
• Saia v. New York, (1948) 334 U.S. 558 
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speech,7 prohibit and punish the making of loud and raucous noise in 
streets and public places by means of amplifiers,8 and even make 
provision for the expulsion of hecklers from public meetings.9 
In England there are certain statutes which permit restrictions on 
freedom of expression in the interests of public order. The Theatres 
Act, 1843, empowers the Lord Chamberlain to prohibit the perform-
ance of any stage play whenever he has reason to believe that such 
performance would go against good manners, decorum or the preser-
vation of public order. The Public Order Act, 1936, is mainly intended 
to prevent unseemly behaviour at public meetings. It prohibits, among 
other things, the use of threatening, abusive or insulting words or 
behaviour in any public place or at any public meeting with intent to 
provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace is 
likely to be caused. Under common law blasphemous libel is punishable 
on the ground that the publication of such libel may cause a breach 
of the peace.10 
In India under the provisions of Article 19(2) this wide concept of 
"public order" seems to have been split up under different heads. As 
observed by Subba Rao, J.,11 all the grounds mentioned in the sub-
clause can be brought under the general head "public order" in the 
most comprehensive sense. "But the juxtaposition of the different 
grounds," he said, "indicates that, though sometimes they tend to 
overlap, they must be ordinarily intended to exclude each other. 
Public order is therefore something which is demarcated from the 
others. In that limited sense, particularly in view of the history of the 
(first) amendment, it can be postulated that "public order" is synony-
mous with public peace, safety and tranquillity."12 
(a) Public order distinguished from security of State 
We have already noticed in what circumstances the amendment to 
Article 19(2) came to be made. The wide interpretation given to the 
expression "public order" is not accepted by the Indian Courts when 
it occurs in Article 19(2). This may be seen from the dissenting judge-
ment of Fazl Ali, J., in Brij Bhushan's case13 where the learned Judge 
7
 Schneider v. Irvtngion (1939) 308 U.S. 147 
' Kovacs v. Cooper, (1949) 336 U.S. 77 
• idem 
10
 R. v. Leese and Whttehead. (1936) L.J. (Newspaper) 310 
11
 Superintendent, Central Pnson v. Dr Lohia, (1960) S.C.J. 567 
12
 idem, page 574 
18
 Bnj Bhushan v. State of Delhi, (1950) S.C.R. 605 
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gave a wider meaning to the expression than that given by the ma-
jority. Fazl Ah, J., observed: 
".. . while 'public disorder' is wide enough to cover a small riot or an 
affray and other cases where peace is disturbed by, or affects, a small 
group of persons, 'public unsafety' (or msecurity of State) will usually 
be connected with serious internal disorders and such disturbances of 
public tranquillity as jeopardise the security of the State."14 
The majority view elaborated in Romesh Thappar v. State of Ma-
dras,16 emphasised that the Constitution, "in formulating the varying 
criteria for permissible legislation imposing restrictions on the funda-
mental right enumerated in Article 19(1) had placed in a distinct 
category those offences against public order which aimed at under-
mining the security of the State or overthrowing it."16 Patanjali Sastri, 
J . (as he then was), observed, that the Constitution "requires a line to 
be drawn in the field of pubUc order or tranquillity marking off, may 
be, roughly, the boundary between those serious and aggravated forms 
of public disorder which are calculated to endanger the security of the 
State and the relatively minor breaches of the peace of a purely local 
significance, treating for this purpose differences in degree as if they 
were differences in kind."17 
The decision in these two cases established two propositions, namely, 
(i) that the maintenance of public order is to be equated with the 
maintenance of public tranquillity and (ii) that the offences against 
public order are to be divided into two categories, namely, (a) major 
offences affecting the security of the State and (b) minor offences 
involving breaches of the peace of a purely local significance. As we 
have seen it was to bring the second category of offences within the 
scope of permissible restrictions on the right to freedom of expression 
that the words "public order" were inserted in Article 19(2) by the 
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. 
Thus "public order" as used in the Constitution, "is synonymous 
with public safety and tranquillity; it is the absence of disorder in-
volving breaches of local significance in contradistinction to national 
upheavals, such as revolution, civil strife, war, affecting the security 
of the State."18 
" idem at 612 
" (1950) S.C.R. 594 
16
 idem at page 600 
17
 idem a t page 601 
18
 Superintendent, Central Prison v. Dr Lohia, (1960) S.C.J. 567 at 577 
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(b) Section 5 of the Indian Telegraph Act 
There are some statutory provisions in India relating to the mainte-
nance of public order. Section 5 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, for 
example, provides that on the occurrence of any public emergency or 
in the interests of public safety, Government or any officer specially 
authorised by Government may (i) take temporary possession of any 
telegraph estabhshed, maintained or worked by any licensed person 
and (ii) order that any message or class of messages from any person 
or class of person or relating to any particular subject brought for 
transmission by or transmitted or received by any telegraph shall not 
be transmitted or shall be intercepted or detained or shall be disclosed 
to Government or the officer specially authorised. A certificate from 
the Central or State Government will be conclusive proof as to whether 
there is an emergency or whether any act done under the section is in 
the interest of public safety. 
As the emergency contemplated under the section is not necessarily 
wartime emergency, the section in effect permits imposition of censor-
ship on communication of news during peace time under certain con-
ditions. Though Government seem to consider that a reserve of such 
powers is necessary in times of emergency and in the interest of public 
safety, Indian journalists in general point out that the powers under 
the section have been exercised under pressure from the local executive 
even when there has been no emergency and no threat to public safety. 
The Press Laws Enquiry Committee, after considering the actual 
operation of the section, have made a sagacious suggestion to which 
the Press Commission have lent their support.19 They have recom-
mended that the Central and State Governments should continue to 
have the power of telegraphic interception for use on special occasions 
of the occurrence of a public emergency or in the interests of public 
safety provided the orders of the Minister in charge are invariably 
obtained, that delegations of this power should be sparingly made, 
that delegations, when made, should be for a specified and short period 
and not general, and that clear instructions should be issued by Govern-
ment to specially authorised officers in order to ensure that the power 
is not abused. As an additional safeguard against the abuse of the 
powers by subordinate officers, the Committee have further recom-
mended that provision should be made in the section itself, for example, 
by the addition of another subsection to the effect that the orders 
" Press Commission of India, Report, Part I. paragraph 1067 
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passed by the specially authorised officers of Government shall be 
reported to the Central or State Government, as the case may be, in 
order to enable the responsible Minister to judge the proper exercise 
of the powers and the orders passed in individual cases.20 
(c) Section 26 of the Post Office Act 
Section 26 of the Post Office Act, 1898, is similar in its general 
purport to section 5 of the Telegraph Act. It enables Government or 
any officer specially authorised in this behalf, on the occurrence of any 
public emergency or in the interest of public safety or tranquillity, to 
direct, by order in writing, that any article in course of transmission 
by post should be intercepted or detained or disposed of in such manner 
as the authority issuing the order may direct. As under subsection 2 
of section 5 of the Telegraph Act, a certificate from Government would 
be conclusive proof of the existence of an emergency or as to whether 
the act done under the section is done in the interest of public safety 
or tranquillity. 
The remarks made about section S of the Telegraph Act are in 
general applicable to this section of the Post Office Act. 
(d) Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code 
Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, confers on 
experienced Magistrates summary powers to deal with local emergen-
cies. This section enables them to deal temporarily with urgent cases 
of nuisance or apprehended danger. It enacts that whenever it appears 
to a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate or other Magistrate 
of the first or second class specially empowered under this section that 
immediate prevention or abatement of a public nuisance or speedy 
action to prevent an apprehended danger to the public is desirable, he 
can issue a written order setting forth the material facts of the case 
and served as a summons, directing any person to abstain from a 
certain act or to take specified order with certain property in his pos-
session or under his management. Such a direction can be given to 
prevent obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully em-
ployed, danger to human life, health or safety, disturbance of the 
public tranquillity, or riot or affray. In cases of emergency the order 
can be passed ex parte. It can either be directed to a person individually 
or to the public generally when present in a particular place. The 
quoted in Press Commission's Report, Part I, paragraph 1065 
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Magistrate can rescind or alter the order either suo motu от on the 
application of the person aggrieved. On receipt of the application, the 
person is entitled to be heard. If the appUcation is rejected, the reason 
for the rejection must be recorded. An order under this section win 
remain in force for two months only; but in special cases it can be 
continued longer by a notification of the State Government. 
The power conferred upon a Magistrate under this section is an 
extraordinary power and he should resort to it only when he is satisfied 
that other powers with which he is entrusted are insufficient to deal 
with the situation.21 The existence of circumstances showing the ne­
cessity of immediate action is a condition precedent to the Magistrate's 
exercising the powers conferred by this section.22 The question whether 
there is an emergency is prima facie for the Magistrate and it has been 
held that the High Court will not lightly interfere.23 
Every order issued under this section, as mentioned above, expires 
at the end of two months, and the Magistrate cannot revive or resusci­
tate his order from time to time,24 unless it can be justified by circum­
stances which have supervened since the original order ; these must be 
set out in the subsequent order, and be prima facie sufficient to justify 
the subsequent order.25 
Until 1923 a ban was placed upon the High Court's power of revision 
with regard to proceedings under this section. But by repeal of section 
435(3) by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1923, the 
High Court has been enabled to deal on revision with an order issued 
under it. In P. T. Chandra v. The Emperor™ it has been held that the 
propriety of the order as well as its legality can be considered by the 
High Court in revision. It has been observed in the same case that the 
power conferred by this section is a discretionary one, and being large 
and extraordinary, it should be used sparingly and only where all the 
conditions prescribed are strictly fulfilled. 
The validity of the section after the adoption of the Constitution 
was questioned in an Allahabad case. In State v. Deadley MisraP the 
High Court held that an order issued under the section by a District 
Magistrate for the maintenance of public peace and tranquillity, one 
2 1
 Sundaram Ghetti v. The Queen (18B2) I.L.R. 6 Madras 203. Section 144 co rresponds 
to section 518 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872. 
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» Emperor v. G. V. Mavlankar, (1930) I.L R. SO Bom. 322 
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of the clauses of which was that no one should arrange, organise or 
take part in any demonstration whatsoever from September 15, 1950 
to October 31, 1950, must be taken as a reasonable order and not of 
an excessive nature beyond what was required in the interests of the 
pubüc. The Court sustained the provisions of the section as valid, 
observing that having regard to the First Amendment there could be 
no two opinions that the section was never in conflict with Article 19 
of the Constitution. 
There seems to be general agreement in India that this section should 
not be applied to the press, though it is sometimes pointed out that 
in so far as it enables Government to act immediately in cases where 
there is a likelihood of disturbance of public tranquillity, it is not 
inconsistent with the concept of the freedom of the press or with 
Article 19(2) of the Constitution. In his report on the Calcutta police 
assault on press reporters, Mukherjea, J., expressed the view that 
reporters could not claim exemption from the operation of an order 
under section 144 prohibiting the assembly of more than a certain 
number of persons merely because of the fact that they were press 
reporters.28 It is submitted with great respect that the learned judge 
is undoubtedly correct in his view; but there are practical difficulties 
which clamour for attention and solution. If a meeting is held in contra-
vention of the order issued under this section, the very holding of the 
meeting as well as all that takes place at the meeting is news and it is 
the duty of the reporters to cover such news. It may be argued that 
they could cover the news by going in groups of less than the pro-
hibited number of persons, but this procedure, if adopted, may prove 
risky in most instances, mainly because it may involve the likelihood 
of personal danger and also of being mistaken for members of the 
unlawful assembly. The Press Commission recommended that "when 
an order is issued prohibiting the assemblage of more than a certain 
number of persons the authority concerned may grant, in the order 
itself, special exemption to bona fide reporters. They should be asked 
to wear distinctive badges in token of the special exemption and carry 
the permit on their person."29 
The recommendations made by the Press Laws Enquiry Committee 
in regard to the apphcation of this section deserve special notice. They 
felt that it was not the intention of the framers of the Code that this 
section should be applied to the press. They doubted the propriety of 
ω
 cited in the Press Commission Report, Part I, paragraph 1062 
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applying the provisions of this section to newspapers and recommended 
that "Instructions should be issued by Government to Magistrates 
that orders in respect of newspapers should not be passed under this 
section. If Government consider it necessary to have powers for issue 
of temporary orders to newspapers in urgent cases of apprehended 
danger, Government may promote separate legislation or seek an 
amendment of section 144 for the purpose."30 It may be mentioned 
that the Press Commission wholeheartedly supported the observations 
made by the Press Laws Enquiry Committee.31 
(e) Section 295A of the Penal Code 
Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code provides punishment for 
deliberately and maliciously outraging the reHgious feelings of any 
class of subjects by words either spoken or written or by visible repre­
sentations, or insulting or attempting to insult the religion or religious 
beliefs of that class. The constitutional validity of the section was 
challenged before the Supreme Court in Ramji Lai Modi v. State of 
Uttar Pradesh.31a The Court upheld its validity as being covered by 
the provisions relating to public order in Article 19(2). The Court ob­
served that the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by Articles 25 
and 26 of the Constitution was expressly made subject to public order, 
morality and health, so that it could not be predicated that freedom 
of religion could not have any bearing whatever in the maintenance of 
public order or that a law enacting an offence relating to religion could 
not under any circumstances be said to have been enacted in the 
interests of public order. These two Articles (that is, 25 and 26) "in 
terms contemplate that restriction may be imposed on the rights 
guaranteed by them in the interests of public order."31" In this case 
the Court appears to have laid down a new rule in testing restrictions 
imposed on the right to freedom of expression in the interests of public 
order. It has held that a law might impose valid restrictions on ex­
pressions which have a tendency to cause public disorder but which 
may not actually lead to any breach of public order. If (to quote from 
the opinion of Das, С J.) "certain activities have a tendency to cause 
public disorder, a law penalising such activities as an offence cannot 
but be held to be a law imposing reasonable restrictions 'in the interests 
> 0
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of public order,' although in some cases these activities may not lead 
to a breach of public order."310 The learned Chief Justice has also 
pointed out that the impugned section "only punishes the aggravated 
forms of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with the deliberate 
and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings" of a class 
of citizens. The calculated tendency of the aggravated form of insult 
would clearly be to disrupt public order and it has, therefore, been held 
that the section which penalises such activities is well within the 
protection of Article \9(2).21d 
It is submitted with great respect that the validity of the section 
may as well be sustained under the provision relating to morality in 
Article 19(2). 
(f) Public Security Acts 
In some of the States of India there are statutes which impose re­
strictions on freedom of speech and expression in the interests prima­
rily of public order or public security. The West Bengal Security Act, 
1950, the Madhya Bharat Public Security Act, 1953, and the Panjab 
Security of State Act, 1953, are examples of such statutes. Most of 
these statutes impose restrictions on all media of expression, but there 
are some enactments like the Panjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956, 
which are specially intended to apply to the press. We have seen that 
the Supreme Court invalidated one of the provisions of the Panjab 
Special Powers (Press) Act, as it was found to be unreasonable both 
from the substantive and the procedural points of view.32 
It is of interest to notice the interpretation given by the Courts to 
some of the provisions of these Security Acts. Section 9 of the Panjab 
Security of State Act penalised the publication of any statement which 
"undermines the security of the State, public order, decency or mo­
rality or amounts to... defamation or incitement to an offence preju­
dicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order... " 
This Act was passed by the State legislature under its legislative power 
relating to public order. The appellants in Kartar Singh v. State of 
Punjab33 were prosecuted under this provision for uttering abusive 
slogans against the Minister of Transport and the Chief Minister while 
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Government to nationalise motor transport. They were convicted on the 
ground that the slogans amounted to defamation, and undermined 
public order and also decency and morality. On appeal the Supreme 
Court found that the utterances in the circumstances of the case did 
not undermine decency or morality. As to defamation the Court held 
that defamation could be punished under the Act only when the defa­
matory statements were of such a character as to be prejudicial to the 
security of the State or the maintenance of public order. In the present 
case it was found that there was no evidence of the statements causing 
any reasonable apprehension of the breach of the peace. The Court 
observed: "These slogans were certainly defamatory of the Transport 
Minister and the Chief Minister of the Panjab Government, but the 
redress of that grievance was personal to these individuals and the 
State authorities could not take the cudgels on their behalf by having 
recourse to section 9 of the Act unless and until the defamation of 
these individuals was prejudicial to the security of the State or mainte­
nance of public order."34 
We have already seen that the Patna High Court upheld section 5 
of the Bihar Essential Services Maintenance Act, 1949, observing that 
it was permissible for the State in the interests of public order to 
restrict or penalise utterances inducing persons employed in the es­
sential services to withhold their services or to commit a breach of 
discipline.36 
In a recent case the constitutional validity of section 3 of the Uttar 
Pradesh Special Powers Act, 1932, was successfully challenged before 
the Supreme Court.36 The Act was passed in 1932 by the British 
Government as a temporary measure to be in force for one year in an 
attempt to offset the campaign for non-payment of taxes and other 
forms of agitation to which the Congress Party resorted. In 1940 when 
the State came under Governor's rule the Act was made permanent. 
After the adoption of the Constitution the enactment was retained, 
with certain adaptations, on the statute book. Section 3 of the Act 
provided: 
"Whoever, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by 
visible representations or otherwise, instigates expressly or by impli­
cation, any person or class of persons not to pay or defer payment of 
any liability, and whoever does any act, with intent or knowing it to 
»* idem at 542 
" State v. Ramanand Tiwari, A.I.R. 1956 Patna 1Θ8 
« Superintendent, Central Prison v. Dr R. M. Lohta, (1960) S.C.J. 567 
PUBLIC ORDER AND INCITEMENT TO AN OFFENCE 5 5 
be likely that any words, signs or visible representations containing 
such instigation shall thereby be communicated directly or indirectly 
to any person or class of persons, in any manner whatsoever, shall be 
punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or 
with fine, extending to Rs. 250, or with both." Section 2 defined "lia­
bility" to mean "land revenue, or any sum recoverable as arrears of 
land revenue or any tax, rate, cess or other dues or amount payable 
to government or to any local authority, or rent of agricultural land 
or anything recoverable as arrears of or along with such rent." 
Superintendent, Central Prison v. Dr Ram Manohar Lohia37 arose out 
of Dr Lohia's making two speeches instigating the audience not to pay 
enhanced irrigation rates to the Government. The Uttar Pradesh 
Government had enhanced the rates for water supplied to cultivators 
and the Socialist Party of India under Dr Lohia's leadership had 
resolved to start an agitation against the enhancement for the alleged 
reason that it was an unbearable burden on the cultivators. 
Subba Rao, J., delivering the opinion of the Court quoted with 
approval the observations of Das, С J., in Virendra v. State ofPanjab** 
wherein the learned Chief Justice had said, referring to the words "in 
the interests of public order" in the amended subclause (2) of Article 
19, that 
"... the words 'in the interests of ' are words of great amplitude and 
are much wider than the words 'for the maintenance of.' The expression 
'in the interests of' makes the ambit of the protection very wide, for 
a law may not have been designed to directly maintain the public 
order or to directly protect the general public against any particular 
evil and yet it may have been enacted 'in the interests of' the public 
order or the general public as the case may be."3 9 The learned judge 
stated that the observations of the Chief Justice did not indicate that 
any remote or fanciful connexion between the impugned Act and the 
public order would be sufficient to sustain its validity. He proceeded 
to state: "The learned Chief Justice was only making a distinction 
between an Act which expressly and directly purported to maintain 
public order and one which did not expressly state the said purpose 
but left it to be implied therefrom, and between an Act that directly 
maintained public order and one that indirectly brought about the 
same result. The distinction does not ignore the necessity for intimate 
" (I960) S.CJ. 567 
» 1958 S.C.R. 30Θ 
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connection between the Act and the public order sought to be main­
tained by the Act."40 
Referring to the test of reasonableness to be applied to the impugned 
provision of law, the learned Judge observed that the "limitation im­
posed in the interests of public order to be a reasonable restriction, 
should be one which has a proximate connection or nexus with public 
order, but not one far-fetched, hypothetical or problematical or too 
remote in the chain of its relation with public order."41 
Under the impugned section any instigation by word or visible 
representation not to pay or defer payment of any exaction or even 
contractual dues to government, authority or land owner was made 
an offence. Even innocuous utterances were made punishable. The 
Court therefore found that there was no proximate or foreseeable 
connexion between such instigation and the public order sought to be 
protected under the section. The Court observed: "Unless there is a 
proximate connexion between the instigation and the public order, the 
restriction, in our view, is neither reasonable nor is it in the interests 
of public order."42 
(g) Wide Powers of the Executive 
Under the legislative provisions mentioned above the Executive is 
entrusted with very wide powers. For instance, both under the Tele­
graph Act and the Post Offices Act a certificate from the Government 
would be conclusive proof as to whether the act done under the relevant 
section is done in the interest of public safety. A large number of 
Magistrates are given extraordinary powers under section 144 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, though the High Courts are enabled to 
deal in revision with an order passed under the section. Under certain 
provisions like the one in section 2 of the Panjab Special Powers (Press) 
Act, 1956, the Executive is granted wide powers exercisable on its 
subjective satisfaction. In Virendra v. State of Panjab*3 the Supreme 
Court attempted to justify such grant of power. Referring to section 2 
of the Panjab Act, Das, С J., expressed the view that as the State 
Government was charged with the preservation of law and order in the 
State and as it alone was in possession of all material facts, it would 
be the best authority to investigate the circumstances and assess the 
1 0
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urgency of the situation that might arise and to decide whether any, 
and if so, what anticipatory action must be taken for the preservation 
of threatened or anticipated breach of the peace. The Court, he said, 
"is wholly unsuited to guage the seriousness of the situation, for it 
cannot be in possession of materials which are available only to the 
executive government. Therefore the determination of the time when 
and the extent to which restrictions should be imposed on the press 
must of necessity be left to the judgement and discretion of the State 
Government." 4 4 The Court held that the conferment of wide powers 
to be exercised on the subjective satisfaction of the government or its 
delegate as to the necessity for their exercise for the purpose of pre­
venting or combating any activity prejudicial to the maintenance of 
communal harmony affecting or likely to affect public order could not, 
in view of the surrounding circumstances and tension brought about 
or aided by the agitation in the press be regarded as anything but the 
imposition of permissible reasonable restrictions on the fundamental 
right. Quick decision and swift and effective action, the Court observed, 
must be of the essence of these powers and their exercise must, there­
fore, be left to the subjective satisfaction of the Government charged 
with the duty of maintaining law and order. The Court further ob­
served: "To make the exercise of these powers justiciable and subject 
to judicial scrutiny will defeat the very purpose of the enactment." 4 5 
Das, С J., gave a further reason why the exercise of the power could 
not be made justiciable. If it is so made, the Court would be substi­
tuting its satisfaction for that of the Executive and that is not what is 
intended under the legislative provision. To quote from his opinion: 
"If the State Government or its delegate is satisfied that for the pur­
poses of achieving specified objects it is necessary to prohibit the 
publication of any matter,... then for the Court to say that so much 
restriction is not necessary to achieve those objects is only to substitute 
its own satisfaction for that of the State Government or its delegate."4 6 
The Court was also of the view that no assumption ought to be made 
that the State Government or the officers to whom the State Govern­
ment might delegate its authority would abuse the power granted. 
"Even if the officer may conceivably abuse the power, what 
4 4
 idem at page 94 
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 ibid. I t may be mentioned that even in his dissenting opinion in Khare v. State 
of Delhi (1950 S.C.J. 328) Mukherjea, J., conceded that in cases of this description 
certain authorities could be invested with power to make initial orders on their own 
satisfaction and not on materials which would satisfy certain objective tests. 
" idem at page 97 
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will be struck down is not the statute, but the abuse of power."47 
The general principle is that if a law sets out its underlying policy 
so that the order to be made under the law is to be governed by that 
policy and the discretion given to the authority is to be exercised in 
such a way as to effectuate that policy, the conferment of a discretion 
so regulated cannot be considered invalid.48 
We may consider in passing how far the right to freedom of expression 
may be liable to restriction on the subjective satisfaction of the Execu-
tive under laws providing for preventive detention during time of peace. 
It would seem that restrictive action based on the subjective satis-
faction of the Executive can easily take the form of negation of freedom 
under the constitutional provisions permitting preventive detention. 
A newspaperman preventively detained will not be in a position to 
exercise his right to freedom of expression through the medium of the 
press. It would appear that there were instances where persons who 
might be prosecuted for instigating breaches of public order were, as 
a matter of convenience, detained under the Preventive Detention Act, 
1951. To cite one instance: Sarju, a Communist leader was detained 
under the provisions of this Act. To quote from the opinion of the High 
Court in Sarju v. Uttar Pradesh,*·9 he "was accused of having deUvered 
a number of speeches... inciting people to violence and the District 
Magistrate therefore felt satisfied that it was necessary to make the 
detention order with a view to preventing the petitioner from acting 
in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State and the mainte-
nance of public order."60 Again, in Ram Singh v. State of Delhi,51 it 
appears that on the allegations of fact made against the detainee, it 
would have been possible to prosecute him under section 153A of the 
Penal Code. If section 124A or section 153A of the Penal Code had 
become of doubtful vaüdity on account of certain decisions and obser-
vations of the superior Courts, the remedy should have been an amend-
ment of the relevant legislative provisions and not recourse to the 
Preventive Detention Act. It is inconceivable that the framers of the 
*' idem a t page 95 
" Virendra v. State of Panjab, 1958 S.C.J. 88 at 95 
" A.I.R. 1956 Allahabad 589 
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Constitution ever intended the provisions regarding preventive de-
tention included (ironically enough) in the chapter on Fundamental 
Rights should be resorted to as a facile alternative for prosecution 
under the criminal law of the land. 
In Ram Singh's case the Supreme Court held that the detainee was 
not entitled to raise before the Court the question whether the speeches 
alleged to have been made by him were deserving of constitutional 
protection under Article 19, though avowedly it was to prevent his 
making such speeches that an order of detention had been made 
against him. This holding seems to have been a corollary to the position 
the Supreme Court had taken in State of Bombay v. Atmaram Sridhar 
Vaidya,62 in which the Court observed that it would not consider itself 
authorised to scrutinize whether the grounds of detention stated by 
the Government were sufficient to justify detention, as such determi-
nation was a matter left entirely to the subjective satisfaction of the 
detaining authority. 
The Courts appear to have also denied themselves the right to 
examine the factual correctness of the grounds of detention stated by 
the Government even when the detainee seeks to establish mala fides 
on the part of the Government in confirming the order of detention 
made by subordinate officers.83 
Even assuming that the allegations made by the Government are 
irrefutable and that the Government's apprehensions about the proba-
ble future activities of the detainee are well-founded and their as-
sessment of the adverse effect of such activities on public interest 
appears reasonable, it would appear that it is still open to the Court 
to examine whether the activity sought to be curbed by means of 
preventive detention is one that is entitled to constitutional protection. 
If this constitutional issue is to be left to the subjective satisfaction of 
the authority making the order of detention, or of the Government, 
the constitutional guarantee of fundamental rights, including the 
right to freedom of expression, may easily vanish into thin air.64 
" 1951 S.C.J. 208. In Vaidya's case the activity sought to be prevented by detention 
was disruption of railway services, an activity which, by its very nature, could not 
possibly claim constitutional protection. But in Ram Singh's case the allegation was 
tha t he made speeches exciting communal disharmony between Hindus and Muslims 
in Delhi. This was a case where the quality of the activity sought to be prevented could 
be regarded as a matter for judicial scrutiny, involving as it did a constitutional issue 
vital to the maintenance of the balance between individual freedom and governmental 
authority, of which the Supreme Court is the final arbiter. 
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(h) The Expression "in the interests of public order" 
The note of dissent on press legislation submitted by four members 
of the Press Commission suggested an amendment to Article 19(2) 
substituting the words "in the interests of prevention of public dis­
order" for the words "in the interests of public order." The expression 
"public order," they said, was capable of a multiplicity of interpretations. 
It might extend from the observance of a municipal order regarding 
traffic lights to public tranquillity sought to be maintained by an 
order under section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is con­
ceivable that the press might on some occasion consider it its duty to 
bring to public notice the un justifiability or unreasonableness of an 
order in fairly strong language and this may be interpreted as an 
interference with public order. "As we view it," they said, "a certain 
element of risk has to be taken in the matter. The Press exists to 
reflect, as far as possible, public opinion and if there is an unjustifiable 
order, it may be called upon to condemn it in such terms as to compel 
the authorities to reverse it. Freedom of expression has always been 
taken to cover such cases."55 They cited instances where the expression 
"prevention of public disorder" appears to have been preferred to 
phrases hke "maintenance of public order" and "in the interests of 
public order." Such documents of international significance as the 
Covenant on Freedom of Information and the Press, the draft con­
vention on freedom of information, and Monsieur Lopez's report to 
the Economic and Social Council refer to public disorder. 
The majority of the Commission thought that it was "risky to 
substitute for the concept some new and perhaps vaguer terms,"58 and 
cited in this connexion the view expressed by the representatives of 
the United States, France, Chile and Egypt in the sixth session of the 
Commission on Human Rights that the idea of public order was clearly 
understood in most countries of the world and its application was 
known to jurisprudence.57 It is submitted with great respect that our 
discussion in the foregoing pages of this chapter would indicate that 
though the idea of public order is understood in most countries it is 
not understood in the same way and that though its application is 
known to jurisprudence, its interpretation is not identical in all coun­
tries. Further, as was pointed out by the representative of the United 
Kingdom at the session "maintenance of public order" may mean 
" Press Commission of India, Report, Part I paragraph 1145 
" idem, paragraph 98Θ 
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acceptance of the existing social order. Though the majority of the 
Commission seemed inchned to follow the phraseology adopted in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights58 it cannot be said that the 
view expressed in the dissenting note is of negligible value. It would 
appear that the words "in the interests of prevention of public dis­
order" are likely to be less amenable to ambiguity of interpretation 
than the phrase "in the interests of public order." Further the former 
appears to be more specific and therefore less liable to be given a wide 
connotation, a connotation which, if applied, may not be in consonance 
with the concept of the freedom of the press. In fact, it has already 
been judicially recognised, as previously stated, that the expression 
"public order" makes the ambit of the protection very wide and that 
"a law may not have been designed to directly maintain the public 
order ... and yet it may have been enacted 'in the interests' of the 
public order..."59 
(ІІ) INCITEMENT TO AN OFFENCE 
Most countries consider incitement to an offence to be an offence in 
itself irrespective of the results of such incitement. It is not easy in all 
cases to establish the clear connexion, the chain of cause and effect, 
between the incitement and the subsequent commission of the offence. 
It may possibly be because of this evidentiary difficulty that legislation 
in almost all countries penahses incitement to grave offences, irre­
spective of its results. For example, in England a person who solicits 
or incites another to commit a fdony or misdemeanour is liable to 
indictment at common law, even though the solicitation or incitement 
produces no effect. Thus where the addressee does not read the letter 
containing incitement, the writer is held guilty of the offence of in­
citement. In the United States, incitement to commit a crime is punish-
5 8
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prevention of public disorder). 
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able. It has been judicially held that if the act (like speaking or circu-
lating a paper), the tendency of the act and the intent with which it 
is done, are the same, there is no ground for saying that success alone 
warrants making the act a crime.80 Belgium punishes any incitement 
to an act which the law regards as crime. Incitement to offences which 
are not regarded as crimes is punishable only if it actually leads to an 
illegal act, except in the case of certain specified offences like theft or 
destruction of property. 
In India the amendment to Article 19(2) of the Constitution permits 
restrictive legislation on the right to freedom of speech and expression 
in relation to mcitement to an offence. The fact that it is the word 
"offence" and not the expression "crimes of violence"61 that finds a 
place in the subclause gives very wide scope to the permissible re-
striction. Under Article 367 of the Constitution the word "offence" has 
to be given the same meaning as is given to it in the General Clauses 
Act, 1897, wherein it connotes any act or omission made punishable 
by any law for the time being in force. And law would include Acts, 
regulations, rules and bye-laws. The result would be that a restriction 
curtailing freedom of expression in relation to incitement to disobey, 
for example, a bye-law made by a municipality would be constitution-
ally permissible. Again, it would be possible for the State to create a 
new offence with a view to curbing freedom of expression in relation 
to a particular subject or class of subjects, and then to enact that 
incitement to commit that offence shall in itself be an offence. In such 
cases, the only remedy would be to move the Courts to see whether 
they would uphold the piece of legislation as being a reasonable re-
striction on the fundamental right. In State of Bombay v. Balsara.62 
the Supreme Court upheld the validity of section 24(1) (b) of the 
Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949. The clause provides: 
"24.(1) No person shall print or publish in any newspaper, news 
sheet, book, leaflet, booklet or any other single or periodical publi-
cation or otherwise display or distribute any advertisement or other 
matter... 
(b) which is calculated to encourage or incite any individual or class 
of individuals or the public generally to commit an offence under the 
Act, or to commit a breach of or to evade the provisions of any rule, 
regulation or order made thereunder or the conditions of any licence, 
40
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permit, pass or authorisation granted thereunder." But the Court de-
clared invalid, among a few others, section 23(b) which provided that 
no person shall "incite or encourage any member of the public or any 
class of individuals or the public generally to commit any act which 
frustrates or defeats the provisions of this Act, or any rule, regulation 
or order made thereunder," on the ground that the words "which 
frustrates or defeats the provisions of this Act, or any rule, regulation, 
or order made thereunder" were so wide and vague that it would be 
difficult te define or limit their scope. 
Circumstances may arise when a citizen would consider it desirable 
in the public interest to advocate the disobedience in a peaceful maimer 
of an administrative order believed to be unjust with a view to drawing 
the attention of the authorities to the iniquity of the order and to 
creating public opinion in favour of its rescission. But, as we have seen, 
under the constitutional provision it is permissible for the Government 
to enact a legal prohibition against the advocacy of such disobedience.63 
The Press Commission, while admitting that the connotation of the 
word "offence" is very wide and that it would be possible for the 
legislatures to create any kind of offence, and that "in that event, 
provision with regard to punishment for incitement to commit that 
offence would acquire constitutional validity"64 seem to indulge in a 
short sermon on good behaviour when they say that "whatever may 
have been the justification for breaking laws when a foreign and irre-
sponsible government was in power and no constitutional redress was 
feasible, things have considerably altered after independence when 
both the Central and State Governments are responsible to popular 
legislatures. When a law is enacted it must be regarded as an expression 
of the will of the people, and if the law is dishked by certain sections 
of the people, the remedy lies not in disobeying the law but in per-
suading the public to see the iniquity of it and getting it altered by 
legitimate and constitutional means."66 It may be borne in mind that 
the incitement to disobey an iniquitous law ceases to be a legitimate 
and constitutional means of seeking the alteration of the law, only 
when such incitement is declared illegal by the State. Again, it is 
doubtful whether it can be asserted in relation to all laws that "when 
'* Justice Holmes drew a distinction between advocacy and incitement He observed 
that there was a wide difference between the two and t h a t if the advocacy would be 
immediately acted upon, causing a clear and present danger, it would be regarded as 
incitement (Whitney v. California, 274 U S 357) I t is doubtful whether this distinction 
is always maintained 
" Press Commission, Report, Par t I, paragraph 996 
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a law is enacted, it must be regarded as an expression of the will of the 
people." Under the Constitution, the President and the Governors of 
the States in India are empowered, during the recess of the respective 
legislatures, to promulgate ordinances which have, for a short period, 
the same force and effect as an Act of the legislature. If it is assumed 
that British constitutional conventions are strictly followed in India, 
it may be said that the promulgation of the ordinances has to be made 
on the advice of the Council of Ministers ; according to a literal interpre-
tation of the constitutional provisions, the President and the Gover-
nors, it would appear, are empowered to promulgate ordinances on 
their own initiative. If it be so, the will of the people does not seem to 
be very much in evidence in this particular legislative picture. It may 
be recollected that even though the President is indirectly elected, the 
Governors are appointed by the President (presumably on the advice 
of the Council of Ministers) and hold office during his pleasure. 
The Press Commission appear to be apprehensive that if the words 
"incitement to an offence" are removed from the Article 19(2) there 
will be no constitutional authority for punishing any utterances which 
incite persons to commit offences and that the whole law of abetment 
contained in the Penal Code would be open to challenge in so far as 
the abetment consists in incitement to an offence, which is one of the 
forms of abetment. The apprehension of the Commission is probably 
justified in so far as it points to the need for making a constitutional 
provision permitting restrictive legislation in relation to incitement. 
The question is whether the provision should be in relation to any kind 
of offences or only in relation to incitement to crimes. We have seen 
that in England incitement to commit felonies and misdemeanours is 
punishable and in the United States, incitement to commit a crime is 
penalised. The European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms states that freedom of expression 
may be subject to such "formaüties, conditions, restrictions or penal-
ties as are prescribed by law ajid are necessary in a democratic society... 
for the prevention of disorder or crime."66 One wonders whether in 
India legislation, restrictive of freedom of expression, should be per-
mitted to cover incitement to all kinds of offences. 
·· Article 10(2), emphasis added 
CHAPTER IV 
OBSCENITY 
Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution permits legislative abridge­
ment of the right to freedom of speech and expression in the interests 
of decency or morality. The expression "indecency" seems to be easily 
interchangeable with "obscenity,"1 the word commonly used in English 
statutes.2 When the word "indecent" occurs in English statutes, it 
seems to convey practically the same meaning as the word "obscene." 
The word "morality" has a wider connotation than "decency." In 
Chapter XIV of the Indian Penal Code entitled "Of offences affecting... 
decency and morals," while sections 292-294 deal with obscenity, 
section 294A treats of "keeping lottery-office." The fact that the Su­
preme Court did not uphold a law penalising the "commending" of an 
intoxicant8 may only indicate that such commending is not against 
morahty as determined by contemporary community standards. It 
does not seem to signify that, because the word "morality" when it 
occurs in Article 19(2) connotes only sexual morahty,4 the commending 
of intoxicants is beyond the limits permitted for restrictive legislation. 
It may be safely assumed that the word can be made to cover much 
wider field than sexual morality and it would not be surprising if a law 
prohibiting advertisement of lotteries is sustained as valid in the 
interests of morality. 
(І) WHAT IS OBSCENE? 
We shall now turn our attention to the expression "decency" in the 
subclause. As noticed before, its opposite, "indecency" seems to have 
1
 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines "obscenity" as "indecency or lewd­
ness (especially of language)" ; and "indecency" as a "quality savouring of obscenity " 
* For instance, the Obscene Publications Acts of 1857 and 1959 But see also the 
Indecent Advertisements Act, 1889 
» State of Bombay v. Balsara, (1951) S С R 682 
« In re Bharah Press (A.I R. 1951 Patna, 12) the Patna High Court held that the 
expression "morahty" in Article 19(2) should be construed m the sense of sexual 
morahty. 
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the same meaning as "obscenity." Though most English statutes 
dealing with the subject and several sections of the Indian Penal Code 
use the word "obscene," it has not been found easy to define what 
obscenity is. "No one seems to know," complained Professors Lockhart 
and McClure, "what obscenity is. Many writers have discussed the 
obscene, but few can agree upon even its essential nature."5 
The Geneva Conference of 1923 on the Suppression of the Circulation 
of, and Traffic in, Obscene Publications admitted that they could not 
find a satisfactory definition of the obscene. In the United States, 
state legislatures in enacting statutes prohibiting obscene publications 
describe the obscene by using one or more of the following words: 
disgusting, filthy, indecent, immoral, improper, impure, lascivious, 
lewd, licentious, vulgar. Dr Samuel Johnson in his Dictionary defined 
it as "immodest, not agreeable to chastity of mind, causing lewd 
ideas." Havelock Ellis explained it to mean "whatever is off the scene" 
and not openly shown on the stage of life.6 The obscene in this sense is 
found in the public exposure of naturalistic aspects of sexual and ex­
cremental processes. Some regard it as that which arouses sexual 
passion.7 Father Harold С Gardiner would argue for the acceptance 
of the idea that "even if it is not certain that such and such an object 
will arouse to sexual passion, nevertheless, if the probabihty swings in 
that direction, then the object is, for practical purposes, obscene."8 
It would seem that "obscenity" has had no fixed meaning. It appears 
to keep changing its clothes, probably less frequently than fashions 
change in a modern metropolis. As Professor Gellhorn puts it, "It is 
a variable. Its dimensions are fixed in part by the eye of the individual 
beholder and in part by a generalised opinion that shifts with time 
and place."9 Within living memory an editor deleted the word "chaste" 
in an article, because it was considered suggestive.10 For a number of 
years Marie Stopes's Married Love was barred by the customs and 
banned from the mails in the United States on the ground of obscenity, 
until a Court in a case with the charming title United States against 
4
 William B. Lockhart and Robert C. McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity and 
the Constitution, 38 Minn. L. Rev 295 at 320 (1954). 
• Revaluation of Obscenity, in More Essays on Love and Virtue 
7
 Walter Gellhorn in Individual Freedom and Governmental Restraints refers to the 
principle that "if this object rouses to genital commotion, it is obscene." (page 58) 
8
 Harold С Gardiner, S.J., Moral Principles towards a Definition of the Obscene, 
20 Law and Contemporary Problems, 560 at 569-570. 
* Walter Gellhorn, Individual Freedom and Governmental Restraints, page 55 
1 0
 mentioned by Curtis Bok, Censorship and the Arts, Civil Liberties under Attack 
(Ed. С Wilcox) page 115. 
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Married Love11 held that the book was an aid to conjugal success rather 
than a piece of obscene writing. While many literary classics have been 
challenged by law enforcement officers, these challenges have met with 
varying fates in the Courts. It is interesting to trace the gradual shift 
in judicial opinion in this field, culminating in the decision that D. H. 
Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover is not to be regarded as obscene 
under the (British) Obscene Publications Act, 1959. 
In 1868 Cockbum, С J., in England attempted a definition of ob­
scenity in the Hicklin case.12 " I think," the learned Chief Justice said, 
"the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter 
charged as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are 
open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication 
of this sort may fall."13 
In the United States Hand, J., adopted the Hicklin test in U.S. v. 
Kennerley,1* but indicated his dissatisfaction with the harsh rule of the 
Hicklin case in these words: "I hope it is not improper for me to say 
that the rule as laid down, however consonant it may be with mid-
Victorian morals, does not seem to me to answer to the understanding 
and morality of the present time... I question whether in the end men 
wiH regard that as obscene which is honestly relevant to the adequate 
expression of innocent ideas, and whether they will not believe that 
truth and beauty are too precious to society at large to be mutilated 
in the interests of those most likely to pervert them to base uses. In­
deed, it seems hardly likely that we are even today so lukewarm in our 
interest in letters or serious discussion as to be content to reduce our 
treatment of sex to the standard of a child's library in the supposed 
interests of a salacious few, or that shame will for long prevent us from 
adequate portrayal of some of the most serious and beautiful sides of 
human nature." 
Nearly two decades later the Hicklin test was rejected in the two 
decisions on James Joyce's Ulysses,16 and a new standard to determine 
1 1
 48 F 2d 821 (S D.N.Y 1931) 
1 2
 Queen ν Hicklin (1868) L R 3 Q В. 360 
l a
 I t is of interest to note Curtis Bok's comment on the Hicklin test : "Strictly ap­
plied, this rule would put an end to current literature, since a moron could pervert to 
some sexual fantasy to which his mmd is open the listings in a seed catalogue." (Censor­
ship and the Arts, op cit p. 112) One is reminded of what John Milton said in the 
Areopagitica ( 1644) · "Wholesome meats to a vitiated stomach differ little or nothing 
from unwholesome, and best books to a naughty mind are not unapplicable to oc­
casions of evil." 
» 209 Fed 119 ( S D N Y 1913) 
1 6
 f7 5 v. One Book called Ulysses, 5 F. Supp. 182 (1933); Î7.5. v. One Book entitled 
Ulysses, 72 F 2d 705 (1934) 
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what amounted to obscenity was substituted in its place. The Court 
observed that the proper test of whether a book was obscene was to 
consider its dominant effect.1· In applying the test, relevancy of the 
objectionable parts to the theme, the established reputation of the 
work in the estimation of approved critics if the book is modem, and 
the verdict of the past if it is ancient, are persuasive pieces of evidence, 
for, in the opinion of the Court, works of art are not likely to retain a 
high position for long with no better warrant for their existence than 
their obscene content. Thus the Hicklin rule which ignored Uterary and 
other social values, judged a whole book or article by passages taken 
out of context and tested for obscenity by the tendency of such extracts 
to deprave and corrupt the minds of those open to such influence and 
into whose hands the book might fall, was definitely given up in the 
United States. 
The Hicklin test seems to have retained its sway in England till 1954. 
As long as it remained, there was no restriction on the conviction of 
innocent publishers, no requirement that the publication should be 
viewed as a whole, and no point in arguing that the general literary or 
artistic merit of the publication should be taken into consideration to 
excuse passages which might have a tendency to deprave or corrupt. 
In 1954 a series of cases involving alleged obscenity came before the 
Courts.17 They all disclosed a conflict in the minds of the judges and 
the jury in regard to what constituted an obscene publication. Should 
a jury direct their attention to the result of a publication falling into 
the hands of young people? Could a judge insist that the literary 
standards of the society should conform to the level of something that 
would be suitable for a well-brought up girl of fourteen? The crucial 
question appeared to be whether an intention to corrupt public morals 
was a necessary ingredient in obscenity. Till then there was no decision 
to indicate that it would be a defence if it could be proved that the 
publication of matter prima facie obscene was for the public good as 
being necessary or useful to religion, literature, science or art, provided 
the extent and manner of publication did not go beyond what the 
public good required. In Regina v. Martin Seeker and Warburg, Limit-
" In Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D & С 101 (1949) Curtis Bok, J., found 
objectionable any writing "whose dominant purpose and effect is erotic allurement 
- that is to say, a calculated and effective incitement to sexual desire. It is the effect 
that counts more than the desire and no indictment can stand unless it can be shown." 
1 7
 for example. Queen v. Reiter, (1954) 2 Q.B. 16; Queen v. Martin Seeker and Warburg, 
Limited, (1954) 34 Cr. App. R. 124. In Queen v. Reiter Goddard, С J., observed: "(The 
Recorder) said, and this Court entirely agrees with him, that the law is the same now 
as it was in 1868." (at p. 19) 
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ed,18 Stable, J., observed that Cockburn, С J.'s view expressed in the 
Hicklin case in 1868 should be appUed in accordance with present day 
standards taking into account prevailing attitude to sex. He pointed 
out that somewhere between the two extreme approaches, one that 
regarded sex as sin and tried to conceal everything about it, and the 
other that thought that only evil would flow from secrecy and con­
cealment, the average, decent, well-meaning man or woman took his or 
her stand. He also stressed that "a mass of literature, great literature 
from many angles, is wholly unsuitable for reading by the adolescent, 
but that does not mean that a publisher is guilty of a criminal offence 
for making these works available to the general public."18" 
These judicial observations and the public opinion in favour of 
rejecting the harshness of the Hicklin test resulted in the enactment 
of the Obscene Publications Act in 1959.19 The Act defines obscene 
publication as follows: 
F o r t h e purposes of th i s Act, a n article shal l be deemed t o be obscene if i t s 
effect or (where t h e article comprises t w o or m o r e dis t inct items) t h e effect of 
a n y one of i ts i tems is, if t a k e n as a whole, such as t o t e n d t o d e p r a v e a n d 
c o r r u p t persons w h o are likely, hav ing regard t o all re levant c ircumstances, t o 
read, see or h e a r t h e m a t t e r conta ined or embodied in i t a 0 
The interests of science, literature and art are sought to be protected 
by that part of the definition which requires that the effect of the 
article should be taken as a whole before judging whether it tends to 
deprave or corrupt. Further, there is provision for the defence of public 
good. The price of the book or periodical, the place of sale, the circum­
stances of its publication are all matters to be taken into consideration 
before the test formulated in the definition is satisfied.21 
As mentioned above, there is provision made in the Act for the 
1 8
 (1954) All E R 683 In this case the prosecution was for the publication of a novel 
which stressed the relationship between the sexes while dealing with contemporary 
life m New York In his charge to the jury Stable, J , observed. "If we are going to 
read novels about how things go on in New York, it would not be much of assistance, 
if we were led to suppose that m New York no unmarried woman or teenager has 
disabused her mind of the idea that babies are brought by storks or are sometimes 
found in cabbage patches or under gooseberry bushes . You have heard a good deal 
about the putting of ideas into young heads. ReaUy, is it books that put ideas into 
young heads, or is it n a t u r e ' " (at page 6Θ7) 
lea
 id at ρ 686 
1 9
 The first case which came before the Courts under the Act was the one concerning 
D Η Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover R. v. Penguin Books, Ltd, ( 1960) 
m
 Section 1 (I) 
8 1
 I t has been observed in an Australian case (Ä v. Close, (1948) V L R 445) tha t 
a work made available in cheap editions for general circulation may be held obscene, 
when the same publication sold in a limited edition intended for adults only may no 
be so held 
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defence of public good. If it is proved that the pubUcation of the article 
is for the public good on the ground that it is in the interests of science, 
literature, art or learning or of other objects of general concern, no 
order for forfeiture and no conviction for an offence under the Act will 
be made. The opinion of experts is admissible in any proceedings under 
the Act, either to establish or negative the defence.28 
In the United States in 1957 the Supreme Court laid down a standard 
to determine what is obscene. The test is whether, to the average 
person applying contemporary community standards, the dominant 
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.23 
In the absence of any statutory definition, the Indian Courts tended 
to apply the Hicklin test when called upon to detennine whether a 
publication was obscene or not. In recent years, however, the trend is 
generally to mitigate the harshness of the Hicklin rule.21 The appli-
cation of contemporary community standards appears to be very much 
in evidence in the judicial verdict when the Supreme Court in Virendra 
v. State of Panjab25 held that vulgar abuses indulged in by a group of 
Motor Union members during a procession did not offend against 
decency or morality. Bhagwati, J., delivering the opinion of the Court 
observed: "Indecent and vulgar though these slogans were as directed 
against the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister of the Panjab 
Government, the utterance thereof by the appellants who were the 
members of the procession protesting against the scheme of nation-
alised motor transport was hardly calculated to undermine decency or 
morality, the strata of society from which the appellants came being 
habituated to indulge freely in such vulgar abuses without any the 
slightest effect on the persons hearing the same."26 
11
 Section 4 
u
 Roih v. United States, (1957) 354 U.S. 476 
14
 As early as 1940 m a Calcutta case (Emperor v. Sree Ram Saktena, I L R. (1940) 
I Cal 581) it was observed tha t a picture of a woman in the nude was not per se obscene, 
when there was nothing in it which would shock or offend the taste of any ordinary 
or decent-minded person. Unless the pictures of nude women were an incentive to 
sensuality or excite impure thoughts in the minds of ordinary persons of normal temper-
ament who might happen to look a t them, they could not be regarded as obscene within 
the meanmg of the provisions of the Penal Code "For the purpose of deciding whether 
a picture is obscene or not, one has to consider to a great extent the surrounding 
circumstances, the pose, the posture, the suggestive element in the picture, the person 
into whose hands it is likely to fall, etc " 
" 1956 S C J 539 
» idem at 542 
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(il) STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
(a) Sections 292 and 293 of the Indian Penal Code 
There are a number of statutory provisions in India directed against 
obscene publications. The most notable of them are sections 292 and 
293 of the Penal Code. These sections were inserted in the Code by the 
Obscene Publications Act, 1925, for the purpose of giving effect to the 
international Convention for the Suppression o<" the Circulation of, and 
Traffic in, Obscene Publications, signed at Geneva in 1923. They pro-
hibit the sale, distribution and exhibition of obscene literature. Section 
292 provides : 
Whoever 
(a) sells, lets to hire, distributes, publicly exhibits or in any manner puts 
into circulation, or for purposes of sale, hire, distribution, public exhibition or 
circulation, makes, produces or has in his possession any obscene book, pamphlet, 
paper, drawing, painting, representation or figure or any other obscene object 
whatsoever, or 
(b) imports, exports or conveys any obscene object for any of the purposes 
aforesaid, or knowing or having reason to believe that such object will be sold, 
let to hire, distributed or publicly exhibited or in any manner put into circu-
lation, or 
(c) takes part in, or receives profits from, any business in the course of which 
he knows or has reason to believe that any such obscene objects are, for any of 
the purposes aforesaid, made, produced, purchased, kept, imported, exported, 
conveyed, publicly exhibited or in any manner put into circulation, or 
(d) advertises or makes known by any means whatsoever that any person is 
engaged or is ready to engage in any act which is an offence under this section, 
or that any such obscene object can be procured from or through any person, or 
(e) offers or attempts to do any act which is an offence under this section, 
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may 
extend to three months, or with fine, or with both. 
Exception: This section does not extend to any book, pamphlet, writing, 
drawing or painting kept or used bona fide for religious purposes or any repre-
sentation sculptured, engraved, painted or otherwise represented on or in any 
temple, or on any car used for the conveyance of idols, or kept or used for any 
religious purpose. 
Sect ion 293 provides for enhanced pun i shmen t ( tha t is, impr i -
sonmen t for a t e r m which m a y ex tend t o six months ) in cases where 
the obscene objects offered, sold, delivered or distributed are to persons 
under the age of twenty years. 
The general conservative attitude to sex prevalent in the Indian 
society coupled with the assumption that they were expected to follow 
English judicial decisions wherever circumstances permitted, tended 
to make British Indian Courts apply the rigorous rule of the Hicklin 
case, save where the publication was covered by the exception enacted 
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in section 292 or where the publication was generally regarded as a 
work of art. Thus Indian Courts have held that a book may be obscene 
although it contains only one single obscene passage.27 But a religious 
or classical work is not to be regarded as obscene, simply on account 
of its containing some objectionable passages, because the tendency of 
such publication is not to deprave or corrupt morals. If objectionable 
passages in a religious book are extracted and printed separately, the 
publication may not be justified, even though the passages form part 
of a religious book, in case the extracts deal with matters to be judged 
by the general standards of human conduct, as where they relate to 
the immoral conduct of human beings and the general tendency of the 
publication is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to 
immoral influences.28 If the detailed passages in a publication are of 
an obscene character, the author's liability in respect of them will not 
be avoided merely by reference to other passages which may contain 
excellent moral precepts.29 It is no justification to say that the matter 
published is written by an eminent writer or written in a style not 
easily understood by all,80 or that the publication is a medical one and 
sold only to a limited number of registered subscribers.31 But three 
decades later, in 1947, it has been held that a book intended to give 
advice to married persons on how to regulate their sex lives to the best 
advantage will not come within the purview of the section.32 
In a Calcutta case it has been held that if in fact a work is one which 
would certainly suggest to the minds of the young of either sex or 
even to persons of more advanced years thoughts of most impure and 
Hbidinous character, its publication is an offence, though the accused 
has in view an ulterior object which is innocent or even laudable.33 The 
Bombay High Court has stressed the form of expression rather than the 
substance in a case involving a question of alleged obscenity and has said 
that the important point to look would be rather the form of expression 
*' See Emperor v. Inderman (1881) I L R. 3 Allahabad 837 
» Emperor ν Ghulam Hussam, 18 Cr. L J. 505 (1917) 
ω
 Emperor v. Vishnu Krtshna (1912) 15 Bom L R. 307 
3 0
 Pubhc Prosecutor v. Markandeyulu, (1918) A.I R Madras 1195 
4 1
 Emperor v. Thakkar Datt (1917) A I R Lahore 288 
" Emperor v. Harnam Das, (1947) A I R Lahore 383. Falshaw, J, observed: "If 
such books are effectively to fulfil their intended purpose it is obvious that they must 
be written m fairly plain language in order to be understood, and I do not think it can 
be said that the publication of such books should be banned altogether because of the 
danger, against which it is undoubtedly very difficult to provide effective safeguards, 
t h a t they may fall into wrong hands." (at ρ 385) Chainani, J , of the Bombay High 
Court expressed a similar view in Girdharlal Popatlal Shah ν State of Bombay. (I.L R. 
1955 Bombay 932) 
M
 Emperor v. Kherode Chandra Roy Chaudhury (1911) I.L.R. 39 Cal. 377 
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than the actual meaning, for the same meaning may be obscenely 
expressed by one form of language and yet by the use of another form 
of language may be couched in expressions free from reproach.34 
Baker, J.'s description of what is obscene is as succinct as it is wide 
when he observed that anything "calculated to inflame the passions" 
is obscene.35 The shade of Cockbum, С J.'s hands, outstretched patron-
isingly, seems to spread over most of these decisions. 
In a recent case,36 Bhattacharya, J., of the Calcutta High Court has 
observed that the law as formulated in Hicklin's case remains practi­
cally unchanged. He has, however, added that though it is difficult to 
subscribe to the theory of eliminating altogether the eifect of a publi­
cation on the minds of young persons, for they also constitute the 
public, "the effect produced by the publication on the ordinary member 
of the society has to be ascertained. Neither a man of wide culture or 
rare character nor a person with depraved mentality should be thought 
of as being the reader of literature in question."37 Such an ordinary 
member of the society is expected to be of normal temperament. "The 
standard of the reader is neither one of exceptional sensibility nor one 
without any sensibihty whatsoever."37" 
It may be mentioned that section 521 of the Code of Criminal Pro­
cedure provides that on conviction the Court may order the destruction 
of all the copies of the article in respect of which the decision has been 
made. 
(b) Sections 18 and 19A of the Sea Customs Act 
Section 18(c) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, prohibits "any obscene 
book, pamphlet, paper, drawing, painting, representation, figure or 
article" being brought into India. Section 19A (2) empowers the Central 
Government to make regulations respecting the detention and confis­
cation of goods the importation of which is prohibited and the con­
ditions, if any, to be fulfilled before such detention and confiscation. 
" Emperor v. Vishnu Krishna, (1912) 15 Bom. L.R. 307 
· · Emperor v. Ambalal Paranngji, Crim. App. Nos. 17 and 18 of 1929 (Unrep. 
Bombay.) I t is interesting to compare this with Jerome J. Frank, J.'s remark in his 
concurring opinion in Roth v. Goldman, 172 F. 2d. 788 (C.A. 2, 1949) at 792: " . . . no 
sane man thinks socially dangerous the arousing of normal sexual desires. Consequently, 
if reading obscene books has merely that consequence, Congress, it would seem, can 
constitutionally no more suppress such books than it can prevent the mailing of many 
other objects, such as perfumes, for example, which notoriously produce that result. " 
" С. T. Prim v. The State, A.I.R. 1961 Cal. 177 
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(c) Section 20 of the Post Office Act?9 
While section 18(c) of the Sea Customs Act prohibits the importation 
of obscene articles into India, section 20 of the Post Office Act, 1898, 
seeks to prevent the transmission of such articles by post to any place 
within or outside the country. The section provides : 
No person shall send by post 
(a) any indecent or obscene printing, painting, photograph, lithograph, en-
graving, book or card, or any other indecent or obscene article, or 
(b) any postal article having thereon or on the cover thereof any words, 
marks or designs of an indecent, obscene, seditious, scurrilous, threatening or 
grossly offensive character. 
(d) The Young Persons (Harmful Publications) Act 
A recent statute of the Indian ParHament seeks to prevent the 
dissemination of publications harmful to young persons. It is not con-
fined to obscene publications, but is concerned with all publications 
harmful to the young. 
The Young Persons (Harmful Publications) Act, \956,3Ba defines 
harmful pubhcation as 
any book, magazine, pamphlet, leaflet, newspaper or other like publication which 
consists of stories told with the aid of pictures or without the aid of pictures or 
wholly in pictures, being stories portraying wholly or mainly (i) the commission 
of offences, (ii) acts of violence and cruelty or (iii) incidents of a repulsive or 
horrible nature, in such a way that the pubhcation as a whole would tend to 
corrupt a young person into whose hands it might fall, whether by inciting or 
encouraging him to commit offences or acts of violence or cruelty or in any other 
manner whatsoever." 
And a young person is defined as a person under the age of twenty 
years. 
A person who sells, distributes, publicly exhibits or has in his pos-
session for any of the above purposes or advertises any harmful publi-
cation may be punished with imprisonment extending to six months 
or with fine or with both. On conviction, the Court may order the 
destruction of all copies of the harmful pubhcation. Thus the Act may 
be said to supplement the provision in section 293 of the Penal Code 
which is limited in its purview to obscene publications. 
" By section 19A of the Post Office Act, inserted by the Post Office (Amendment) 
Act, 1958, it is prohibited to send by post any ticket or advertisement of a lottery or 
any other matter relating to a lottery which is calculated to induce persons to partici-




 This Act is based on the (British) Children and Young Persons (Harmful Publi-
cations) Act, 1955. 
*· Section 2 
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The Act provides that the State Government, if it considers after 
consultation with the principal law officer of the State that any publi­
cation is a harmful publication, may declare by order every copy of 
the pubhcation forfeit to the Government. The notification of forfei­
ture should state the grounds of the order. Any person aggrieved by 
an order of forfeiture may, within sixty days, apply to the High Court 
to set aside the order.40 
Any Magistrate of the first class may, by warrant, authorise any 
poHce officer not below the rank of sub-inspector to enter and search 
any place where any stock of harmful publications may be or may be 
reasonably suspected to be, and such police officer may seize any pubh­
cation found in such place if in his opinion it is a harmful publication.41 
If in the opinion of the Magistrate or Court such publication is a 
harmful pubhcation, the Magistrate or Court may cause it to be de­
stroyed.42 
Any offence punishable under this Act is declared a cognizable 
offence,43 that is, an offence for which a police officer may arrest with­
out warrant. 
If the constitutional validity of this Act is challenged before the 
Courts, it would appear that its provisions could be upheld as author­
ising the imposition of reasonable restrictions in the interests of "mo­
rality," giving the word "morality" the wide connotation to which it 
is entitled.44 
This Act is a clear instance where reasonable interference by govern­
ment has been found necessary to protect the interests of the community 
against any section of the press which may tend to become irresponsi­
ble. 
(ІІІ) PROBLEMS OF APPLICATION 
In spite of all these laws directed against obscene publications, 
there is a considerable number of such publications in circulation in 
India. Their existence and popularity seem to be due mainly to two 
reasons. One is that there is a type of Uterature which may fall short 
4 0
 Section 4 
4 1
 Section 6 (2) 
" Section 6 (4) 
4 3
 Section 7 
4 4
 See the following passages quoted in the Oxford English Dictionary to illustrate 
the meaning of the word: "The morality of the Gospel had a direct influence upon the 
politics of the age." Freeman ; "Instances.. . of genius and morality united in a lawyer... 
are distinguished by their singularity." Junius Letters. 
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of what is legally punishable and may still defy the moral standards 
of a notable number of persons in the community, because there exists 
a wide gap between the legally punishable and the morally good. 
Another is that the banning of a publication in most instances will 
only tend to force its pnce up. It is not sold in open market, but it is 
sold nonetheless.45 It would therefore appear that strict censorship is 
not the answer to the increasing production and circulation of obscene 
publications, for without community agreement censorship would be 
unworkable in a democracy, especially because members of the com-
munity would begin to disagree on what should be censored.16 Further, 
mimmal restraint appears to be the guiding principle in most modern 
democracies. As the American Catholic hierarchy puts it : "Our j uridical 
system has been dedicated from the beginning to the principle of 
minimal restraint. Those who may become impatient with the re-
luctance of the State through its laws to curb and curtail human free-
dom should bear in mind that this is a principle which serves to safe-
guard all our vital freedoms - to curb less rather than more; to hold 
for liberty rather than for restraint."47 
Even assuming that the principle of minimal restraint is abandoned 
in the interests of public good, one has to realise that there are limits 
to effective legal action. When laymen see that the law of the State 
does not prohibit all the vices, nor prescribe all the virtues, they are 
inclined to infer that the law is amoral, if not immoral. They seem to 
forget the fact that the law does not approve the vices which it refrains 
from prohibiting, nor does it discourage men from practising the virtues 
which it does not think it prudent to prescribe for the present. If the 
law does not come up to the expectations of the moralist, it is because 
it is conscious of its own limitations, and has to take account of the 
frailties of human nature and the prevailing influence of contemporary 
civilisation. Jurisprudence would cease to be prudent if it ignored the 
limits of practicability. At the same time it would not be just if it 
45
 Whitney Gnswold has said, "Books won't stay banned They won't b u m Ideas 
won't go to jail In the long run of history, the censor and the inquisitor have always 
lost The only sure weapon against bad ideas is better ideas " {Essays on Education, 
page 96) 
** A prominent censor is reported to have remarked, " I don't discriminate between 
nude women, whether or not they are art I t ' s all lustful to me " Commenting upon 
this Enc Larrabee has said that one man's sex may be another's psychoneurosis and 
that the remark casts much more light on the censor than it does on obscenity (Eric 
Larrabee, Morality and Obscenity, in Freedom of Book Selection, Ed F J Moscher, 
page 37) 
*' from a statement issued by the American Catholic Hierarchy in 1957, quoted in 
D J Thorman, Censorship, The Sign, December 1960, page 48. 
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failed to perform its function to the fullest extent possible within these 
limits. 
These general considerations force us to the conclusion that the best 
way to prevent the production and circulation of objectionable publi­
cations is to give the members of the society an understanding of the 
problem involved in the dissemination of the contents of such publi­
cations and to educate the public in such a way as to raise community 
standards,18 for the legislatures and the Courts would apply con­
temporary community standards in their functions. When once the 
community standard is raised and public opinion formed, the legisla­
tive and judicial agencies would take notice of the contemporary 
standard of public morality,49 and if they do not, it would not be 
difficult to make it known to them. To quote the words of Charles H. 
Keating, Jr., founder of Citizens for Decent Literature: "When the 
public clearly shows that it considers filthy and revolting pubhcations 
unfit for our society, the Courts are greatly aided."60 One may add that 
the legislatures too are aided. 
*
B
 Walter Gellhom said that foolish reading could not be ended by force, but only 
by patient persuasion, by education rather than by edict. (Walter GeUhom, Individual 
Freedom and Governmental Restraints, page 103) 
" See State v. Lerner. (1948) 81 Ν E. 2d 282 at 289, in which it was observed: "The 
community concept of what is Obscene' literature is approximately ascertainable." 
, 0
 quoted in D. J. Thorman, Censorship, The Sign, December 1960, page 47 
CHAPTER V 
CONTEMPT OF COURT AND OF LEGISLATURE 
(І) THE LAW OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 
"The Press," writes Lord Denning, "plays a vital part in the ad­
ministration of justice. It is the watchdog to see that every trial is 
conducted fairly, openly and above board. Any misconduct in a trial 
is sure to receive notice in the press and subsequent condemnation by 
public opinion. The press is itself liable to make mistakes. The watch­
dog may sometimes break loose and have to be punished for misbe­
haviour."1 This is the reason for the law of contempt of court as apphed 
to the press. 
In R. v. Gray2 Lord Russell attempted a summary of the law of 
contempt of court when he said, "Any act done or writing published 
calculated to bring a Court or a Judge of the Court into contempt, or 
to lower his authority, is a contempt of Court. This is one class of 
contempt. Further, any act done or writing published calculated to 
obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process 
of the Courts is a contempt of Court. The former class belongs to the 
category which Lord Hardwicke, L. C, characterised as "scandalising 
a Court or a Judge." That description of that class of contempt is to 
be taken subject to one and an important quahfication. Judges and 
Courts are alike open to criticism, and if reasonable argument or ex­
postulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the 
public good, no Court could or would treat that as contempt of Court. 
The law ought not to be astute in such cases to criticise adversely 
what under such circumstances and with such an object is published, 
but it is to be remembered that in this matter the liberty of the press 
is no greater and no less than the liberty of every subject of the Queen."3 
A serious discussion of the correctness of judicial decisions is not 
1
 A. Denning, The Road to Justice, ρ 78 
2
 (1900) 2 Q B D 36 
' tdem at ρ 40 The Hyderabad High Court adopted Lord Hardwicke's classification 
in Read ν Huggonson, ( 1772) 26 E R 683, when it said m Η Ε Η Nizam ν Β G Keskar 
( A I R I 955 Hyderabad 264) that "there are three classes of contempt, one is committed 
by scandalising the Court, another by abusing parties who are concerned in the case 
and the third by prejudicing mankind against persons before the case is heard " 
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treated as contempt. But a suggestion that the judge was partial or 
prejudiced would be regarded as serious contempt deserving substantial 
punishment. In England a pamphleteer accused Lord Mansfield of 
acting "officiously, arbitrarily and illegally" and said that he had de-
layed the issue of a writ of habeas corpus. In writing his judgement in 
the case4 which arose out of this comment, Sir Eardley Wilmot ob-
served: "The arraignment of the justice of the judges... calls out for a 
more rapid and immediate redress than any other obstruction whatso-
ever; not for the sake of the judges as private individuals, but because 
they are the channels by which the King's justice is conveyed to the 
people. To be impartial, and be universally thought so, are both abso-
lutely necessary... " 
In 1928 the New Statesman, a London weekly, pubhshed a comment 
on a case tried by Avory, J . I t was a libel action against Dr Marie 
Stopes, the well-known advocate of birth control. Commenting on the 
fact that she lost the action, the periodical said, "The serious point in 
this case is that an individual owning to such views as those of Dr 
Marie Stopes cannot apparently hope for a fair hearing in a Court 
presided over by Mr Justice Avory - and there are so many Avorys." 
It was held that the comment constituted a contempt because it im-
puted unfairness and lack of impartiality to a judge in the discharge 
of his judicial duties.5 
In India the Supreme Court held the Editor, Printer and Pubhsher 
of The Times of India guilty of gross contempt for having published an 
article, criticising a decision of the Supreme Court, in which it was 
stated among other things that "Politics and policies have no place 
in the pure region of the law ; and Courts of law would serve the country 
and the Constitution better by discarding all extraneous considerations 
and uncompromisingly observing divine detachment which is the glory 
of law and the guarantee of justice."· The Court, though it dropped 
further proceedings in view of the unconditioned apology tendered by 
the respondents, observed: "No objection could have been taken to 
the article had it merely preached to the Courts of law the sermon of 
divine detachment. But when it proceeded to attribute improper mo-
tives to the judges, it not only transgressed the limits of fair andoowa 
fide criticism, but had a clear tendency to affect the dignity and pres-
tige of this Court. The article in question was thus a gross contempt 
* R. v. Almon, Wilmot's Notes, p . 294. The judgement was written in 1765, but was 
not published until 1802. 
« R. v. Editor of the New Statesman, (1928) 44 T.L.R. 301 
" A Disturbing Decision, The Times of India, October 30, 1952 
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of Court. It is obvious that if an impression is created in the minds of 
the public that the judges in the highest court in the land act on 
extraneous considerations in deciding cases, the confidence of the 
whole community in the administration of justice is bound to be under-
mined and no greater mischief than that can possibly be imagined."7 
As has been said above, the Courts are open to fair criticism. When 
some judges may be severe and others lenient in passing sentences on 
offenders, the press is entitled to point out the inequalities of sentences, 
without being guilty of contempt of Court. When a Trinidad Court 
held that this was contempt, the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council advised a reversal of the decision.8 Dehvenng the opinion of 
the Judicial Committee Lord Atkin said: "No wrong is done by any 
member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticising, 
in good faith, in pubhc or in private, the public act done in a seat of 
justice. The path of criticism is a pubhc way: the wrong-headed are 
permitted to err therein : provided that members of the pubhc abstain 
from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the adminis-
tration of justice... they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered virtue: 
she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though 
outspoken, comments of ordinary men."9 
Contempt of Court may be punished in England on indictment in-
volving trial by jury. But in practice contempt cases are usually dealt 
with summarily and trial by jury is seldom permitted. In the case 
involving the comment on Lord Mansfield, it was argued that the 
judges ought not to determine the matter because they would be de-
termining in their own cause and that it would be most proper for a 
jury to determine it. But the Court overruled the contention. Since the 
jury system is regarded as a safeguard for the liberty of discussion in 
England, it is doubtful whether summary procedure is desirable in 
contempt cases, except those of contempt in facie curiae. 
In Hira Lai Dixit v. State of Uttar Pradesh,10 as in Aswini Kumar v. 
Arabinda Bose11 to which reference has been made above, the Supreme 
Court of India had to deal with a case involving contempt of that 
Court itself. A party to a pending appeal in the Supreme Court in which 
the State of Uttar Pradesh was the respondent distributed in the Court 
a leaflet containing, among other things, the folowing passage : "The 
7
 Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, 1953 S.C.J. 38 at pp. 38-39 
• Ambard v. Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago, (1936) A.C. 322 
" idem at p. 335 
10
 1954 S.C.J. 846 
11
 1953S.C.J. 38 
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public has full and firm faith in the Supreme Court, but knowledgeable 
sources say that the Government acts with partiality in the matter of 
appointment of those Hon'ble Judges as Ambassadors, Governors, 
High Commissioners, etc., who give judgements against the Govern-
ment, but this has so far not made any difference in the firmness and 
justice of the Hon'ble Judges." The leaflet also contained a strong 
denunciation of the State of Uttar Pradesh, a party to the appeal and 
petitioner before the Court, regarding the matter under consideration 
in the Court. The Supreme Court held the writer of the leaflet guilty of 
contempt on two grounds, (i) for an attempt to prejudice the Court 
against the State, one of the parties before the Court and (ii) for an 
attempt to interfere with the proper administration of justice. Das, J. 
(as he then was), in the course of his opinion observed: "... it is not 
necessary that there should in fact be an actual interference with the 
course of administration of justice, ... it is enough if the offending 
publication is likely or if it tends in any way to interfere with the 
proper administration of law. Such insinuations as are implicit in the 
passage in question are derogatory to the dignity of the Court and are 
calculated to undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity 
of the judges."12 
The learned Judge proceeded to state that "the summary juris-
diction exercised by superior courts in punishing contempt of their 
authority exists for the purpose of preventing interference with the 
course of justice and for maintaining the authority of law as is ad-
ministered in the Court and thereby affording protection to public 
interest in the purity of the administration of justice. This is certainly 
an extraordinary power which must be sparingly exercised, but where 
the public interest demands it, the Court will not shrink from exer-
cising it and imposing punishment even by way of imprisonment, in 
cases where a mere fine may not be adequate."13 
As constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the subject in 
India do not define "contempt of Court," the Indian Courts tend to 
adopt the English concept of contempt, as may be seen from the judge-
ment of the Supreme Court in the above case. In spite of the persuasive 
influence of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United 
States on Indian judicial decisions in recent years, especially in the 
field of constitutional law, there seems to be little likelihood that the 
Indian Judges would follow the more Uberai trend in the United States 
la
 Hira Lai Dixit v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1954 S.C.J.846 at 850 
" idem at pp. 850-51 
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in the matter of contempt of Court.18" No Indian Judge, for instance, 
would breathe a word in favour of so much freedom as a newspaper's 
crime investigator enjoys in the United States in pubhshing the results 
of his investigations.14 
(ІІ) CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The origin of the contempt jurisdiction of the High Courts in India 
has been explained by the Privy Council in the following words : 
"Contempt of Court is an offence which by the common law of 
England is punishable by the High Court in a summary manner by 
fine or imprisonment or both. That part of the common law of England 
Weis introduced into the Presidency towns when the late Supreme 
Courts were respectively estabhshed by the Charters of Justice. The 
High Courts in the Presidencies are superior Courts of Record, and the 
offence of contempt and the powers of the High Court for punishing it 
are the same there as in this country, not by virtue of the Penal Code 
for British India and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, but by 
virtue of the common law of England."15 
1 , 0
 In Bridges ν California (314 U S. 252) the argument based on the ground of 
undermining administration of justice was rejected by the Court, Black, J , observing, 
"We must therefore turn to the particular utterances here in question and the circum­
stances of their publication to determine to what extent the substantive evil of unfair 
administration of justice was a likely consequence, and whether the degree of likelihood 
was sufficient to justify summary punishment " As to disrespect for the judiciary 
alleged in the case, the learned Judge said " I t is a prized American privilege to speak 
one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions. 
And an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity 
of the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion and contempt much 
more than it would enhance respect " (at ρ 271) Again, in Craig ν Harney (331 U S 
367) the Supreme Court observed ". . . the vehemence of the language used is not alone 
the measure of the power to punish for contempt The fires which it enkindles must 
constitute an imminent, not merely likely, threat to the administration of justice The 
danger must not be remote, or even probable, it must immediately impenl " (at ρ 376) 
1 4
 The Indian judges would follow the decision in R ν Evening Standard and others 
(1924) 40 Τ L R 833, in which Lord Hewart described the amateur detectives employed 
by the newspapers concerned as men "who bnng to an ignorance of the law of evidence 
a complete disregard of the interests alike of the prosecution and the defence " Since 
the decision in this case there has been nothing in the nature of trial by newspaper in 
England But there is still some danger of prejudicing a fair trial in the lawful publi­
cation of proceedings before Magistrates prior to the committal of the accused for trial, 
especially because the accused usually reserves his defence and therefore what is 
reported is only the case for the prosecution The reports of coroner's inquests in cases 
involving murder or manslaughter may constitute a real and substantial danger, in as 
much as the trial jury may, from such reports before heanng the case form a precon­
ceived opinion adverse to the accused, and these reports are of proceedings which are 
not restricted by the rules of evidence in force in a criminal court 
1 5
 Surendranath Banerjea ν Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court of Bengal, 
(1883) 10 Indian Appeals 171. 
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This inherent jurisdiction of the Courts of Record16 has been given 
express recognition in the Constitution of India. Article 215 of the 
Constitution reads : 
E v e r y H i g h Court shall b e a c o u r t of record a n d shal l h a v e all t h e powers of 
such a c o u r t including t h e power t o punish for c o n t e m p t of itself. 
Article 129 in identical terms confers the same powers on the Supreme 
Court. 
As observed before, neither in the Constitution nor in the Indian 
statutes relating to the subject is the expression "contempt of court" 
defined. The Patna High Court thought that the founding fathers used 
the expression in the Constitution without defining it, because they 
had in mind the well-recognised interpretation given to it by the 
Courts.17 From an analysis of case law it is not easy to define what 
amounts to contempt. Niyogi, J., of the Nagpur High Court expressed 
himself as follows: 
"It is indeed difficult and almost impossible to frame a comprehensive 
and complete definition of contempt of Court. The law of contempt 
covers the whole field of litigation itself. The real end of a judicial 
proceeding, civil or criminal, is to ascertain the true facts and dispense 
justice... Anything that tends to curtail or impair the freedom of the 
limbs of the judicial proceedings must of necessity result in hampering 
the due administration of law and in interfering with the course of 
justice."18 
After an analysis of some cases involving contempt, Mookerjee, J., 
stated: 
"The principle deducible from these cases is that punishment is 
inflicted for attacks of this character upon Judges, not with a view to 
protect either the Court as a whole or the individual judges of the 
Court from a repetition, of the attack, but with a view to protect the 
public, and specially those who, either voluntarily or by compulsion, 
are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, from the mischief they 
will incur, if the authority of the tribunal be undermined or impaired."19 
" A Court of Record is a Court whose acts and proceedings are enrolled for permanent 
memorial and testimony These records are regarded to be of such high authority that 
their t ruth cannot be questioned in any Court, though the Court of Record itself may 
amend clerical slips and errors A Court of Record has the power to fine and imprison 
for contempt of its authority, so that, according to Stephen, any Court possessing this 
power may be called a Court of Record (Stephen, Commentaries, Vol I, pp 58-59) 
1 7
 Legal Remembrancer ν В В Das Gupta, A I R 1954 Patna 204 
1 8
 Talhara Cotton Ginning Companv ν Kashtnath Gangadhar Namjosht, I L R ( 1940) 
Nagpur 69 
1 8
 In re Mottlal Chose and others, (1918) I L R 45 Calcutta 169 at p. 233 
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We shall see in the following sub-sections of this chapter that while 
a few provisons in the Penal Code describe certain types of contempt, 
the Contempt of Court Act, the statute exclusively devoted to the 
subject, does not define the offence. In fact when an attempt was made 
to define it in the draft Bill which subsequently became the Contempt 
of Court Act, 1926,20 the Select Committee, which considered the Bill, 
omitted the definition on the ground that the case law on the subject 
would prove an adequate guide. 
When one considers that "the law of contempt covers the whole 
field of litigation itself" and that the procedure adopted in contempt 
cases is, in general, summary, one is inclined to think that it would 
probably be desirable to define the term as far as possible, indicating 
how far the right to freedom of expression may reasonably be curtailed 
in relation to contempt of Court. 
(ІІІ) STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article 19(2) of the Constitution, according to the Orissa High Court, 
not only saves the statutory law, but the entire law of contempt of 
Court in India contained in the case law on the subject prior to the Consti­
tution.200 Whether one agrees to this statement or not, there is no 
doubt that the constitutional provision has helped in the passing of the 
Contempt of Court Act, 1952. 
(a) The Contempt of Court Act, 1952 
The Contempt of Court Act, 1952, was passed to define and limit the 
powers of certain courts in punishing contempt of court. 
Under the Act, "every High Court21 shall have and exercise the 
same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same 
procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of Courts subordinate 
to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself."22 But a 
High Court is prohibited from taking cognizance of a contempt alleged 
to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where 
such contempt is an offence punishable under the Penal Code.23 
Section 5 of the Act empowers a High Court to try offences com­
mitted or offenders found outside its ordinary jurisdiction. It provides 
, 0
 This was repealed and replaced by the Contempt of Court Act, 1952 
, o e
 State v. Editors and Publishers of Eastern Times and Prajatantra, A.I.R. 1952 
Orissa 318. 
1 1
 For the purposes of this Act, "High Court" includes the Court of a Judicial Com­
missioner. (Section 2) 
" Section 3(1) » Section 3 (2) 
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that a High Court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into and try a 
contempt of itself or of any Court subordinate to it, whether the con-
tempt is alleged to have been committed within or outside the local 
limits of its jurisdiction and whether the pei son alleged to be guilty of 
the contempt is within or outside such limits. 
A contempt of Court may be punished with simple imprisonment for 
a maximum term of six months or with fine which may extend to two 
thousand rupees or with both.24 The Act also provides that the accused 
may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on 
apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court.25 
This Act repealed the Contempt of Court Act, 1926. Where the Act 
of 1952 broke new ground was in granting a High Court jurisdiction 
to try cases of contempt committed, and offenders found, outside its 
ordinary jurisdiction. 
This Act, like the Act of 1926, does not define contempt of Court; 
nor does it lay down the procedure to be followed in contempt cases. 
I t permits the Courts to follow the procedure which they previously 
followed. The Patna High Court rejected the contention that, because 
the Act does not define contempt, it was an unreasonable restriction 
on the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression, and held 
that it was not void. The Court observed that the framers of the 
Constitution considered it unnecessary to define the term as it carried 
a meaning ascribed to it by judicial pronouncements of EngUsh and 
Indian Courts.25" 
Section 2(3) of the Act of 1926 which is identical with section 3(2) 
of the Act of 1952 has been interpreted to mean that the High Court's 
jurisdiction under the Act is not barred if the offence is punishable 
under the Penal Code otherwise than as contempt. In B. R. Reddy v. 
State of Madras28 the Supreme Court has held that the section excludes 
the jurisdiction of the High Court only in cases where the acts alleged 
to constitute contempt of a subordinate Court are punishable as con-
tempt under specific provisions of the Penal Code, but not where these 
acts merely amount to offences of other descriptions for which punish-
ment has been provided for in the Penal Code.27 The case arose out of 
·* Section 4 
« ibid. 
2 W
 Legal Remembrancer v. B. B. Das Gupta, A.I.R. 1954 Patna 204 
*» 1952 S.C.J. 1937 
17
 Courtney Turrell, C. J., observed in Jnanendra Prasad Base v. Gopal Prasad Sen 
(I.L.R. 1932 Patna 172 at 177): "Courts of record have inherent power to punish con-
tempts of their authority, whether committed in the face of the Court or whether 
committed vicariously upon the persons of their officers. I t was, however, not thought 
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an allegation published in a newspaper article that a particular sub-
magistrate was (to quote from the judgement) "known to the people 
of the locality to be a bribe-taker and to be in the habit of harrassing 
litigants in various ways." It was contended on behalf of the appellant 
that if a libel was published against a Judge in respect of his judicial 
functions, that would also constitute defamation, within the meaning 
of section 499 of the Penal Code, and as such libel constituted a con-
tempt of Court, it might be said that libel on a judge would be punish-
able as contempt under the Penal Code. Rejecting this argument the 
Court observed: "A libellous reflection on the conduct of a judge in 
respect of his judicial duties may certainly come under section 499 of 
the Indian Penal Code and it may be open to the judge to take steps 
against the libeller in the ordinary way for vindication of his character 
and personal dignity as a judge ; but such libel may or may not amount 
to contempt of Court."28 Quoting the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council with approval to show that "although contempt may include 
defamation, yet an offence of contempt is something more than mere 
defamation and is of a different character,"29 the Court proceeded to 
observe: "When the act of defaming a judge is calculated to obstruct 
or interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of 
law, it would certainly amount to contempt. The offence of contempt 
is really a wrong done to the public by weakening the authority and 
influence of Courts of law which exist for their good... What is made 
punishable in the Indian Penal Code is the offence of defamation as 
defamation and not as contempt of Court."30 The Court therefore held 
that if the defamation of a subordinate court amounted to contempt 
of Court, proceedings could certainly be taken under the Contempt of 
Court Act, quite apart from the fact that other remedy might be open 
fit to give power of that character to subordinate Courts. The express provisions of 
section 228 (of the Indian Penal Code) set forth the contempt of inferior courts which 
are punishable under the Code and it was subsequently held that contempts, which 
would be certainly contempts of a Court of record, if they do not come within the 
provisions of section 228 or any other section, cannot be punished as offences of the 
character of contempt of Court. And it was further held that the High Courts of record 
cannot punish contempts of the inferior Courts. Subsequently the Contempt of Court 
Act (of 1926) was passed, which enabled the superior Courts to punish contempts of the 
inferior courts, notwithstanding that such contempt as is complained of is not an 
offence (as contempt) against any of the sections of the Indian Penal Code and the 
object is that as to contempts considered as contempts of the Court which are punish-
able by the Indian Penal Code they shall not be taken cognizance of by the High 
Court." 
,
* idem at p. 141 
*· Surendranath Banerjea v. The Chief Justice and the Judges of the High Court of 
Bengal, (1883) 10 Indian Appeals 171 
»» B. R. Reddy v. State of Madras, 1952 S.C.J. 137 at 141 
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to the aggrieved judicial officer under section 499 of the Penal Code. 
In another case31 where the members of the executive committee of 
a Bar Association passed a resolution making allegations against two 
judicial officers and communicated it with a covering letter marked 
"confidential" to the official superiors of the officers concerned, the 
Supreme Court held that it could not be said that in ventilating their 
grievances they exceeded the limits of fair criticism. Even assuming 
that the portion of the resolution describing the officers as "thoroughly 
incompetent in law and whose judicial work did not inspire confidence" 
was defamatory, the contempt, if any, must be held, in the Court's 
view, to be of a technical character. 
Mukerjea, J. (as he then was), delivering the opinion of the Court 
made the following observations : 
"... there are two primary considerations which should weigh with 
the Court when it is called upon to exercise the summary powers in 
cases of contempt committed by scandalising the Court itself. In the 
first place, the reflection on the conduct or character of a judge in 
reference to the discharge of his judicial duties would not be contempt, 
if such reflection is made in the exercise of the right of fair and reason-
able criticism which every citizen possesses in respect of public acts 
done in the seat of justice. It is not in stifling criticism that confidence 
in Courts can be created... 
"In the second place, when attacks or comments are made on a judge 
or judges, disparaging in character and derogatory to their dignity, 
care should be taken to distinguish between what is libel on the judge 
and what amounts really to contempt of Court. The fact that a state-
ment is defamatory so far as the judge is concerned does not neces-
sarily make it a contempt."32 
It may be mentioned in passing that the Supreme Court has held 
that the Commissioner appointed under the Public Servants (Inquiries) 
Act, 1850, is not a Court within the meaning of section 3 of the Con-
tempt of Court Act, as he is a mere fact-finding authority and the 
report of his findings is merely the expression of his opinion and not a 
definitive judgement or a judicial pronouncement in as much as it is 
not binding and authoritative and lacks finality.33 
11
 Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh. 1953 S.C.J. 521 
*· idem, pp. 525-26 
** Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, 1956 S.C.J. 155 
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(b) Provisions in the Penal Code 
There are a few provisions in the Indian Penal Code dealing with 
contempt of the lawful authority of public servants, including judicial 
officers. Section 228 is exclusively concerned with contempt of judicial 
officers. It provides: 
Whoever intentionally offers any insult, or causes any interruption to any 
public servant, while such public servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial 
proceeding, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may 
extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, 
or with both. 
It has been held that the whole sitting of a Court for the disposal of 
judicial work from the opening to the rising of the Court is a judicial 
proceeding, and the necessary interval between the conclusion of one 
case and the opening of another is a stage in a judicial proceeding.34 
A number of offences punishable under the Code as contempt are set 
forth in Chapter X of the Penal Code entitled "Of contempts of lawful 
authority of public servants." Contempts of the lawful authority of 
courts of law, of revenue officers, of police officers and of other public 
servants are punishable under the various sections of this chapter. It 
may be mentioned that the powers under this chapter are in addition 
to the powers possessed by judges and other public servants to enforce 
their orders. 
The more notable among these offences are those contained in sec-
tions 175, 178, 179 and 180. Section 175 penalises intentional omission 
to produce or deliver up to any public servant as such, or a Court of 
Justice, any document when legally bound to produce or deliver up 
such document. Section 178 provides for the punishment of any person 
who refuses to bind himself by an oath or affirmation to state the 
truth, when duly required so to bind himself by a public servant. The 
next section lays down punishment for any person who, being legally 
bound to state the truth on any subject, refuses to answer a public 
servant authorised to question on the subject. Section 180 declares that 
whoever refuses to sign any statement made by him when duly required 
to sign it by a public servant is liable to be punished. 
(c) Provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure 
Section 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, provides that 
when any such offence as is described in sections 175, 178, 179, 180 and 
288 of the Penal Code 
· · Emperor v. Salig Ram, (1898) 1 Weir 214 
CONTEMPT OF COURT AND OF LEGISLATURE 89 
is committed in the view or presence of any Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court, 
the Court may cause the ofiender to be detained in custody and at any time 
before the rising of the Court on the same day may, if it thinks fit, take cogni-
zance of the offence and sentence the ofiender to fine not exceeding two hundred 
rupees, and in default of payment, to simple imprisonment for a term which may 
extend to one month, unless such fine be sooner paid. 
The section enables the Court to resort to a summary remedy in 
cases of contempt offered to it in the view or in the presence of the 
Court. I t is not obliged to hear any evidence. I t can rely on its own 
opinion of what took place and can detain the offender in custody, take 
cognizance of the offence and sentence him. 
The words "take cognizance" indicate that Civil and Revenue Courts 
are given additional powers to deal with offences falling under the 
sections of the Penal Code mentioned above.35 
It is provided by section 481 that the remedy laid down in section 
480 being of a summary nature, the record of the Court concerning the 
procedure should be in detail. The Court should record the facts consti-
tuting the offence, with the statement, if any, made by the offender, 
as well as the finding and the sentence. If the offence is one under 
section 228 of the Penal Code the record must further show the nature 
and stage of the judicial proceeding in which the Court was interrupted 
or insulted, and the nature of the interruption or the insult. 
Section 482 makes provision for trial where a Court considers that 
an offence referred to in section 480 need not be tried summarily by it 
or requiries a heavier sentence. In such cases, the Court can, after 
recording the facts and the statement of the accused, forward the case 
to a Magistrate for trial in the ordinary way. 
Even after the procedure prescribed either by section 480 or section 
482 has been followed, the Court may, in its discretion, discharge the 
offender, or remit punishment on his submission to the Court order or 
on his apologising to the satisfaction of the Court.38 
Section 485 provides for imprisonment or committal of persons for 
refusal to answer questions or produce documents. If a witness or a 
person called to produce a document or thing refuses either to answer 
questions or produce the document or thing, a Criminal Court may, for 
reasons to be recorded in writing, proceed summarily against him by 
sentencing him to simple imprisonment or by detaining him in the 
custody of an officer of the Court for a period of seven days. If the 
person relents in the meantime, he is to be set free; but if he persists, 
'« Emperor v. Venkatrao (1922) I.L.R. 46 Bombay 973 
M
 Section 184 
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he may be dealt with under the provisions of section 480 or section 482. 
If the Court is a High Court, the offender will be deemed guilty of 
contempt of Court. 
Section 486 makes provision for appeals in certain contempt cases. 
It enacts that any person sentenced by any Court under section 480 
or section 485 may appeal to the Court to which decrees or orders made 
in such Court are ordinarily appealable. 
Under section 195 cognizance of the offences mentioned above, 
among some others, is to be taken only upon complaint in writing by 
the Court or the public servant concerned. This section was enacted to 
prevent improper or reckless prosecutions by private persons for offences 
in connection with the administration of justice and those relating to 
the contempt of lawful authority of a pubhc servant. 
Section 487 provides another safeguard for the offender. It enacts 
in part : 
"487(1). Except as provided in sections 480 and 485, no Judge of a 
Criminal Court or Magistrate, other than a Judge of a High Court, 
shall try any person for any offence referred to in section 195, when 
such offence is committed before himself or in contempt of his au-
thority, or is brought under his notice as such Judge or Magistrate, in 
the course of a judicial proceeding."37 
The prohibition under the section has been interpreted by the 
Madras High Court as "a personal prohibition, the mischief to be 
prevented being that the same person should not decide a matter 
which he may have already prejudged."38 
It is of interest to examine in some detail the procedure adopted in 
contempt cases, as in most of them, especially those involving contempt 
of superior courts, the trial judge appears to be not only the judge, but 
also prosecutor, witness and jury. 
(iv) PROCEDURE IN CONTEMPT CASES 
The Courts have held that proceedings in contempt, though not 
criminal, are of a quasi-criminal nature39 and that therefore in the 
case of criminal contempt, if there is any reasonable doubt, the person 
charged with contempt is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. In cases 
*' It is, however, provided by sub-section (2) that a Magistrate empowered to commit 
to the Court of Session or High Court from himself can commit any case to such Court. 
« Anon. (1877) I.L.R., I Madras 305 
·» Weston v. Editor, Printer and Publisher of "the Bengalee", (1911) IS C.W.N. 771; 
N. N. Choudhuri v. Bela Bala Devi, A.I.R. 1952 Calcutta 702. 
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of what is known as civil contempt (that is, where the contempt 
charged with consists in a breach of an order of the Court), the Calcutta 
High Court has held that, as the liberty of the subject is involved, the 
Court has to be satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the notice 
of the Court's order had been received before the acts complained of 
were committed. 4 0 
But difficulties may arise because of two factors associated with 
contempt proceedings. One is the fact that the proceedings are gener­
ally summary. The second is that the trial judge is judge, prosecutor, 
witness and jury in these proceedings. 
The Supreme Court has held that the power of the High Court to 
institute proceedings for contempt and punish where necessary is a 
"special jurisdiction" which is inherent in all Courts of record and that 
the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply in matters of contempt 
triable by the High Court.4 1 "The High Court can deal with it summa­
rily and adopt its own procedure. ΑΠ that is necessary is that the 
procedure is fair and that the contemner is made aware of the charge 
against him and given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend 
himself."42 In Sukhdev Singh Sodhi's case43 a petition asking for the 
transfer of certain contempt proceedings from the Pepsu High Court 
to any other High Court, and in the alternative, asking that at least 
the matter should not be heard by two of the Judges of the High Court 
who were named, was dismissed on the ground that the Supreme Court 
had no power to gгaлt the appHcation. If the Code of Criminal Pro­
cedure does not apply, the Supreme Court has no power to transfer the 
proceedings for contempt from one High Court to another. Further, as 
the Constitution, by Article 215, confers on every High Court the 
power to punish contempt of itself, neither the Supreme Court nor the 
Legislature has any power to deprive a High Court of that consti­
tutional power by ordering a transfer of contempt proceedings to 
another High Court. As to transfer from one judge to another judge, 
the Supreme Court has held that there is no original jurisdiction that 
it can exercise. 
Bose, J., (as he then was) delivering the opinion of the Court, how­
ever, commented: 
4 0
 N. N. Choudhuri v. Bela Bala Devi, A.I.R. 1952 Calcutta 702 
4 1
 Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. Chief Justice and Judges of the Pepsu High Court, 1954 
S.C.J. 67 
4 S
 idem p . 72 
" Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. Chief Justice and Judges of the Pepsu High Court, 1954 
S.C.J. 67 
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"We wish... to add that though we have no power to order a transfer 
in an original petition of this kind we consider it desirable on general 
principles of justice that a judge who has been personally attacked 
should not as far as possible hear a contempt matter which, to that 
extent, concerns him personally. We do not lay down any general rule 
because there may be cases where that is impossible, as for example, 
in a Court where there is only one judge or two and both are attacked. 
Other cases may also arise where it is more convenient and proper for 
the judge to deal with the matter himself, as for example in a contempt 
in facie curiae. All we can say is that this must be left to the good 
sense of the judges themselves, who, we are confident, will comport 
themselves with that dispassionate dignity and decorum which befits 
their high office and will bear in mind the oft-quoted maxim that 
justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done by all con-
cerned and most particularly by an accused person who should always 
be given, as far as that is humanly possible, a feeling of confidence that 
he will receive a fair, just and impartial trial by judges who have no 
personal interest or concern in his case."44 
Commenting on contempt proceedings, the Press Commission of 
India said : 
"Some of the peculiar features of this jurisdiction are contrary to the 
fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence. There never has been 
any suggestion or attempt on the part of the judges and jurists to 
propound that the exercise of the special jurisdiction is in harmony or 
in conformity with the well-established rules of British criminal juris-
prudence. But the exercise of this extraordinary power has been justi-
fied on the grounds of expediency."45 
Quoting with approval, among many others, Bowen, L. J., who said, 
"The law has armed the High Court of Justice with the power and 
imposed on it the duty of preventing brevi manu, i.e., by summary 
proceedings, any attempt to interfere with the administration of justice. 
It is on that ground and not on any exaggerated notion of the dignity 
of individuals, that insults to judges are not allowed. It is on the same 
ground that insults to witnesses or to jurymen are not allowed.",46 the 
Commission came to the conclusion that "... instances where it could 
be suggested that the jurisdiction has been arbitrarily or capriciously 
exercised have been extremely rare, and we do not think that any 
" idem at p. 73 
" Press Commission, Report, Part I, paragraph 1078 
» In re Johnson, (188)7 20 Q.B. 62 at 74 
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change is called for either in the procedure or practice of the contempt 
of Court jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts."47 
In this connection it is of interest to note what Sir Sultan Ahmad 
said in March 1942 when speaking on behalf of the Government of 
India, in the Council of State, on a resolution moved by Mr H. N. 
Kunzru, to amend and consolidate the law of contempt of Court. He 
said: "While I find in certain sections of the Criminal Procedure Code 
that a Magistrate who has a personal interest in any ordinary trivial 
case even is disquahfied to try it, it does seem a little odd that in a 
case where he himself has been scandahsed, he should himself as a 
judge try that case."48 When contempt was committed in the presence 
of the Court, Sir Sultan admitted, it must be dealt with by the Judge 
in whose Court the offence was committed. 
In the course of his speech supporting the resolution, Mr P. N. Sapru 
(as he then was)49 made the following suggestions: 
"We are all human. We cannot help our subconscious processes. 
And when our interests are involved we are inclined to lose a proper 
sense of values and there is at times a tendency particularly on the 
part of the subordinate judiciary to lose sight of these elemental facts 
of human nature. Therefore I would suggest for the consideration of 
the Law Member that the law should be revised in this manner that 
the Judge who has been scandalised should not himself sit in his own 
cause."50 
It is interesting to find that the power of the Federal Courts in the 
United States to punish for contempt by summary proceedings has 
been confined by Congress to "misbehaviour of any person in their 
presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice." 
The argument that an accuser ought not to be judge in his own cause 
was advanced in Nye v. (7.S.51 for restricting the power of the Federal 
judges to punish summarily for contempt for such misbehaviour. The 
words "in their presence or so near thereto as to obstruct" were con-
strued narrowly, as the terms employed were held to be geographical. 
The Courts may punish acts not within those terms. But then they 
should follow the usual pattern of criminal procedure, indictment, jury 
trial and trial before an impartial, disinterested judge. 
Judges have repeatedly emphasised the necessity for contempt juris-
*' Press Commission, Report, Par t I, paragraph 1089 
«« quoted in K. L. Gauba, Battles at the Bar, p. 208 
49
 Later he became a Judge of the High Court at Allahabad 
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 quoted in K. L. Gauba, Battles at the Bar, p . 207 
" 313 U.S. 33 
94 CONTEMPT OF COURT AND OF LEGISLATURE 
diction, with aü that it it involves. For example, the Privy Council 
said: 
"... this summary power of punishing for contempt... is a power 
which a Court must of necessity possess."52 It is illuminating to read 
in this connection Edmonds, J.'s comment on this summary juris-
diction.53 He wrote : 
"The notion that contumacious publications have been subject to 
the summary power from time immemorial has been shown to be 
historically incorrect. Also, the experience of Pennsylvania and other 
jurisdictions where immunity of the press has long been maintained, 
conclusively proves that no such power is necessary to maintain either 
the existence or the respect for Courts. 
"It is not necessary to the wholesome administration of justice in 
this state that judicial officers have uncontrolled discretion in passing 
upon alleged constructive contempts of Court. The opportumty for 
arbitrary punishment often provides the occasion for it. Noise, inter-
ruptions, violence of any kind in the course of judicial proceedings 
must be repressed... but indirect contempts, particularly publication 
in newspapers, are entirely different in their nature and consequences."64 
If the law of constructive contempt of Court, as administered in 
India today, is challenged on the ground that reasonableness under 
Article 19(2) is required not only in the substantive provisions of the 
impugned law but also in the procedural provisions,66 the Courts may 
take the view that the power to punish for contempt is granted to the 
Supreme Court and the High Courts by the Constitution and that 
from the case law prior to the Constitution, the founding fathers knew 
exactly what was being granted when provision was made for the 
exercise of this power. 
(v) CONTEMPT OF LEGISLATURE 
Contempt of legislature is not one of the categories of subjects 
mentioned in Article 19(2) in relation to which reasonable legislative 
restrictions are permissible. Does this mean that absolute freedom is 
·* Parashuram Detaram v. Emperor, (1945) 72 Indian Appeals 189 
** This opinion was expressed in a case involving contempt proceedings against a 
labour leader for releasing to the press a copy of a telegram he sent to the Secretary 
of Labour protesting against a court decision favourable to a rival union. 
M
 quoted in C. D. MacDougall, Newsroom Problems and Policies, p . 305 
» N. B. Khare v. State of Delhi, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 211 
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granted under the Constitution in regard to reports of proceedings of 
legislatures in India when such reports do not violate any of the laws 
falling within the purview of the sub-clause? The answer would appear 
to be in the affirmative, if Article 19(2) is deemed to exhaust the cate­
gories of permissible legislative abridgement. It is submitted with 
great respect that whether the list of categories should be regarded as 
exhaustive, is a point deserving further consideration.550 Another point 
is that Articles 105 and 194 do contemplate the grant of certain powers 
and privileges to the legislatures. These powers, one of which appears 
to be the power to prohibit the publication of its proceedings, may 
come in conflict with the fundamental right of the citizen to freedom 
of speech and expression. The Supreme Court had to deal with this 
issue in M. S. M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha.6a Before we discuss 
the Supreme Court decision, it may be helpful to set out the provisions 
of Article 105 and Article 194. Article 105 provides: 
105. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and 
standing orders regulating the procedure of Parliament, there shall be freedom 
of speech in Parliament. 
(2) No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court 
in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any com­
mittee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by 
or under the authority of either House of Parhament of any report, paper, votes 
or proceedings. 
(3) In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of each House 
of Parliament, and of the members and the committees of each House shall be 
such as may from time to time be defined by Parliament by law, and, until so 
defined, shall be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the commencement of this 
Constitution. 
(4) The provisions of clauses (1), (2) and (3) shall apply in relation to persons 
who by virtue of this Constitution have the right to speak in, and otherwise to 
take part in the proceedings of, a House of Parhament or any committee thereof 
as they apply in relation to members of Parliament. 
Article 194 in identical terms makes similar provisions in relation to 
State legislatures. 
The Indian Parliament has, to a certain extent, exercised its powers 
under Article 105(3) and passed the Parliamentary Proceedings (Pro­
tection of Publication) Act, 1956. The Act provides that no person shall 
be liable to any proceedings, civil or criminal, in any court in respect 
of the publication of a substantially true report of any proceedings of 
either House of Parhament, unless the publication is proved to have 
5 И
 See infra, Chapter VII 
" 1959 S.C.J. 925 
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been made with malice.67 This provision, however, does not protect 
the publication of any matter, the publication of which is not for the 
public good.58 
The State legislatures do not appear to have made any law under 
the provisions of Article 194. It would therefore appear that as long 
as they do not define their powers and privileges, they may enjoy 
greater powers and privileges than the Parliament, assuming that the 
House of Commons had on January 26, 1950, greater powers and 
privileges in relation to publication of its proceedings than are assumed 
by the Indian Parliament under the Parliamentary Proceedings Act, 
1956. 
The power of the State legislatures to prohibit publication of their 
proceedings was considered by the Supreme Court in M. S. M. Sharma 
v. Sri Krishna Sharma,59 usually referred to as the Searchlight case. 
The facts of the case were that the editor of the Searchlight pubhshed 
in his newspaper an account of a speech made by a member of the 
Bihar Legislative Assembly on the floor of the House, including the 
portions of the speech which the Speaker had ordered to be expunged. 
The Privileges Committee of the Assembly issued a notice to the editor 
to show cause why appropriate action should not be taken against him 
for breach of privilege in respect of the Speaker and the Assembly 
itself committed by publishing a "perverted and unfaithful" report of 
the proceedings of the Assembly, including the expunged portions of 
a member's speech. The editor challenged the validity of the notice 
before the Supreme Court. It may be mentioned that it was not denied 
that what was reported in the Searchlight was actually said in the 
House ; and no malice was pleaded or proved. 
The question of law involved in the case was whether the powers and 
privileges of the legislatures exercisable under the latter part of clause 
(3) of Article 194 were subject to the fundamental rights guaranteed 
by the Constitution. Assuming that the House of Commons had on 
January 26, 1950 the power to prohibit absolutely the publication of 
its own proceedings, had a House of a State legislature in India under 
the provisions of sub-clause (3) power to order similar prohibition or 
were its powers in this regard limited by Article 19(1) (a) which 
guarantees to the citizen the right to freedom of speech and expression, 
including freedom of publication and circulation? The majority opinion 
«' Section 3(1) 
·» Section 3 (2) 
" 1959 S.C.J. 925 
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of the Supreme Court was to the effect that the State legislatures had 
the power of prohibiting absolutely the publication of their proceedings 
on the ground that Article 194(3) was not to be read as subject to 
Article 19(1) (a). Das, С J., dehvering the opinion of the majority 
said: "It must not be overlooked that the provisions of Article 105(3) 
and Article 194(3) are constitutional laws and not ordinary laws made 
by Parliament or the State Legislatures and that, therefore, they are 
as supreme as the provisions of Part I I I " 6 0 He quoted with approval 
the observations of Venkatarama Ayyar, J., in Anantha Knshnan v. 
State of Madras*1 to the effect that Article 13е2 "applies in terms only 
to laws in force before the commencement of the Constitution and to 
laws to be enacted by the States, that is, in future. It is only those two 
classes of laws that are declared void as against the provisions of Part 
III. It does not apply to the Constitution itself. It does not enact that 
the other portions of the Constitution should be void as against the 
provisions m Part III and it would be surprising if it did, seeing that 
all of them are parts of one organic whole. Article 13, therefore, cannot 
be read so as to render any portion of the Constitution invahd." 
and he proceeded to observe : 
"Article 19(1) (a) and Article 194(3) have to be reconciled and the 
only way of reconciling the same is to read Article 19(1) (a) as subject 
to the latter part of Article 194(3) .. In our judgement the principle 
of harmonious construction must be adopted and so construed, the 
provisions of Article 19(1) (a) which are general, must yield to Article 
194(1) and the latter part of its clause (3) which are special."вэ 
The learned Chief Justice referred to the decision of the Court in the 
Blitz case64 in which it had been held that an arrest made in pursuance 
of an order of the U.P. Legislature was subject to the fundamental right 
embodied in Article 22(2) which required that an arrested person should 
be produced before a Magistrate within twentyfour hours and no 
further detention was permissible without the authority of the Magis-
, 0
 idem at ρ 943 
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 1952 S С J. 203 
"
a
 Article 13 which forms part of Part I I I of the Constitution, dealing with funda­
mental rights, provides in par t : 
13 "(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights 
conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the 
extent of the contravention, be void 
(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires, - (a) "law" includes any 
Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the 
territory of India the force of law. " 
·» M. S M Sharma ν Srt Krishna Sharma, 1959 S C.J. 925 a t 944 
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trate. Though the question was not elaborately considered by the 
Court, this decision might indicate that Article 194 is to be regarded 
as subject to Part III of the Constitution. But Das, С J., said that the 
decision "proceeded entirely on a concession of counsel and cannot be 
regarded as a considered opinion on the subject."65 
It is not contended that Article 194 is not valid. It is admitted that 
until the legislature defines its powers, privileges and immunities, they 
"shall be those of the House of Commons of the Parhament of the 
United Kingdom." But in the exercise of these powers and privileges, 
there is bound to be a difference between the Indian legislatures and 
the House of Commons, as their exercise by the Indian legislatures 
would appear to attract the operation of Article 13. For instance, the 
order of the Speaker of an Indian legislature committing a person to 
imprisonment is "law" under Article 13, a law made after the adoption 
of the Constitution. So if that order violates any of the fundamental 
rights, it would seem that it is to be considered invahd. 
This interpretation would harmonise the provisions in the two parts 
of Articles 105(3) and 194(3). It would also bring them into harmony 
with the provisions in Part III. If the founding fathers thought that 
a law defining the powers and privileges of the legislature should be 
subject to the fundamental rights of the citizens, it is reasonable to 
assume that they wished that the exercise of the powers and privileges 
also should be subject to those rights. 
Das, С J., in the course of his judgement, made the observation: 
"... quite conceivably our Constitution-makers, not knowing what 
powers, privileges and immunities Parliament or the Legislature of a 
State may arrogate and claim for its Houses, members or committees, 
thought fit not to take any risk and accordingly made such laws subject 
to the provisions of Article 13, but that knowing and being satisfied 
with the reasonableness of the powers, privileges and immunities of 
the House of Commons at the commencement of the Constitution, they 
did not, in their wisdom, think fit to make such powers, privileges and 
immunities subject to the fundamental right conferred by Article 19 
(1) (a)."ee One is inclined to wonder why, if that be the case, they 
thought fit to enact the former part of Article 105(3) or Article 194(3). 
They could have simply enacted under clause (3) that "In other re­
spects, the powers, privileges and immunities of each House of Parlia­
ment (or State Legislature), and of the members and committees of 
·» M. S. M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, 1959 S.C.J. 925 at 944 
и
 idem at p. 943 
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each House shall be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the 
commencement of the Constitution. 
Subba Rao, J., in his dissenting opinion made the following illumi-
nating comment : 
"When the Constitution expressly made the laws prescribing the 
privileges of legislature of a State of our country subject to the funda­
mental rights, there is no apparent reason why they should have 
omitted that limitation in the case of the privileges of the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom in their application to a State Legislature... 
The contention also, if accepted, would lead to the anomaly of a law 
providing for privileges made by Parliament or a Legislature of our 
country being struck down as infringing the fundamental rights, while 
the same privilege or privileges, if no law was made, would be valid."67 
In the majority opinion Das, С J., attempted to meet these ob­
jections by observing: 
"It is true that a law made by Parliament in pursuance of the earlier 
part of Article 105(3) or by the State Legislature in pursuance of the 
earlier part of 194(3)... if such law takes away or abridges any of the 
fundamental rights... will contravene the peremptory provisions of 
Article 13(2) and will be void to the extent of such contravention and 
it may well be that that is precisely the reason why our Parliament and 
the State Legislature have not made any law defining the powers, 
privileges and immunities just as the Australian Parliament had not 
made any under section 49 of the Constitution corresponding to Article 
194(3) up to 1955... It does not, however, follow that if powers, privi­
leges or immunities conferred by the latter part of these Articles are 
repugnant to the fundamental rights, they must also be void to the 
extent of such repugnancy."*8 
Are we justified in assuming that when they enacted the second part 
of these clauses the Constitution-makers in their wisdom did not know 
that power tends to perpetuate itself? Is it again reasonable to assume 
that the Constitution-makers who provided that a law made (in most 
cases) by two Houses of the Legislature and assented to by the Head 
of the State should not be repugnant to any of the fundamental rights, 
would contemplate the same fundamental rights being encroached 
upon and infringed by a single House of the Legislature? Did they 
contemplate that the freedom of expression guaranteed to the citizen 
" idem at p. 955 
•· idem at p. 943 
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by the Constitution might be whisked away by a mere resolution 
adopted by a simple majority of a House of Legislature, which might 
be inclined to assume an exaggerated notion of its dignity or decorum?ββ 
It is inconceivable that the founding fathers ever contemplated that 
the right to freedom of expression should be made subject to the fiat 
of a single House of Legislature, regardless of whether the fiat is 
covered by any of the permissible legislative restrictions enunciated 
in Article 19(2). If contempt of legislature is permitted to run amok,69 
any newspaperman who publishes a report of the proceedings of a 
House of Legislature or fair comments on them in the public interest, 
may be punished by imprisonment for contempt,70 and such imprison­
ment would prove an effective deterrent to the exercise of his right to 
freedom of speech and expression. 
The correct interpretation of clauses 2 and 3 of Articles 105 and 194 
would seem to be that the publication of proceedings, reports, papers 
or votes, authorised by the legislature is privileged, while a publication 
not so authorised (say, a newspaper report) is subject to the ordinary 
law of the land passed in conformity with Article 19(2). But under 
clause (3) it is competent for the legislatures to exempt such publi­
cation from the operation of the ordinary law by investing it with 
qualified or absolute privilege. This is what has been done by the 
Parhament by the Parliamentary Proceedings (Protection of Publi­
cation) Act, 1956. 
A harmonious interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Consti­
tution would compel us to the conclusion that an order of the Speaker 
of a House of Legislature prohibiting the publication of proceedings 
must be founded on the reasonable restrictions in Article 19(2) and 
that the powers, privileges and immunities of the House of Commons 
as applied to the Indian legislatures should be interpreted subject to 
Indian conditions and the Indian Constitution. The Press Commission 
emphasised that "It is important to remember that in England which 
has no written Constitution, the privileges of the House of Commons 
were achieved by a long process of adjustment between the three 
bodies. In India, with its written Constitution and fundamental rights 
'* After citing a number of instances of contempt proceedings in India, the Press 
Commission observed : "Some of these cases, in our opinion, disclose oversensitiveness 
on the part of legislatures to even honest criticism. When the decisions of the High 
Court and the Supreme Court are liable to be criticised without any action being taken 
for contempt of Court, there appears no reason why legislatures should claim excessive 
immunity from criticism in Press or public." [Report, Part I, paragraph 1120) 
'
0
 The decision in the Blitz case may not help him, in view of the observations of 
Das, С J., about that decision in the Searchlight case, (supra) 
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of freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution, it may not be 
wholly appropriate to adopt bodily the basic concepts of the privileges 
of the House of Commons as they developed in England and greater 
caution is, therefore, necessary in adopting them, even though permitted 
by the Constitution, and in applying them consistently with the Indian 
Constitution and conditions. There is nothing sacrosanct about the 
procedure of the House of Commons and it is not imperative that the 
House of Commons practice should be followed in every detail."71 
While expressing their considered view that it is desirable that the 
ParHament and the State Legislatures should define by legislation the 
precise powers, privileges and immunities which they possess in regard 
to contempt and the procedure for enforcing them, the Press Com-
mission observed: "The Press, as a whole, is anxious to maintain and 
enhance the dignity and prestige of our courts and legislatures and 
recognises that within the precincts of the Assembly hall the presiding 
officer's ruling is supreme and the freedom of the members absolute. 
I t is therefore all the more necessary that the legislators should respect 
the freedom of expression where it is exercised by the Press within the 
limits permitted by law, without imposing additional restrictions in 
the form of breach of privileges unless such restrictions are absolutely 
necessary to enable them to perform their undoubtedly responsible 
duties... The fact that there is no legal remedy against at least some 
of the punishments imposed by the legislature should make them all 
the more careful in exercising their powers, privileges and immunities. "72 
The Press Commission commended to the notice of the Indian 
Parliament and the State Legislatures a few of the observations made 
by the Committee of Privileges of the House of Commons in the Daily 
Mail case in April 1948. One of them which appears to be of special 
relevance in this context points out : 
"Whilst recognising that it is the duty of Parliament to intervene 
in the case of attacks which may tend to undermine public confidence 
in and support of the institution of Parliament itself... the law of 
Parliamentary privilege should not be administered in a way which 
would fetter or discourage the free expression of opinion or criticism, 
however prejudiced or exaggerated such opinions or criticisms may be, 
and that . . . the process of Parliamentary investigation should not be 
used in a way which would give importance to irresponsible state-
ments."73 
71
 Press Commission, Report, Par t I, paragraph 1093 
** idem, paragraph 1120 




"Good name in man and woman, dear my lord," wrote Shakespeare, 
"Is the immediate jewel of their souls; 
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;... 
But he that filches from me my good name... makes me poor indeed." 
The Bhagavad Gita expressed the idea even more emphatically 
when it said, "For a man of honour defamation is worse than death." 
As it is thus considered a great evil, provision for reasonable legislative 
abridgement of the right of freedom of speech and expression in re-
lation to defamation is made in Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution. 
Defamation, when viewed as a civil wrong, may be defined as the 
publication by the defendant to a third party of a false statement 
which tends to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking 
members of the society generally or which causes him to be shunned 
or avoided by such members. It is thus essentially an injury to repu-
tation. Prosser describes it as "an invasion of the interest in reputation 
and good name."1 In the law of defamation social interest in freedom 
of expression is subordinated to the private interest of the person 
affected. 
EngUsh law distinguishes between libel and slander. A defamatory 
statement is libel if made in some permanent and visible form, such as 
printing, writing or carving; it is slander if spoken or conveyed in some 
fugitive form such as, for example, gestures. Reading out a letter has 
been held to be übel, not slander.2 Defamation by broadcasting for 
general reception is übel.8 Libel gives rise to a cause of action without 
the necessity of proving actual damage. In slander, on the other hand, 
actual damage has to be proved, save in a few exceptional cases. The 
exceptions relate to (i) imputation of criminal offence which is not 
punishable by fine alone, (ii) imputation that the plaintiff is suffering 
1
 Presser, Torts, (2nd Ed.) p. 572 
• Forrester v. Tyrell (1893) 9 T.L.R. 257 
* The Defamation Act, 1952, section I 
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from an existing contagious disease of such a nature as to necessitate 
his exclusion from society, (in) imputation of unchastity or adultery 
against a female, and (iv) statement made by the defendant which is cal­
culated to disparage the plaintiff in any office, profession, calling, trade 
or business held or carried on by him at the time of publication. If the 
publication of the same defamatory statement is made in the form of 
libel as well as slander there are two distinct wrongs and two separate 
causes of action. 
English criminal law judges a defamatory statement from its tenden­
cy to provoke a breach of the peace. 
In India civil liability for defamation is generally determined by the 
principles of English law,4 but criminal liability is governed by the 
provisions of the Indian Penal Code and by them alone. 
(ІІ) CIVIL LIABILITY5 
At common law a man cannot recover damages in respect of injury 
to a character which he does not possess or a reputation to which he 
cannot have any reasonable claim. The truth of the imputation made 
is therefore a complete defence to an action for defamation. It is not 
that uttering the truth always carries its own justification, but that 
the law prevents the other party from getting redress which he does 
not deserve. Publication of truth concerning a person is not therefore 
actionable in damages. This rule of law may lead to the undesirable 
result of exposing to public gaze unsavoury details of private life long 
buried and forgotten. The French law strikes one as making a more 
helpful provision in that it protects a person's private life and does not 
permit truth as a defence except in matters in respect of officials and 
persons in public positions, for, in their case it is assumed that the 
truth ought to be known in the public interest. 
At common law there is complete immunity from liability not only 
in respect of defamatory statements of fact if those statements are 
true, but also in respect of defamatory statements of opinion which 
are fair comment on matters of public interest. A number of occasions 
are privileged, some absolutely privileged so that no action can lie in 
any circumstances and some have qualified privilege so that no action 
can lie without proof of malice, that is, ill-will. 
4
 In India, civil law relating to defamation is not yet codified. 
1
 It is not proposed to deal with the civil wrong of defamation in detail as the Indian 
law on the subject is not substantially different from English law. 
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If libellous matter is published in a newspaper, the proprietor, the 
editor, the printer and the publisher are all liable to be sued either 
separately or together. In cases of joint publication each defendant is 
liable for all the consequent damage. The proprietor is civilly hable 
for any libel published in the columns of his newspaper though the 
publication is made in his absence, without his knowledge, or even 
contrary to his orders.8 
The sale of each copy of a newspaper containing a libel is prima facie 
publication of the libel, rendering the distributor as well as the princi­
pal responsible for it. But the distributor is excused if he can prove (i) 
that he did not know that it contained any Hbel, (ii) that his ignorance 
was not due to any negligence on his part and (iii) that he did not know, 
and had no ground for supposing, that the newspaper was likely to 
contain libellous matter.7 
It would appear that at common law the publication of one defama­
tory statement may be sued upon by several persons, even though 
none of them was actually in the defendant's mind. In an AustraHan 
case, a newspaper published defamatory statements about a "De­
tective Lee," under circumstances which it considered privileged. 
When the defence of privilege failed, the newspaper was held hable to 
a number of "Detective Lees" who showed that the statement could 
be taken to refer to any one of them.8 
The effective guarantee of freedom of expression under English law 
lies in the fact that the principal matters (for instance, the question 
of "libel or no hbel") are determined by the jury, both in civil and 
criminal cases involving defamation. 
(ІІІ) CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
The definition of the offence of defamation adopted in the Indian 
Penal Code does not maintain the artificial distinction of the common 
law between libel and slander; nor does it postulate that the essence of 
the offence consists in its tendency to provoke a breach of the peace. 
As the authors of the Code put it, in India "the essence of the offence 
of defamation consists in its tendency to cause that description of pain 
which is felt by a person who knows himself to be the object of the 
• Dina Nath v. Sayad Habid (1929) I.L.R. 10 Lahore 816 
' Emmens v. Pottle, (18Θ5) 16 Q.B.D. 354 
» Lee v. Argus, (1934) 51 C.L.R. 276 
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unfavourable sentiments of his fellow-creatures, and those incon-
veniences to which a person who is the object of such unfavourable 
sentiments is exposed."9 They further observed: "It appears to us 
evident that between the offence of defaming and the offence of pro-
voking to a breach of the peace, there is a distinction as broad as that 
which separates theft and murder. Defamatory imputations of the 
worst kind may have no tendency to cause acts of violence. Words 
which convey no discreditable imputation whatever may have that 
tendency in the highest degree. Even in cases where defamation has a 
tendency to cause acts of violence, the heinousness of the deformation, 
considered as defamation, is by no means proportioned to its tendency 
to cause such acts: many circumstances which are great aggravations 
of the offence, considered as defamation, may be great mitigations of 
the same offence, considered as a provocation to a breach of the peace. 
A scurrilous satire against a friendless woman, published by a person 
who carefully conceals his name, would be defamation in one of its 
most odious forms. But it would be only by a legal fiction that the 
satirist could be said to provoke a breach of the peace. On the other 
hand, an imputation on the courage of an officer contained in a private 
letter, meant to be seen only by that officer and two or three other 
persons, might, considered as defamation, be a very venial offence. But 
such an imputation would have an obvious tendency to cause a serious 
breach of the peace."10 
There is a whole chapter devoted to defamation in the Penal Code. 
Section 499 defines the offence and states the exceptional circumstances 
in which the publication of a defamatory statement is legally justified. 
Section 500 provides for punishment for defamation, which is simple 
imprisonment for a maximum period of two years or fine or both. 
Section 501 lays down the same punishment for the printing or en-
graving of any matter by any person knowing or having good reason 
to beheve that such matter is defamatory. This section makes the 
abetment of defamation a distinct offence, in as much as a person who 
prints or engraves defamatory matter abets the offence. Section 502 
declares it an offence to sell or offer for sale any printed or engraved 
substance containing defamatory matter and visits the offender with 
the same punishment as for the aforementioned offences. 
We shall consider in some detail section 499 which provides : 
• Notes appended to the Draft Penal Code, 1836, p. 175 
10
 idem. pp. 175-176 
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Whoever by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by 
visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any 
person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such 
imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases 
hereinafter excepted, to defame that person. 
Explanation 1. I t may amount to defamation to impute anything to a de-
ceased person, if the imputation would harm the reputation of that person if 
living, and is intended to be hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near 
relatives. 
Explanation 2. I t may amount to defamation to make an imputation con-
cerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such. 
Explanation 3. An imputation in the form of an alternative or expressed 
ironically, may amount to defamation. 
Explanation 4. No imputation is said to harm a person's reputation, unless 
that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the 
moral and intellectual character of that person or lowers the character of that 
person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, 
or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state, 
or in a state generally considered as disgraceful. 
The section has incorporated in it ten exceptions, covering the 
occasions when a person is allowed to publish imputations about others 
which would be considered defamatory in ordinary circumstances. 
They provide that it is not defamation 
(i) to impute anything which is true concerning any person, if it be for 
the public good that the imputation should be made or published j 1 1 
(ii) to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the con-
duct of a public servant in the discharge of his public functions, or 
respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct 
and no further ; 
(iii) to express" in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the 
conduct of any person touching any public question, and respecting 
his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no 
further; 
(iv) to publish a substantially true report of the proceedings of a Court 
of Justice, or of the result of any such proceedings ; 
(v) to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the merits 
of any case, civil or criminal, which has been decided by a Court of 
Justice, or respecting the conduct of any person as a party, witness or 
agent, in any such case, or respecting the character of such person, as 
far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further; 
(vi) to express in good faith any opinion respecting the merits of any 
performance which its author has submitted to the judgement of the 
11
 Whether or not it is for the public good is a question of fact. 
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public, or respecting the character of the author so far as his character 
appears in such performance, and no further. 
While the seventh exception covers censure passed in good faith by 
a person in authority, the eighth exempts accusation preferred in good 
faith to such person. The ninth exception provides that it is not 
defamation to make an imputation on the character of another, pro-
vided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of 
the interests of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the 
public good. The tenth and last exception declares it to be not defama-
tory to convey a caution in good faith to one person against another, 
provided that such caution be intended for the good of the person to 
whom it is conveyed, or of some person in whom that person is inter-
ested, or for the public good. 
To constitute the offence under the section, the defamatory matter 
must be pubUshed, that is, communicated to some person other than 
the person defamed.12 It is sufficient if the accused intentionally does 
an act which has the quality of communicating to a third person the 
alleged defamatory matter, as where the writer sends to an illiterate 
person a letter which is defamatory of the latter with the knowledge 
that as the recipient is illiterate, he will have to get it read to him by 
a third person.13 In Emperor v. Sukhdeo,1* a notice was issued by the 
President of a Notified Area Committee to the accused, who sent a 
reply containing defamatory allegations against the President. This 
reply was placed on the official file by the President and was read by 
the members of the Committee. I t was held that there was publication 
of the defamatory allegations; for the placing of the reply on the 
official file was not a voluntary or gratuitous act on the part of the 
President, but it was his duty to do so and the accused knew or must 
have known that the contents of his reply would necessarily be com-
municated to the members of the Committee. If a number of persons 
meet and resolve not to associate with a person for good reasons, there 
is no defamation, nor does the sending of a copy of the resolution to 
the person concerned make it defamation.15 If two persons conspire to 
draw up a document defaming a third person and leave the document 
with one of the two, there is no publication.16 The mailing of a postcard 
12
 The rule of English law that defamatory matter even if communicated only to the 
person defamed will support an indictment, provided it is likely to provoke a breach 
of the peace, is enacted in section 504 of the Code. 
13
 Emperor v. Kundanmal (1943) 45 Cr.L.J. 105 
" (1932) I.L.R. 55 All. 253 
16
 Emperor v. Nga On Thin (1921) 23 Cr.L.J. 240 
16
 Doraiswami Naidu v. Kanniappa Chetti, (1931) A.I.R. Madras 487 
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with defamatory matter written on it, it has been held, constitutes 
publication.17 
As has been observed by the Kerala High Court,170 the exceptions 
2,3 and 9 embody what is compendiously called "fair comment." They 
apply to expressions of opinion or imputation on character and not to 
assertions of fact. To justify the latter the facts must be true. Comment 
must be based on actual and not imagined conduct. Even if the accused 
person genuinely believed the imputed conduct to be real, it cannot 
be considered a valid defence. It is only the public acts of a public man 
which may lawfully be made the subject of fair comment or criticism, 
and not misconduct imputed to him by a reporter's fertile imagination. 
When the allegations of fact are in themselves defamatory and are not 
proved to be true, there can be no defence of fair comment.17* The press 
is permitted to disclose any matter which it is for the public good to 
publish, of which the editor has knowledge, even if it is defamatory 
of others, provided always that he can prove the truth of his statement. 
In Sanatati Daw v. Dasarathi Tah17e the respondent had published an 
editorial in his weekly paper criticising the management of an electric 
company in which the appellant was the managing partner. It was 
found that the allegations made in the article were substantially true. 
The Court expressed the view that there was no want of care and 
caution in the publication of the editorial, that the publication was 
made for the public good and that the respondent acted in good faith. 
Referring to the use of the expression "black marketing" in the edi-
torial in relation to the excessive profits the company made at the 
expense of the consumers, the Court observed: "It is a well-settled rule 
of interpretation that where a matter is of public interest, the Court 
ought not to weigh any comment on it in a fine scale. Some allowance 
must be made on even intemperate language provided however that 
the writer kept himself within the bounds of substantial truth and does 
not misrepresent or suppress facts. ""^ 
The editor of a journal is in no better position than an ordinary 
citizen with regard to his liability for libel. He is bound to take due 
care and proper caution before he makes a libellous statement.18 
The Rangoon High Court,19 interpreting the section has held that 
17
 Emperor v. Sankara Narasimha Bharati (1883) I.L.R. 6 Madras 381 
va
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 idem, at p. 679 
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" now in the Republic of Burma 
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a newspaper does not come within the term "person" and it is not 
therefore a criminal offence to defame a newspaper. But defamation 
of a newspaper may in certain circumstances involve defamation of 
those responsible for its publication. It might, for instance, amount to 
defamation of the person responsible for the newspaper, if it were said 
that its policy was dictated by a particular third person who was known 
to be disreputable.20 
To hold the accused guilty of the offence, it is not necessary to prove 
that the complainant actually suffered from the alleged imputation; 
it is sufficient to show that the accused intended or knew, or had reason 
to believe, that the imputation made by him would harm the reputation 
of the complainant.21 If the words used are not likely to harm the 
reputation, there is no defamation.22 
(iv) DEFAMATION OF PUBLIC SERVANTS 
A person who fills a public position is considered to render himself 
to public discussion. He must be prepared to accept an attack as a 
necessary, though unpleasant, appendage to his office.23 It is difficult 
to set down a standard of fair criticism. If the statement of facts on 
which opinions are expressed is substantially correct and the opinions 
themselves are honestly held and their expression is devoid of malice 
a wide latitude in language is permitted. 
Referring to the vulgar abuses hurled against the Chief Minister and 
the Transport Minister of the Panjab Government Bhagwati, J., said, 
"So far as the individuals were concerned, they did not take any notice 
of these vulgar abuses and appeared to have considered the whole thing 
as beneath their notice. Their conduct in this behalf was consistent 
with the best tradition of democracy... Public men in such positions 
may well think it worth their while to ignore such vulgar criticisms and 
abuses hurled against them rather than give an importance to the same 
by prosecuting the persons responsible for the same."24 
Nearly a hundred years ago a similar view was expressed by Cock-
bum, С J., when he said: "Those who fill a public position must not 
be too thin-skinned in reference to comments made upon them. It would 
m
 Emperor v. Maung Sein (1926) I.L.R. 4 Rangoon 462 
" Emperor v. Alex Pimento, (1920) A I.R. Bombay 339 
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often happen that observations would be made upon public men which 
they know from the bottom of their hearts were undeserved and 
unjust ; yet they must bear with them and submit to be misunderstood 
for a time."2 5 
(a) Section 198В of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
By the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1955, public 
servants have been afforded certain special facilities in the matter of 
instituting legal procedure in relation to alleged offences of defamation 
committed against them in respect of their conduct in the discharge of 
official duties. The amendment has added section 198B to the Code. 
The new section provides that when the offence of defamation is alleged 
to have been committed by any means other than spoken words against 
the President, the Vice-President, the Governor of a State, a Minister 
or any other public servant employed in connexion with the affairs of 
the Union or of a State, in respect of his conduct in the discharge of 
his public functions, a Court of Session may take cognizance of such 
offence, without the accused being committed to it for trial, upon a 
complaint in writing made by the Public Presecutor. The complaint 
by the Public Prosecutor has to be made in the case of alleged defama­
tion against the President, the Vice-President, or the Governor of a 
State with the previous permission of any Secretary of the Government 
authorised in this behalf, in the case of a Minister with that of the 
Secretary of the Council of Ministers, if any, or of any Secretary to the 
Government authorised in this behalf by the Government concerned, 
and in the case of any other public servant with that of the Govern­
ment concerned. 
The Court of Session will try the case without a jury. The person 
who is alleged to have been defamed will be examined as a witness for 
the prosecution, unless the Court otherwise directs for reasons to be 
recorded. 
In order to discourage vexatious or frivolous prosecution, it is pro­
vided that if the Court discharges or acquits the accused and is of the 
opinion that the accusation was false and either vexatious or frivolous, 
the Court may order the person who is alleged to have been defamed 
(other than the President, the Vice-President, or the Governor of a 
State) to show cause why he should not pay compensation to the 
accused. After considering the matter, it may order payment of com-
" Seymour v. Butlerworth (1862) 3 F & F 372 at 376-77 
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pensation up to a maximum of one thousand rupees to the accused. A 
person ordered to pay compensation will not, by reason of such order, 
be exempted from criminal or civil liability in respect of the complaint 
made against the accused. But the amount paid to the accused under 
this section will be taken into account in awarding compensation in 
any subsequent civil suit relating to the same matter. The person 
ordered to pay compensation may appeal from the order, in so far as 
the order relates to the payment of the compensation, as if he had been 
convicted in a trial held by the Court of Session. 
(b) Press Commission's Views 
The Press Commission recommended a substantially similar pro-
cedure in cases of alleged defamation of public servants. While recom-
mending it they said they looked at the problem of defamation of 
public servants "not from the point of giving a favoured treatment to 
public servants, but from the point of view of public interest." They 
thought that it would not be an unreasonable discrimination to make 
some special provision with regard to them considering their peculiar 
position.28 The Commission observed, "The dilatory procedure in the 
Courts, the inconvenience caused in having to leave their legitimate 
duties and to attend courts on the numerous days to which the case 
is adjourned, the labour involved in collecting evidence for the purpose 
of prosecution, the reckless allegations often made against them in the 
course of the cross-examination which is aimed at besmirching the 
character of the complainant in order to prove that he had no repu-
tation to lose and finally the tendency of the Courts to impose nominal 
fines - all these make it hardly worthwhile for a public servant to 
undertake such a prosecution."27 The Commission recognised that 
most of these difficulties were common to public servants and private 
persons who were defamed, except for the difficulty created by the 
Government Servants' Conduct Rules in the case of Government 
servants. But in view of the public interest involved in alleged defa-
mation of public servants, the majority of this commission recom-
mended a special procedure for them. 
The four members of the Commission who dissented from the ma-
jority in this matter expressed themselves strongly against making 
*· If they are Government Servants they are precluded by the Government Servants' 
Conduct Rules from making a rejoinder to any allegations made against them. They 
are liable to be posted anywhere in India and, for that matter, anywhere ùi the world, 
if they belong to the Foreign Service. 
*' Press Commission, Report, Par t I, paragraph 1131 
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any discrimination in favour of the public servant. They said: "It is 
in the public interest that public servants should accept the obligations 
that should be common to all citizens in cases of defamation, which is 
an offence relating to the person. Any other course would be a fetter 
on the press in the discharge of its responsibihties and would lead to 
undermining of public confidence in the administration."28 
If the difficulties encountered by public servants and private persons 
are nearly the same in the matter of instituting prosecution for defa-
mation, it would be worth while to consider the adoption of some 
procedure which would be suitable for both, thus helping to eliminate 
the charge of discrimination in favour of public servants. 
(c) Suggested Procedure 
The Pakistan Press Commission in their Report published in 1959 
have laid down in some detail a procedure which appears suitable for 
adoption. "Any defamed person" (to quote from the Report) "may 
make an apphcation to a District Magistrate that he should order the 
Public Prosecutor to file a complaint on behalf of the State in respect 
of that offence. If the District Magistrate is satisfied that an offence 
has been committed and the imputation is not trivial or common-
place, or in the case of newspaper, a contradiction has not been pub-
blished which he considers satisfactory, he may order the Public 
Prosecutor to file a complaint. He may also, if necessary, require the 
police to further investigate the complaint... When the Public Prose-
cutor has filed the complaint, the case will proceed on behalf of the 
State."29 They also suggested that neither this procedure nor the 
District Magistrate's refusal to order the Public Prosecutor to file a 
complaint should detract from the right of the defamed person to 
institute legal proceedings on his own. 
Both the Indian and the Pakistan Commissions have recommended an 
amendment to section 499 of the Penal Code by laying down that every 
person has reputation and that it is irrelevant for the purpose of the 
section whether that reputation is high or low. Such a provision, 
in their view, would serve to stop cross-examination directed merely 
to show that the person has either no reputation or that his reputa-
tion is so low that it cannot be lowered further.30 
" Press Commission, Report, Part I, paragraph 1160 
" Pakistan Press Commission, Report, p. 24 
"> Pakistan Press Commission, Report, p. 23; Indian Press Commission, Report, 
Part I, Paragraph 1137. The Patna High Court in D. Sastri v. K. B. Sahay (1953) ?" 
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It would appear that the main reason which inhibits a person from 
instituting prosecution for defamation is the discursive cross-exami­
nation aimed at establishing that the person has no reputation to lose. 
If the principle that the defamed person's reputation is irrelevant in a 
prosecution is incorporated in the section, "there will be no need in 
most cases to examine the person defamed as a witness."31 Thus many 
of the difficulties enumerated above in relation to a prosecution for 
defamation would be obviated. 
(v) SUGGESTED CHANGES IN THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 
The Press Commission recommended the adoption of the provisions 
of section 4 of the (British) Defamation Act, 1952, as a general law for 
India and not merely for application to newspapers. This section which 
concerns unintentional defamation was enacted on the recommen­
dations of the Porter Committee which expressed the view that where 
a statement defamatory of the plaintiff was published by the defendant 
who was not aware that it would be understood to refer to the plaintiff 
and was not aware of the circumstances which would make the state­
ment defamatory of him, the plaintiff's remedy should be limited to 
requiring the defendant to publish an explanation and an apology 
and if such explanation and apology were pubhshed, damages should 
not be recoverable. The section provides that a person publishing 
words alleged to be defamatory of another person and claiming 
that they were published by him innocently, may make an offer 
of amends, instead of paying damages. If the offer is accepted by 
the aggrieved party, no proceedings for libel or slander may be 
taken or continued against the offeror. If the offer is not accepted, 
it may nevertheless afford a defence in such proceedings. The offer 
must be clearly expressed to be made under this section and be 
accompanied by an affidavit of the facts relied on to show that the 
publication was innocent. It must be an offer to publish a suitable 
I L.R. 276 at 302 observed • "The fact is that everyone has reputation and the only 
question that can anse regarding it is whether it is high or low. The question is., 
irrelevant m a prosecutioi for defamation The law does not contemplate that any 
person's reputation is so low that it cannot fall lower by the publication of fresh de­
famatory matter relating to him." As the Indian High Courts are not unanimous on 
this point, an amendment by way of an additional explanation to section 499 to this 
effect has been suggested. 
.« Pakistan Press Commission, Report, ρ 24 
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correction and apology and also to notify any person to whom copies 
of the original pubUcation have been given by or with the knowledge 
of the offeror. If the offer is accepted, its fulfilment may be determined 
by the High Court, in the absence of agreement between the parties. 
PubUcation is deemed innocent only where the pubHsher, his servants, 
and his agents took all reasonable care and either did not intend to 
refer to the party aggrieved or know of circumstances suggesting a 
defamatory reference to him, or, where the words were not defamatory 
on the face of them, did not know of circumstances suggesting a defa-
matory reference to him. The section would not apply in cases where 
the author wrote the words maliciously and the onus is on the publisher 
to show that the author wrote without malice. 
Another provision of English law which deserves notice in this 
connexion is section 7(2) of the same Act. This subsection declares 
various categories privileged subject to explanation or contradiction. 
It states that in an action for libel in respect of the publication of any 
statement which is privileged subject to explanation or contradiction,32 
the defence of qualified privilege will not be considered valid, "if it is 
proved that the defendant has been requested by the plaintiff to 
publish in the newspaper in which the original pubUcation was made 
a reasonable letter or statement by way of explanation or contra-
diction, and has refused or neglected to do so, or has done so in a 
manner not adequate or not reasonable having regard to all the circum-
stances." 
These two provisions seem to be the nearest approach in EngUsh 
law to droit de réponse, which, generaUy speaking, grants the persons 
who have been attacked or have been the object of incorrect statement 
in a periodical the right to a prompt rectification or explanation. These 
provisions are very limited in their scope; section 4 deals with un-
intentional defamation only and section 7(2) is confined to reports of 
proceedings of certain public bodies and associations. Though the 
adoption of these provisions may be considered welcome, it would 
seem more desirable for the Indian legislator to lay down as part of 
the law of the land rules similar to those covered by the right to reply 
and the right to correction obtaining in many countries foUowing the 
romanist legal system. The statutes relating to these rights do vary in 
** A list of such statements is given in Par t I I of the Schedule to the Act I t enumer-
ates various categones of public bodies and associations, the reports of whose pro-
ceedings are privileged subject to explanation or contradiction Part I of the Schedule 
enumerates the categones of statements which are privileged without explanation or 
contradiction The privilege m both cases is qualified privilege. 
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their contents in different countries,33 but the main purpose served is 
generally the same. The adaptation of such provisions from these 
statutes as are found suitable to Indian conditions may unhesitatingly 
be recommended, for "the use of this particular method in no way 
encroaches upon the right to free expression but, on the contrary, 
tends to uphold it, because it increases the volume of information, 
adds to its sources, and promotes healthy controversy."34 Further, 
this has been found to be the best means of combating the diffusion of 
false information. 
If legislative recognition is given to the right of reply and that of 
correction, and if the procedure recommended by the Pakistan Press 
Commission is adopted in defamation cases, two benefits, at least, may 
accrue to the public. One is that defamatory statements in the press 
will tend to be less offensive and less frequent, as the publishers and 
editors may incline to be more careful in publishing defamatory alle-
gations for fear of legal proceedings and the obligation to publish the 
aggrieved party's reply or correction. The second is that the public 
will be afforded ample opportunity to get at the truth, by judging for 
themselves the veracity of statements in the original publication and 
in the reply. 
A provision of law on the general lines of the following may probably 
be found suitable for adoption. "The responsible editor or sub-editor 
shall insert in the periodical, in full and free of charge, replies, cor-
rections or statements by persons to whom actions, ideas or pro-
nouncements have been attributed which impugn their dignity or 
which they consider misrepresent them.35 
"The insertion of a reply, correction or statement may be refused, 
if its contents are contrary to law or public morals, if it contains 
insulting language or expressions foreign to the general tone of the 
publication, if it mentions offensively or maliciously a person not 
involved in the discussion at issue or if it has no direct bearing on the 
original article or report which provoked it.3* 
"The insertion referred to in the preceding paragraph may be made 
within three days in the case of a daily newspaper and in the issue next 
** Besides reply and correction, various expressions such as elucidation, explanation' 
declaration, answer, explanatory statement, notice, rectification, refutation, defence' 
denial, contradiction, and réplique are found in statutes reflecting, in some measure' 
the difference in contents of these rules. 
34
 F . Terrou and L. Solai, Legislation for Press, Film and Radio, p . 340 
15
 See Article 8 of the Italian law of February 8, 1948 
и
 See Article 16 of the Vaud (Switzerland) law of December 14, 1947 and Article 
27 of the Mexican Press Law of 1917. 
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following in the case of other periodicals, in the same edition, page and 
column of the periodical and in the same type as the original article or 
report was printed.35 
"The correction, reply or statement may not be of greater length 
than the article or report to which it refers. It may, however, be of 
twenty lines if the article or report is of lesser length. 
"Refusal to meet the above obligations shall be punishable with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or fine 
which may amount to one thousand rupees or with both. 
"An abstract of the sentence shall be pubhshed in the periodical. 
The Court may, if desirable, also order publication of the reply or 
correction or statement which was refused pubhcation."35 
As its effect would be more telling and immediate, such a provision 
of law, more than fear of possible legal proceedings for libel, may help 
newspapermen bear in mind the golden rule : "Write of others as you 
think they could fairly write of you." 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
In the preceding pages we have noticed the constitutional provisions 
in relation to freedom of expression in India and their application as 
envisaged in statutes and implemented in judicial decisions. While it 
may, in general, be said that the constitutional provisions are in 
keeping with the concept of freedom of the press as described in the 
Introduction,1 it may be a matter of doubt whether all the statutory 
provisions and judicial decisions are in harmony with this concept. 
In the following pages it is not intended to review the constitutional or 
legislative provisions already noticed or to re-state the views already 
expressed. The purpose of this chapter is merely to spotlight a few 
provisions which seem to call for repeal or amendment. 
It has been said that "the press is an institution developed by modern 
civilisation to present the news of the day, to foster commerce and 
industry, to inform and lead public opinion and to furnish that check 
upon government which no Constitution has ever been able to pro-
vide."2 It is in its attempts to furnish that check that the press runs 
up against governmental authority and the result is a struggle for 
freedom of expression on the part of the press against the imposition 
of restraints by government. In evidence of this, it may be seen that 
"when a regime moves toward autocracy, speech and press are among 
the first objects of restraint or control."3 
The problem of balancing liberty with order, so that neither rights 
nor powers would be abused or tend to be excessive, has been and still 
is a significant problem bristling with difficulties. As Lord John Russell 
puts it, "... whichever way the balance is overthrown, the interests of 
the community suffer and freedom itself is impaired, for a free man 
1
 An exception may be made about the provision regarding "friendly relations with 
foreign states" in Article 19 (2). 
* R. R. McCormick, quoted in C. D. Mac Dougall, Newsroom Problems and Policies, 
p. 54. 
' Commission on the Freedom of the Press in the United States, A Free and Re-
sponsible Press, p. 107. 
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ought to be able to do all that is not forbidden by the laws and to be 
enabled by those laws to do all that is not absolutely necessary for the 
welfare of society he should be restrained from doing."4 
As no civil liberty is an absolute right, the freedom of expression 
guaranteed by the Constitution of India is not an absolute but an 
ordered freedom. The question is how far it is ordered and whether 
such ordering is necessary to serve the purpose of the community. 
It is possible that the guaranteed freedom may be subject to such far-
reaching qualifications that they empty the guarantee of meaningful 
content.5 
Again, while assessing community interests, it is worth while bearing 
in mind that "there are quite a few thousand men who would rather 
have the freedom of speech than a new pair of clothes, and it is these 
that form a nation."8 
It can be asserted without fear of contradiction that freedom of the 
press in India increased rather than diminished during the years follow­
ing the achievement of independence and especially after the adoption 
of the Constitution. The Press (Objectionable Matter) Act, passed in 
1951 after the first amendment of the Constitution turned out to be 
only a temporary measure. The Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 
1956, which, according to the preamble, is intended to prevent unfair 
competition among newspapers so that newspapers may have fuller 
opportunities of freedom of expression, is of an experimental nature 
and meant to be of short duration.7 The Press and Registration of 
Books (Amendment) Act, 1955, by which a few restrictive provisions 
were inserted in the principal Act was repealed in 1960. The provision 
inserted by the amending Act of 1960 to the effect that a declaration 
in respect of a newspaper should be made before the newspaper is 
published seems to have been enacted on the basis of the recommen-
* John, Earl Russell, An Essay on the History of the English Government and the 
Constitution, in England ts Here, Ed by W L. Hanchant, ρ 131 
* for example, Article 77 of the Turkish Constitution of 1945 which provided t h a t 
the press was " t o enjoy freedom within the framework of the law " See also Article 23 
of the Constitution of Afghanistan which states· "Such publications and newspapers 
in Afghanistan as are not anti-religious are under no restrictions beyond those provided 
by the special law relating to them " 
* Chief Justice Kayam of the West Pakistan High Court in reference to the sacrifice 
of fundamental civil liberties to the gods of order and progress The Times, London, 
July 12, 1960 
' I t is to be in force for five years from September 7, 1956 I t provides, inter alia, 
that the Central Government may, from time to time, make an order providing for 
the regulation of the prices charged for newspapers m relation to their maximum or 
minimum number of pages, sizes or areas, and for the space to be allotted for adver­
tising matter in relation to other matters therein section 3 (I). 
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dations made by the АД India Newspaper Editor's Conference.8 
It is, however, possible to present a dismal picture of press freedom 
in India. Under the provision relating to "friendly relations with 
foreign states" included in Article 19(2), it would be possible to place 
substantial restraints on the discussion of the foreign policy of the 
government. Under the recently-inserted section 198B of the Criminal 
Procedure Code, it has become easy for public servants to prosecute 
newspapermen for alleged defamatory statements. I t is therefore 
probable that newspapermen may be wary in criticising public servants 
with the result that the public may be denied the opportunity of being 
informed of many facts about the public acts of public men which they 
ought to know. Under the Telegraph Act telegraphic messages may be 
intercepted in the interests of public safety. I n case the government 
are not confident that legal proceedings, if instituted against a news­
paperman in a particular case, will succeed, they can have recourse to 
the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act. I t would be hard to 
prove mala fides on the part of the government, especially if evidence 
to that effect is not permitted to be produced. I t is not unusual for 
the executive to resort to preventive detention as a line of least re-
sistence and for easy implementation of their policy, for preventive 
detention is a matter left to the discretion of the executive subject to 
certain not very effective safeguards. The courts do not propose to 
substitute their discretion for that of the executive who are in pos­
session of all material facts concerning particular cases. Further, it 
would not be difficult, in Indian conditions, to cause the postponement 
of the publication of a newspaper for a considerable time by delaying 
to authenticate a declaration required under the provisions of the 
Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867.' 
What is set out above is merely the possibility of governmental 
action, if the government choose to suppress opposition to their policy 
through the medium of the press. In practice, however, the Indian 
press can compare well with the press in many other democratic coun­
tries in its freedom from governmental interference.1 0 But the fact 
8
 See the memorandum submitted by the Conference in December 1947 (Appendix 
В in the Report of the Press Laws Enquiry Committee, ρ 43 at ρ 44 ) 
' Most Magistrates in India, while being members of the judiciary, are also executive 
officers A separation of these functions is contemplated under the directive principles 
of state policy declared in the Constitution 
1 0
 The restrictions judicially held permissible in the United States may be considered 
for purposes of comparison They may be broadly classed under the following heads · 
protection of the State from external aggression, Schenck ν United States, (1919) 249 
U S 47, protection of the State against internal disorder, Chaphnsky v. New Hampshire, 
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remains that there is a sword of Democles hanging over the press in the 
statutory provisions, if not, to any considerable extent, in the consti­
tutional provisions. One wonders whether the presence of this threat­
ening weapon is necessary or justified. It may be that its presence would 
prove an effective factor in inducing self-restraint on the part of the 
newspaperman to such an extent that he would deny himself the right 
to communicate ideas beneficial to the community rather than risk a 
probable prosecution. It may be that the average newspaperman is too 
wary, and that probably explains why there is not a multitude of 
prosecutions launched against the press. 
As has been already observed, the present position is not so much 
due to the absence of constitutional provisions safeguarding the right 
as to the considerable number and effectiveness of statutory provisions 
affecting the press. 
(І) ARTICLE 19(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION 
Most important of the provisions tending to restrict press freedom 
is the constitutional provision enshrined in Article 19(2) which permits 
reasonable legislative abridgement of the right to freedom of speech 
and expression. No one would be inclined to find fault with the founding 
fathers for incorporating that provision in the Constitution. For, as 
Daniel Webster puts it, "Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome 
restraint ; the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the more 
liberty we have."11 Montesquieu expressed a similar view when he said, 
"Liberty is a right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if a citizen 
could do what they forbid, he would no longer be possessed of liberty, 
because all his fellow-citizens would enjoy the same power."12 
One might even be justified in inclining to the view that the cate­
gories of subjects listed in the subclause are not exhaustive and that 
it would be inadvisable to treat them as exhaustive. In the course of 
the debate on the First Amendment, Premier Nehru remarked : "There 
(1942) 315 U.S. 568; or against overthrow of its orderly government by force, Cox v. 
New Hampshire, (1941) 312 U.S. 569; protection of individuals from defamation, Near 
v. Minessota, (1931) 283 U.S. 697; protection of the community against the dissemi­
nation of obscenity, Reynolds v. United States, (1887) 98 U.S. 145; protection from 
interference with the administration of justice, Bridges v. California, (1941) 341 U.S. 
252; incitement to crime. De Jonge v. Oregon, (1937) 290 U.S. 516;. What is conspicuous 
by its absence is maintenance of friendly relations with foreign states. The significant 
difference between incitement to crime and incitement to an offence may also be noted. 
» D. Webster, Works, Vol. I I , p. 393 
" Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Book I I I , Chapter 3 
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are a hundred and one restrictions that Umit individual freedom if you 
live in society. Clause (2) which covers libel, slander, morality, decency 
and the security of the State is not an exhaustive list of such restric­
tions. Others are either understood or implied."13 
In a pre-Amendment case, Teja Singh, С J., of the Pepsu High 
Court felt constrained to hold that apart from the qualifications enumer­
ated in clauses 2 to 6 of Article 19, fundamental rights were subject to 
a further qualification, namely, that the exercise of these rights by a 
citizen should not infringe the rights of others.14 
Mack, J., of the Madras High Court observed that if two funda­
mental rights came into conflict and one was sought to be extended to 
extreme, though logical, ends at the expense of the other, the Courts 
would be extremely slow to recognise and uphold such an extension 
of one fundamental right.15 While upholding most of the provisions of 
the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act 
1954, the Supreme Court seemed inclined to cling to its oft-repeated 
view that the list was exhaustive. The Court sustained the validity of 
the provisions on the ground that the Act was directed against self-
medication and that commercial advertisements intended to further 
a private individual's business had no relevance to the concept of 
freedom of the press.16 
As new situations arise, there will be occasions when the Courts may 
have to sustain laws directed towards beneficiai social goals. They will 
have to accommodate such situations by enlarging the scope of the 
given categories, as they have indicated their reluctance to add to the 
categories themselves. When situations arise that are defiant of the 
ordinary connotation of words used in the subclause and the Courts 
1 3
 J . Nehru, Speeches 1943-53 (Publications Division, Government of India) p. 504 
1 4
 Jang Bahadur Santpal ν Prtnctpal. Mohmdra College (A.I.R. 1951 Pepsu 59) 
The case involved the question whether rustication by a Principal of a student who 
circulated a handbill containing serious defamatory allegations against College au­
thorities infringed the student's fundamental right to expression of opinion The learned 
Judge observed that the t ruth of the allegations could not be a defence in a case of this 
kmd, because if the student believed that he had a genuine grievance, the proper course 
for him was to approach the higher educational authorities and the government rather 
than to bring out a handbill In these circumstances an order of the Principal rusticating 
him for one year, the Court held, was justified and did not violate the fundamental 
right of expression of opinion guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (a). 
1 5
 In re Vengan, A I R 1952 Madras 95, Mack, J , negatived the right of the members 
of the Dravida Kazhakam to picket shops in South India owned by North Indians. 
Here the right to freedom of speech squarely came in conflict with the right to reside 
and settle down in any part of India 
" It would seem that the same may be said of any of the categories mentioned 
in the subclause, for instance, defamation Compare Brennen, J. 's observations in 
Roth ν United States (354 U S 476) wherein he said, "We hold that obscenity is not 
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press " (at p. 485) 
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will prefer not to deny legislative power for the adoption of restrictive 
measures in such situations, it would appear to be gracious to say that 
the list of categories is not exhaustive, but only illustrative. If this is 
not done, it may be desirable to effect an amendment adding to the 
categories a few subjects like public health, privacy and contempt of 
legislature. It may be recollected that the founding fathers, in their 
wisdom, have provided for a process of constitutional amendment 
which is not particularly difficult. 
It would be desirable to include "public health" among the cate-
gories, so that statutes directed against publications encouraging self-
medication or other practices injurious to health may not be impugned. 
In this connexion it is of interest to note Article 16(3) of the draft 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which provides that the exer-
cise of the right to freedom of expression may be subject to certain 
restrictions, but these shall be only such as are provided by law and 
are necessary (1) for respect of the rights or reputation of others, and 
(2) for the protection of national security or of public order, or of 
public health or morals. 
Contempt of Legislature, as we have seen from our discussion of the 
Searchlight case, is a thorny problem. It would facilitate in ensuring 
and clarifying the rights of the citizen if "contempt of legislature" is 
included among the categories in Article 19(2) and the latter part of 
subclause (3) in Articles 105 and 194 is repealed by an amendment. As 
long as the list of categories is considered exhaustive, it may be argued 
that, if contempt of legislature is not included in subclause (2) of 
Article 19 and if the latter part of subclause (3) of Articles 105 and 194 
is repealed,17 a law passed by a legislature defining its powers and 
privileges should be in conformity with Article 19(2) in so far as it 
affects the freedom of expression of the citizen. As contempt of 
legislature is not one of the categories in Article 19(2), the order of the 
Speaker of a House of Legislature, for instance, prohibiting the publi-
cation of the proceedings of the House will have to be covered by any 
of the categories enumerated in the subclause. 
It would seem necessary to give recognition to the right to be left 
alone, as has been done in many States in the United States of America. 
There seems to be no protection under the present law against publi-
cations such as printing and circulating to the public the picture of 
one's deformed child or pubhshing one's name to the public as a debtor. 
17
 I t would seem that the framers of the Constitution intended this provision to be 
made use of by the legislatures for a short period only. 
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If a law directed against such revelations of privacy is passed, it has 
to be covered by any of the permissible restrictions under Article 19(2). 
It would be hard to bring under any of the enumerated categories the 
types of publications mentioned above. It would be helpful if "privacy" 
is included in the subclause. 
It is well worth remembering that if "judicial discretion is kept 
within narrow limits because the Constitution specifies with great 
particularity the circumstances in which guaranteed rights may be 
abridged, the Constitution may become ... rapidly unsuited to changing 
conditions."18 
(ІІ) THE PRESS AND REGISTRATION OF BOOKS ACT, 1867 
It would appear that there is no prohibition against prior restraints 
in the Constitution, as long as the prior restraints enforced are in 
relation to the categories of subjects mentioned in Article 19(2). The 
observations of Patanjali Sastri, J., about pre-censorship in Brij 
Bhushan's case are obiter.™ It may be that the Indian Courts following 
common law tradition would regard prior restraints including pre-
censorship as an unreasonable restriction.19 If the Courts incHne to do 
so, it would be difficult to uphold the constitutional validity of section 
5 (rule 2c) of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, which 
provides for a declaration to be made and authenticated before a news­
paper can be published.20 If the purpose of the provision is to furnish 
the government with information regarding the newspaper, that 
purpose may be more conveniently served by providing that the 
publisher of a newspaper should send in a statement containing the 
required information to a Magistrate within, say, three days after the 
publication of the first number of the newspaper.21 It is of interest in 
1 8
 S. A. de Smith, Fundamental Rights in the Commonwealth, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, January 1961, ρ 83 at 88 
" I t may be pointed out that what Patanjali Sastn, J , said in Bnj Bhushan's case 
was that pre-censorship was a restriction, not that it was an unreasonable resti iction. 
But then this was said before the First Amendment, which inserted the word "reason­
able" to qualify "restrictions" in Article 19 (2) 
a o
 The Madras High Court sustained the validity of section 3 of the Act only in In re 
G Alavandar (A I R. 1957 Madras 427) 
2 1
 Under the (British) Newspaper Libel and Registration Act, 1881, which is intended 
" to amend the law of newspaper libel and to provide for the registration of newspaper 
proprietors," no registration is necessary when a newspaper commences publication. 
Thus if a newspaper commences publication m August 1961, no registration of its 
proprietors need be made until July 1962, as the returns under the Act are to be made 
in the month of July in each year. 
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this connection to recollect the observations of Kayani, C. J., of the 
West Pakistan High Court. If the citizen, he said, "is required to fulfil 
a condition before actually expressing himself, the restraint will be of 
a preventive nature and that kind of restraint is not contemplated by 
Article 8"22 (of the abrogated Constitution of Pakistan, which corre-
sponded to Article 19 of the Indian Constitution). 
Rutledge, J., of the United States Supreme Court was forthright in 
his criticism of prior registration in relation to the constitutionally 
guaranteed freedom of speech. He said: "As a matter of principle, a 
requirement of registration in order to make a public speech would 
seem generally incompatible with an exercise of the rights of free 
speech and free assembly. Lawful public assembUes, involving no 
element of grave and immediate danger to an interest the State is 
entitled to protect, are not instruments of harm which require previous 
identification of the speakers."23 
(iii) SECTION 124A OF THE PENAL CODE 
The Press Commission of India recommended the repeal of section 
124A of the Indian Penal Code and the enactment of another section 
penalising expressions which incited persons to alter by violence the 
system of government with or without foreign aid. Until the law is 
amended on the lines indicated, it would seem that the freedom of 
criticising the government is partly safeguarded by the forbearance of 
the executive to prosecute. This would be too precarious a position for 
the citizen if a basic and precious right Hke freedom of expression is 
to be safeguarded to any extent by the patience or sufferance of the 
executive, especially because of the fact that what is constant about 
the attitude of the executive is its changeability, as the executive itself 
is subject to periodical changes in a democracy. If the law remains 
unamended and if section 124A is held constitutionally valid, a judge 
would be justified in giving it a literal interpretation. He may give 
expression to a view similar to that expressed by the Lord Chancellor 
" Mahmud Zaman v. District Magistrate, Lahore, (P.L.D. 1958 W.P. (Lahore) 651). 
Though these observations were made in relation to the provision for demanding 
security before publication enacted in the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, (re-
pealed in India) they are equally pertinent to the question of making a declaration 
before publication. 
" Thomas v. Collins, (1945) 323 U.S. 516 at p . 539, 
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in Wallace-Johnson v. The King:2* "The fact remains that it is in the 
Criminal Code of the Gold Coast Colony and not in English and 
Scottish cases that the law of sedition in the Colony is to be found. It 
must therefore be construed... free from any glosses or interpolations 
derived from any expositions, however authoritative, of the law of 
England or Scotland." One may recollect with profit the observations 
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in King Emperor v. 
Sadashiv Narayan:20 "The offence under section 124A of the Indian 
Penal Code should be construed with reference to the words used in 
that section." 
If the circumstances of the country have changed, it is for the legis­
latures to amend the provision to suit the present circumstances rather 
than for the Courts to mitigate the severity of the law by giving it a 
liberal interpretation where the purport of the words is clear and un­
ambiguous. It has been judicially observed that "A change in the 
spirit of the time cannot justify a change in a principle of law by 
judicial decision, though changes in public opinion may lead to legis­
lative interference and substantive alteration of the law."26 
(iv) SECTION 2 9 2 OF THE PENAL CODE 
It would be desirable to incorporate in section 292 of the Indian 
Penal Code the provision of law enacted in section 4(1) of the (British) 
Obscene Publications Act, 1959, which stipulates that a publication is 
not to be deemed obscene if it is justified as being for the public good 
on the ground that it is in the interests of science, literature, art or 
learning or of other objects of general concern. 
It would undoubtedly prove helpful if the press and the public would 
care to remember in this connexion what the Royal Commission on the 
Press in England observed in their report : "The failure of the press to 
keep pace with the requirements of society is attributable largely to the 
plain fact that an industry that lives by the sale of its products must 
give the public what the public will buy. A newspaper cannot, there­
fore, raise its standard above that of its public and may anticipate 
" 1940 A.C. 231 Section 326 (8) of the Criminal Code of the Gold Coast Colony (1936 
Revision) provided that "seditious words are words expressive of a seditious intention" 
and seditious intention was defined as an intention " t o bring into hatred or contempt... 
the government of the Gold Coast as by law established." 
« A.I.R. 1947 P.C. Θ2 
" Das, J., in Debt Soran v. The State, A.I.R. 1954 Patna 254 
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profit from lowering its standard in order to gain an advantage over 
a competitor. This tendency is not always resisted as firmly as the 
public interest requires. The press does not do all it might to encourage 
its public to accept or demand material of higher quality."27 
(v) SECTION 295A OF THE PENAL CODE 
It is difficult to agree with the Indian Press Commission when they 
suggest that section 295A of the Penal Code (which refers to deliber-
ately and maliciously outraging the religious feeHngs of any class of 
citizens or insulting or attempting to insult the religious beliefs of that 
class) should be limited in its operation to those cases where there is 
intention to cause violence or knowledge of likelihood of violence 
ensuing. Considering conditions in India, it would seem to be advisable 
to leave the provision as it is, because it is necessary to avoid not only 
violence, but also ill-feeling between religious communities or groups. 
While a discussion of religious tenets or practices in decent and temper-
ate language, with no malicious intent, but with a view to inducing 
conviction, improvement or correction can be permitted,28 an attempt 
to vilify or degrade a reHgion has to be brought within the purview of 
restrictive legislation.29 Such a restrictive provision, it is submitted, 
win be covered by "morality" in Article 19(2). Reviewing the events 
that led to the partition of India in 1947, it is arguable that the 
provision could be thought of as being covered by "security of the 
State" in the subclause. 
(vi) CONTEMPT OF COURT 
It is desirable to give statutory definitions of all acts of contempt 
liable to be punished. As criminal contempt is a vast uncharted terri-
tory, one cannot overlook the possibility that the contempt juris-
" Royal Commission on the Press, Report, (Cmd. 7700), pp. 176-177 
*' Blackstone said : "Contumely and contempt are what no establishment can toler-
ate ; but, on the other hand, it would not be proper to lay any restraint upon rational 
and dispassionate discussions of the rectitude and propriety of the established mode 
of worship." 4 Commentaries 51 
m
 Similar statutory provisions are found in some other countries, for example. 
Article 173 (3) of the Turkish Penal Code provides: "Every one who publishes any 
contemptuous or scurrilous matter relating to any religion or any sect of religion will 
be liable on conviction to imprisonment of not less than one and not more than six 
months." 
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diction may be extended to situations yet unknown.30 It would there­
fore appear to be necessary to define what constitutes contempt, 
especially when one accepts the principle nulla poena sine lege. It would 
again be desirable to give statutory basis to the procedural law of 
contempt. 
When Courts punish summarily for minor offences of contempt 
committed in facie curiae, there should be statutory provision to limit 
the punishment, say, to a fine of one hundred rupees or simple im­
prisonment for one month.30 Direct contempts of a more serious nature 
deserving severer punishment and all cases of constructive contempt 
should be tried in the ordinary manner and by a Judge or Court other 
than the one against whom the contempt was alleged to have been 
committed. 
Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may, in its 
discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any decision made by a 
Court in India. This provision may be regarded as sufficient to remind 
other Courts that the contempt jurisdiction should be exercised 
sparingly and in serious cases only. No other provision for appeal may, 
therefore, be necessary.31 
These remarks on the contempt jurisdiction of the Courts may be 
concluded by two quotations, the first from J. С McRuer, Chief 
Justice, Ontario, who said: 
... the law of contempt of court is not a law for the protection of judges or 
-to place them in a position of immunity from criticism. I t is a law for the pro­
tection of the freedom of individuals. Everyone in a well-ordered community is 
•entitled to the protection of a free and independent administration of justice... 
it is for the press to enlighten the public on what has been done in this branch 
of government, fairly and firmly to criticise what has been done where criticism 
appears to be warranted, but never to attempt to influence the courts of justice 
or to undermine the faith of those who live under the protection of the law and 
the impartial authority of the courts.3* 
and the second from Hugo Fischer : 
3 0
 In United States v. Dennis (1950) 183 F. 2d. 201 (U.S.C.A. 2nd Cir.) counsel for 
the defence were imprisoned for contempt of court for having, among other things, 
"persisted in making long, repetitious and unsubstantiated arguments... working in 
shifts." See also the observations of Varadachariar, J., in K. L. Gauba v. Chief Justice and 
Judges. Lahore. (1941) F.L.J. (F.C.) 33. 
3 1
 Professor Alan GledhiH remarks: "In India the right of special appeal to the 
Supreme Court should be sufficient to prevent abuse." (A. Gledhill, Contempt of Court, 
S. V.L.C. Journal, Mysore, 1960, p. 1 at p. 7) 
3
" J. С McRuer, Criminal Contempt of Court Procedure, 30 Canadian Bar Review, 
(1952), pp. 243-244. 
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A judge hearing a case must not be exposed to fears or apprehensions, litigants 
must be protected against the possibility that their case will be influenced by 
matters extraneous to the litigation in which they are engaged, and an accused 
must not be exposed to attempts to arouse public opinion against him. If this 
is the true purpose of the protection granted to the courts, the dignity of the 
court is no longer identical with the prestige of the individual judge or the bench. 
The protection is designed to ensure freedom from unlawful interference with 
the due process of law. If this is accepted, we may come to a further conclusion, 
namely, that the suppression of constructive criticism itself constitutes an inter-
ference with the due administration of justice.33 
(VÜ) CONTEMPT OF LEGISLATURE 
It may not be irrelevant to refer to the subject of contempt of legis-
lature again. It would appear to be necessary that the law or custom 
relating to contempt of legislature be subject to the fundamental rights 
set out in the Constitution. As has been observed by the Press Com-
mission, instances where legislatures have shown oversensitiveness 
have not been too rare, while cases where the misapplication of the 
law of contempt of court has been clearly evident have been few. It is 
worth bearing in mind that the majority of the members of a House of 
Legislature may not be possessed, to any remarkable degree, of a 
judicial mind, the possession of which generally makes a judge's ap-
proach to a contempt case very different from that of the legislature. 
Contempt of legislature therefore, has to be made subject to the funda-
mental rights by repealing the latter part of clause 3 in Articles 105 
and 194, if the decision in the Searchlight case continues to be the 
authoritative pronouncement about the law on the subject. 
It might tend to prevent significant abridgement of freedom of 
expression if the members of the legislatures in India recollect what 
the Attorney General of England, after having filed an information for 
an alleged libel upon the House of Commons said in stating the case 
to the jury. He said: 
This information... comes before you in consequence of an address from the 
House of Commons. This... I do not mention as in any degree to influence the 
j udgement which you are by and by to give upon your oaths ; I state it as a measure 
which they have taken thinking it in their wisdom... to be the fittest to bring 
before a jury of the country, an offender against themselves, and against their 
honour, avoiding thereby what sometimes indeed is unavoidable, but which they 
wish to avoid, whenever it can be done with propriety... the acting both as judges 
and accusers; which they must necessarily have done, had they resorted to their 
, 3
 H. Fischer, Civil and Criminal Aspects of Contempt of Court, 34 Canadian Bar 
Review (1956), p. 161. 
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powers, which are very great and very extensive, for the purpose of vindicating 
themselves against insult and contempt, but which, in the present instance, they 
have wisely forborne to exercise, thinking it better to leave the defendant to 
be dealt with by a fair and impartial jury.34 
Finally, it may be said that freedom of the press in India will be 
doubly assured as the citizen of free India develops more and more an 
instinct for liberty and for justice and a practical good sense to balance 
freedom with order, rights with responsibilities and powers with safe-
guards. Until the average citizen develops these qualities, it is for 
those at the helm of affairs in the Republic to encourage him to culti-
vate them, rather than assume the role of petty sovereigns clothed in 
a little brief authority. 
M
 R. v. Stockdale, (1788) 22 St. Tr. 238 
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STELLINGEN 
1. 
Preventive detention by the Executive in a period of normalcy is to 
be regarded as not in consonance with the concept of the rule of law. 
2. 
It is necessary to make legislative provisions in relation to declaration 
and administration of martial law. 
3. 
The Indian Courts, in their law-making function, are bound to 
follow the directive principles of state policy enunciated in Part IV 
of the Constitution, although they may not constrain the other 
organs of the State to take positive action in accordance with these 
principles. 
4. 
The ordinance-making power of the Head of the State in India, 
exercisable when the legislature is not in session, is liable to easy 
abuse, especially if it is held, as has been done in In re Veerabhadra 
(A. I. R. 1950 Madras 243), that the conduct of the President or a 
Governor in proroguing the legislature for the express purpose of 
exercising this power cannot be impugned as illegal or fraudulent. 
5. 
The rule of stare decisis may be regarded as part of the existing law 
referred to in Article 13 of the Indian Constitution, but there are 
reasonable grounds to hold that the Supreme Court of India is not 
bound by the rule, just as its predecessor, the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council, was (and is) not bound by it. 

6. 
If the President of India continues to confer titles like Bharai Ratna 
and Padma Vibhushan, it is desirable that Article 18(1) of the Indian 
Constitution, which prohibits the State from conferring any title 
other than military or academic distinction, be abrogated or suitably 
amended. 
7. 
The directive principle that the State shall take steps to separate the 
judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State 
(Article 50 of the Indian Constitution) should be implemented as 
soon as possible in all the units of the Indian Union. 
8. 
Article 16 of of the Dutch Staatsregeling of 1798 should be considered 
superior to Article 7 of the present Constitution of the Netherlands 
in that the former purports to provide for better protection to the 
citizen's right to freedom of expression by laying down a definite 
principle as a basis for any restriction on the basic right. 
JOSEPH MINATTUR 
Freedom of the Press in India 
November 10, 1961 
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